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ABSTRACT 





This dissertation studies the interchange between political theatre and postwar political 
trials. I argue that to an extraordinary extent, theatre history in this period is inextricable 
from trial history. Through close archival study of mid-century theatre productions 
including Bertolt Brecht’s 1954 production of The Caucasian Chalk Circle and the 
fifteen simultaneous premiere productions of Peter Weiss’s The Investigation in 1965, I 
show how directors and playwrights looked to legal trials in order to develop and 
articulate theories of epic and documentary theatre, and how this new theatre in turn 
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In the early spring of 1969, Hjalmar Schacht traveled from Munich to see a play at 
Vienna’s Burgtheater. Hjalmar had been looking forward to the play for a long time, and he 
spared no expense: he bought two front row tickets, one for himself and one for his daughter. 
The play, and one character in particular, mesmerized Hjalmar. At the play’s end, as he rose 
from his seat and left the theatre, all that he could think and talk about was that one character. 
Named for an American abolitionist, Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht gained fame first as the 
head of the Reichsbank, and later as one of the few acquitted defendants at the Nuremberg Trial 
of the Major War Criminals. The character on stage with whom he identified so thoroughly was 
none other than himself. The play: Trial in Nuremberg. 
Schacht was particularly honored that his role was played by the Artistic Director of the 
Burgtheater. Schacht told reporters that the Artistic Director played him wonderfully, mimicking 
him very effectively in both gesture and expression: “When you see yourself on stage, you know 
for the first time who you really are.” It is unclear what Schacht learned about himself that was 
so striking to him. It certainly did not have anything to do with his culpability for war crimes. 
While Schacht had high praise for both the actor playing him and the director of the play, he 
sharply criticized the playwright:  
It is a miserable work. The Nuremberg Trials should have been terrific material for a 
dramatist. The author (who actually wrote all this? A young German, born in 1932? 
Obviously…) unfortunately made nothing of it. With a little skill he could have used the 
material to prepare a wonderful indictment (Anklage) of the absurdity of the accusations 




As a crowd gathered around him in the coat check area, Schacht decided to make up for the 
author’s lost opportunity to exonerate him:  
The author shows me in the wrong light. He wants to make the audience believe that I 
joined the Hitler regime because of rearmament. That’s nonsense! I wanted to tame 
unemployment, that’s why I joined the regime. You have to keep in mind that at that time 
there were 6.5 million people out of work. And furthermore, in the ’30s we had to rescue 
Germany from the Communists. There were 230 National Socialist deputies against 100 
Communists. And so I ask you: Who tamed unemployment? I was the only person in all 
of Europe who did it.  
The crowd was sympathetic to Schacht, they listened closely to his story. One woman shyly 
approached him and asked him to sign her program.  Schacht leered: “Don’t you know that I’m a 
‘war criminal’? Finally! Someone who’s not afraid.” At the end of the impromptu performance 
Schacht was able to get in one last moment in the spotlight, to reclaim his proper place in 
German history. A reporter asked him who he thought was the greatest economist of the century: 
“Well, if you ask me like that: me, of course!”1 
*** 
 I came across a newspaper account of Schacht’s comeback performance at the Academy 
of the Arts Archive in Berlin toward the beginning of my research into postwar trial plays. The 
account was at once fascinating and deeply troubling. Searching through political theatre of the 
1960s, I was certainly neither looking for, nor anticipating, a public defense of National Socialist 
policies in the 1930s. Theatre, I had assumed, would be a public space for democracy, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Accounts of the performance in press clippings from Express am Sonntag (9 March 1969), in Kurt Meisel Archive, 




healing, for challenging audiences to critically confront the past. Not a place for (acquitted) war 
criminals to sign autographs and claim their place in history.  
 The account of Trial at Nuremberg at the Burgtheater was all the more jarring because I 
found the review within a folder otherwise dedicated to the original performance of the play in 
East Berlin. The play was written by an East German playwright, Rolf Schneider, and its original 
production at the Deutsches Theater was designed neither to reassess the rise of fascism, nor to 
criticize the procedure of the International Military Tribunal. Instead, Trial in Nuremberg sought 
to use the trial as a precedent to judge and condemn current events: the rearmament of West 
Germany, America’s war in Vietnam, and Israel’s Six Day War. Reading through accounts of the 
rehearsal process, Schneider himself was hard not to like. He struggled to preserve his version of 
the piece against the continual interferences of the East German censors; his democratic 
convictions would later result in his being blacklisted as a playwright, and he would end his 
career in obscurity.2  
I begin with Schacht’s visit to Trial at Nuremberg not because it is representative of the 
postwar productions and performances I analyze in this dissertation, but because it challenges 
many easy assumptions about performance, drama, and the use and abuse of history. The politics 
of the Burgtheater staging and this impromptu performance are unlike most of the productions I 
write about. Most of this dissertation discusses theories and techniques of the theatre that I 
believe can further the cause of justice, not offer reactionary revisions of the past. But of course, 
this is precisely what Schacht thought he was doing—claiming justice that had been unfairly 
denied him. Trial in Nuremberg is an important test case because there seem to be so many 
elements that would make for a theatre of justice as I was trying to define it: a proto-dissident 
East German, a documentary war crimes trial play dedicated to social justice on both sides of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Iron Curtain, and an informal, subversive performance for the public that challenges the dramatic 
text as replicating the legal repressions of an occupying army. Certainly, though, this is not a 
performance to be fêted. 
 Schacht’s visit to Trial at Nuremberg offers multiple levels of text, interpretation, and 
performance: the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals itself (and the documents used 
during the trial), the transcripts of the trial, the play based on those transcripts, the staging of the 
play (which we have good reason to suspect did not correspond to the intentions of the 
playwright), the performance of that staging within an institutional theatre, and finally Schacht’s 
informal and unscripted performance in the lobby. These layers of text, interpretation, and 
performance within this one event challenge any easy marking of the boundaries between text 
and performance. They also contradict the political and ethical values often accorded to text and 
performance. The informal, unscripted performance is a reactionary defense of National 
Socialism; the hegemonic text that this performance opposes is the precedent for condemning 
crimes against humanity.  
 
The Archive as Repertoire 
Since its inception as a challenge to Eurocentric text-based approaches to theatre and 
drama, Performance Studies as a field has offered both methodological and political reasons why 
performance should supersede text as the privileged subject of study. There have been very good 
reasons for this approach, particularly in its decentering of the Western dramatic canon. But, as I 
will argue throughout this dissertation, an emphasis on performance as such can run the risk of 




 Within Performance Studies, the relationship between the written word and performance 
traditions often follows a predictable pattern in which the written word is connected to 
hegemonic, imperialist ambitions, from which performance struggles to break free. This 
understanding of the relationship between text and performance is a direct result of the 
development of Performance Studies as an oppositional discipline in which the field developed 
as not only a methodological rejection, but also a political rejection of drama departments and 
scholars whose work focused primarily on dramatic literature. Attending to performance has 
been understood as a democratizing stance, and its rejection of the primacy of a traditional 
European dramatic canon has been closely aligned with Feminist, Queer, and Postcolonial 
approaches.3  
In Peggy Phelan’s influential analysis, text is equated with the law, while performance—
by virtue of its liveness and ephemerality—always occupies a subversive position vis-à-vis the 
law. 4  There are two different ways that the dichotomy between repressive text/law and 
subversive performance has been challenged from within Performance Studies. The first 
challenge is about the characterization of law as legal code separated from performance. For 
example, Philip Auslander has shown how live performance is essential to legal procedure, 
demonstrating “the system’s strong preference for live testimony,” in which “testimony is 
defined as a live performance of memory-retrieval.” 5 Auslander teaches us that not only is live 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  See Shannon Jackson, Professing Performance: Theatre in the Academy from Philology to Performativity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). This emphasis on performance versus text as a political stance is 
Anglo-American. The German tradition of Theaterwissenschaft, in contrast, defines theatre through performance as 
a matter of classification. Because the discipline emerged in Germany gradually throughout the twentieth century, 
scholars were not at pains to morally or politically justify a new discipline in opposition to dramatic literature. It is 
also safe to assume that because of their own history, German scholars have been more circumspect when it comes 
to celebrating collective energy and transformative, live performance.	  
4 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (New York/London: Routledge, 1993).	  




performance central to legal procedure, but that courtrooms have resisted the incursion of media 
technology to a greater extent than theatre itself. 6  
 The second set of challenges to the repressive text/law versus subversive performance 
dichotomy have been historical ones.  Joseph Roach’s Cities of the Dead offers a useful rejoinder 
to celebrations of performance in his discussion of the shifting valences of Mardi Gras 
performance in New Orleans in the past decades. Roach reveals how state legislation forbidding 
racial discrimination among festival krewes flipped the relationship between law, subversive 
performance, and race: “it returned white carnival once more to its Bakhtinian tradition of 
transgression against the official culture.”7 In other words, racism became a transgression of the 
law rather than a characteristic of the law; because of that, it is imperative to understand the 
political work of carnivalesque performances in a different way. While certain contexts of 
colonialism, imperialism, and fascism demand a critique of law, the relationship between 
subversive performance and law becomes more complicated in situations like post-Civil Rights 
era Louisiana or postwar West Germany. Diana Taylor offers a similar complication of this 
dichotomy, arguing in The Archive and the Repertoire that the common celebration of 
performance in and of itself fails to account for the ways that performance, too, can constitute 
hegemonic power, for as she succinctly reminds us, “performance belongs to the strong as well 
as the weak.”8 Taylor points to inquisitorial burnings, lynching, and state-sponsored torture as 
examples of performances of the strong.  
 While Roach’s and Taylor’s accounts grant greater nuance to the political work of 
performance, both continue to define performance against text-based modes of transmission and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., 115.	  
7 Joseph Roach, Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
273.	  
8 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas (Durham/London: 




circulation. Taylor conceives of these two modes of transmission as the archive  (“documents, 
maps, literary texts, letters, archaeological remains, bones, videos, films, CDs”) and the 
repertoire (“performances, gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing”).9  Taylor points out that 
both the archive and the repertoire may work together to maintain repressive social orders. In her 
discussion of protests staged by H.I.J.O.S., an organization of the children of the disappeared in 
Argentina, she demonstrates how these performances use the archives (eg. photographs and ID 
cards of the disappeared, forensic reports) to transmit traumatic memory.10 These elements of the 
archive need performance. Just as in a trial, “facts cannot speak for themselves. The case needs 
to be convincingly presented.”11 It is neither the facts (the photographs or DNA evidence) 
themselves, nor the liveness of the performance, but rather practices of staging that constitute the 
political intervention of the protestors.  
 Taylor positions her argument as one that seeks to recover and foreground the repertoire 
as opposed to the archive (despite the seeming inextricability of the archive and the repertoire 
that her case studies reveal). Taylor’s analysis demands the existence of a stable text against 
which to define performance: “Antigone might be performed in multiple ways, whereas the 
unchanging text assures a stable signifier.”12 But as W.B. Worthen argues, Antigone is anything 
but stable. The text and its meaning are created through embodied practices of reading, 
annotating, staging, acting, etc.; it is repertoire all the way down.13  Schacht’s visit to Trial at 
Nuremberg and its overlay of legal and dramatic texts and performance is a case in which the 
distinctions between archive and repertoire quickly become confused. Documents were 
presented at the Nuremberg Trials, the transcript turned into a play, the play was staged in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 20.	  
10 Ibid., 165.	  
11 Ibid., 176.	  
12 Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire , 19.	  




radically different ways in East Berlin and Vienna, etc. etc.  Which moments and modes of 
transmission here represent the archive and which the repertoire?  
The relationship between the archive and the repertoire is usually imagined and discussed 
in relation to colonial history. Rebecca Schneider, in her insightful book Performing Remains, 
reflects on the story of the archive as one that begins with the house of the Greek archon, the 
head of state, and eventually becomes the “arm of [colonial] empire” that used documents to 
disable local knowledges, becoming “a mode of governance against memory.”14 In post-colonial 
situations and in the aftermath of atrocity, though, the relationship between archives and memory 
can change. As war crimes and crimes against humanity are slowly brought to court, archives 
become evidence against those who create them. 15 For the past two decades there has been 
increasing anxiety about the ever-shrinking number of Holocaust survivors who can testify about 
their experiences in the camps. The loss of survivors raises questions about the transmission of 
memory from one generation to the next and what sort of evidence and testimony can be used for 
memory. Visual documentation of the Holocaust, including  some of its most iconic images, 
were materials produced for and by those enacting genocide for their own archives. Marianne 
Hirsch shows in her recent book, The Generation of Postmemory, how these archival images 
continue to circulate and become part of a repertoire of materials used by visual artists of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Rebecca Schneider, Performing Remains: Art and war in times of theatrical reenactment (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 100.	  
15 Thomas Keenan and Eyal Weizmann trace three paradigms of evidence in war crimes trials. The Nuremberg 
Trials relied on reams of documents produced by the National Socialists themselves; with the Eichmann Trial came 
“an era of testimony” and witness accounts; starting with the exhumations following Argentina’s Dirty War and the 
discover of Josef Menegele’s scull in Brazil, forensic evidence has become ascendant in war crimes trials. Thomas 





post-generation (those who learned of the camps through the experience of parents or 
grandparents).16  
 
Documentary Trial Theatre 
The division between the archive and the repertoire is a false one, as my research will 
show. War crimes and human rights trials themselves are simultaneously performances and 
archives. The trials are archival repositories for documents, testimony, and forensic remains. At 
the same time, the trial is also a performance that stages documents and testimony in order to 
narrate a story for audiences. The trials set a legal precedent and they also become material for 
subsequent extra-legal performances. These extra-legal performances based on legal trials take 
two primary forms: events that seek to replicate the structure and spirit of the trial, and events 
that seek to reenact the transcripts of the trial. 
The most famous series of extra-legal tribunals has been the Russell Tribunals, convened 
originally to charge the United States with war crimes in Vietnam. In founding the International 
War Crimes Tribunal on Vietnam (1966-67), Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre claimed the 
precedent of Nuremberg to judge the United States by the same standards that the U.S. had 
judged Nazi Germany. Following the second Russell Tribunal on Latin America, activists 
created a Permanent People’s Tribunal that has since held almost forty sessions on topics 
including the policies of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (1988), crimes against 
humanity in the former Yugoslavia (1995), and “transnational corporations and peoples’ rights in 
Colombia” (2006-2008).17 There have been many similar tribunals since, including, in 2012, the 
Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission hearings that found Tony Blair and George W. Bush 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012).	  




guilty of war crimes in connection to the Iraq War, and a series of three inquiries organized by 
Occupy London that presented cases against Tony Blair (for war crimes in Iraq), the Legal Aid 
Bill (that would criminalize squatting), and the Royal Bank of Scotland (for fraud).18 These 
tribunals replicate the structure of legal trials (presentation of testimony and evidence, reference 
to the precedents established at Nuremberg, issuing of judgment) to judge cases that are not tried 
in legal courts.  Many of these tribunals, like the recent Russell and Kuala Lampur commissions, 
pass their findings on to the United Nations and International Criminal Court.  
Tribunals such as the Russell Tribunals emphasize that their proceedings are based on 
fact; they focus on “well-documented”19 crimes, and rely heavily on existing reports by bodies 
like the United Nations. The press materials for the most recent iteration of the Russell Tribunal, 
the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, refers to the tribunal as “a mirror of what we want to see in 
reality-- states and institutions undertaking their responsibilities under international law and 
bringing those accountable for violations to justice.”20 What does it mean to mirror something 
that does not (yet) exist? The tribunal implies that creating this mirror image will press states and 
institutions to create a reality that accords to its preexisting reflection. The tribunal claims that it 
is not a representation of legal judgment, but its direct reflection, disavowing any theatricality or 
fiction in its proceedings.21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “Call for Justice: Occupy London Begins Putting One Percent on Trial” online: http://occupylsx.org/?p=3200 	  
19 “Joint statement on the New York conclusions of the RToP submitted by Badil and the MRAP to the Human 
Rights Council 22nd session,” February 22, 2013 online: http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/3332/joint-
statement-on-the-new-york-conclusions-of-the-rtop-submitted-by-badil-and-the-mrap-to-the-human-rights-council-
22nd-session 	  
20  Press pack, Russell Tribunal on Palestine, online: http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Aneta-final-version-EN-2.pdf 	  
21 The correspondence between Peter Weiss and Bertrand Russell and his assistants regarding Weiss’s participation 
in the first tribunal gives an indication of the precariousness of this stance. After several meetings and letters with 
Russell and his associates, Weiss decided not to be an official part of the tribunal as originally planned. In a letter to 
Russell’s assistant, Weiss wrote that he believed the best way that he could protest the war in Vietnam was through 
his writing, adding that to reach an “internationally useful result” in an investigation of the criminality of American 
warfare, it was necessary that the investigation be made by “an international (or parliamentary) commission of 




Theatre and art projects have often taken the opposite approach to staging performances 
based on political trials. While the Russell Tribunals refer to Nuremberg for precedent and 
structure, theatre and art projects—what I will call documentary trial theatre— often use 
transcripts and other photographic or video documentation of political trials to stage a 
reenactment that includes language and sometimes images identical to the trials themselves. 
There is a counterintuitive relationship between archive and repertoire when we compare 
tribunals and trial theatre. Documentary trial theatre stages the archival materials of the trial, 
creating scripts sometimes solely out of the trial transcripts. They can be said to be reenactments 
of the original trial. Tribunals depend much more loosely on the original trials. They use past war 
crimes trials as a repertoire from which to develop new performances. And yet, the archival 
performances that offer a mimetic reenactment of the legal trials emphasize their radical 
differences from the trials, whereas the tribunals consider themselves a “mirror” of legal trials.  
Documentary trial theatre can take a variety of different forms and is not only a post-
World War Two phenomenon (Georg Büchner’s plays Danton’s Death and Woyzeck could both 
qualify). In the category of documentary trial theatre, I include works based not only on trials, 
but also on legal hearings (like the House Un-American Activities Committee) and state-
sponsored commissions like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. There are three types of 
documentary trial theatre, broadly speaking: verbatim theatre whose text derives almost entirely 
from the trial’s transcripts; theatre that uses the text of trial proceedings but models it in 
accordance with a preexisting literary work; and theatre that blends transcripts with fictional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
going to Vietnam should consist of specialists in international law and warfare” rather than writers like himself. A 
deeply politically engaged artist, he worried that a trial by artists and public intellectuals would not be perceived as 
credible. Letter from Peter Weiss to Ralf Schoenman (September 14, 1966), Peter Weiss Archive, Akademie der 




material.22 These plays take different positions on the original trial -- many condemn the trials 
they restage, some find that the trial was legitimate but the judgment was either wrong or did not 
go far enough, some condone the judgment. What all of them have in common is that they 
emphasize the structural differences between the theatre and courtroom. That is, they all share 
the premise that reenacting a trial in a theatre will offer justice in ways that the courtroom did or 
could not.   
Some of these plays—particularly the verbatim plays—might seem to shun theatricality. 
But they do just the opposite; they rely on the theatre and theatrical techniques to make the 
transcripts mean and achieve something that they did not in the original proceedings. 
Documentary trial theatre makes the case for theatre as a public institution that helps people pass 
judgments specifically through theatrical techniques. Documentary trial theatre as a political 
project (which it always is) only makes sense if justice and judgment work differently in a 
theatre than in a courtroom. Aesthetic judgment is different than legal or moral judgment, but no 
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Making a Case for Postwar Theatre 
Studying documentary trial theatre in the immediate postwar period can help us to think 
about modern drama in new ways. Martin Puchner has influentially read Brecht (and modernist 
drama more generally) as the proponent of an anti-theatrical theatre.23 By this he means in 
particular a turn from mimesis to diegesis. Certainly, the spectacles of Nazi Germany and 
Stalinist Russia were enough to deter Erwin Piscator from reviving his spectacular productions 
of the interwar period after the war. But fascist spectacle is only one particular sort of 
theatricality. In the pages that follow I analyze the ways that Brecht, Piscator, and Weiss—
among other directors and playwrights—claimed a role for theatre in political life precisely on 
account of theatre’s theatricality and aesthetic qualities. That is, they did not make a case for 
theatre by denying the theatre its theatricality, but precisely by and through underscoring the 
possibilities of theatre’s theatricality.  
My arguments about the relationship between theatre, politics, and judgment draw 
heavily on a reading of Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy. In the first chapter, I analyze 
Arendt’s three conceptions of judgment, which I understand as the judgment of an actor, the 
judgment of a storyteller (or stage director), and the judgment of an audience. I argue that 
Arendt’s conception of the actor, storyteller, and audience are based on contemporary theatre 
practice, rather than simply the common metaphor of the world as a stage. To understand Arendt, 
we must understand her writing in relation to theatre, and in particular Bertolt Brecht’s epic 
theatre. Arendt’s writings on judgment, in turn, provide a framework for understanding what 
actually happens when a trial is restaged within a theatre.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The second chapter looks at Brecht’s theories and practice of epic theatre in relation to 
the political trials of his lifetime. I argue that Brecht relied on the model of courtroom 
proceedings to develop epic theatre. Yet at the same time, he used the courtroom scenes within 
his plays to make a case for the way that theatre exceeds the courtroom and the formal aspects of 
the law. I discuss in particular the staging and rehearsal process of Brecht’s production of The 
Caucasian Chalk Circle at the Berliner Ensemble in 1954. While staging this production in 
rehearsals open to the public, Brecht challenged both the cultural policy of the German 
Democratic Republic and its judicial system, arguing that formal innovations in theatre allow 
theatre to become a site of justice that evades legal formalism and instead offers particular, 
ethical judgments.  
 Staging trials in the theatre is a way of reflecting on and changing the relationship 
between the theatre and courtroom as public institutions. It is also always a way of engaging with 
history. Shoshana Felman argues that the Nuremberg Trials produced a “conceptual revolution” 
in how the relationship between history and justice was understood. Nuremberg was the first trial 
that “called history itself into a court of justice.” Since Nuremberg, “not only has it become 
thinkable to put history on trial, it has become judicially necessary to do so.”24 The plays and 
productions that I study, all coming after Nuremberg, sought to develop ways to stage not only 
trials, but also history. The subject of my third chapter is Erwin Piscator’s changing conception 
of the relationship between theatre and history. I examine the changes in Piscator’s work as he 
moves from a theatre practice predicated on the contemporaneity of the theatre event in the 
interwar years to a postwar theatre that seeks to historicize the staged event. In both periods, 
Piscator mistrusts any form of teleology or sweeping historical narratives, even as a member of 
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the Communist party and when relying on Christian tropes. Through archival materials 
connected to Piscator’s production of The Burning Bush (based on a nineteenth century 
Hungarian trial) in New York in 1949 and his productions of The Crucible in West Germany 
between 1954 and 1959, I show how Piscator used documentary trial theatre to propose an 
understanding of history as a chronicle of events and persecutions that each deserved to have 
their day on stage. Piscator’s conception of history as a chronicle opened a possibility for 
understanding Nazi genocide in relation to European colonialism and racial injustice in the 
United States without sacrificing attention to the specificity of individual historical events.   
In the final chapter, I turn to Peter Weiss’s play The Investigation, based on  
the proceedings of the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, the first postwar trial of lower level 
functionaries working in the extermination camps. The play was premiered simultaneously in 
fifteen theatres across the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. 
Through set design, music, gestures, and costumes, each staging told a different story about the 
victims of Auschwitz, German culpability, and law in the Federal Republic. Not only did each 
staging issue a different judgment, but each proposed a different way of judging. The 
Investigation and these premiere productions were preceded and followed by extensive debates 
about representation of the Holocaust. This debate helps us to consider what can be lost, and 
what gained, by representing Holocaust trials within the theatre. 
In each of these chapters I give a piece of an answer to the overall question of how 
theatrical reenactments of court cases sought to further the cause of justice and claim a role for 
theatre in postwar politics. But inside this, there is also a second question: if artists help to teach 
us how to judge, how do we judge artists? To what political and moral standards do we hold 




on moral and political condemnations. All three have been charged with Stalinism and spreading 
communist propaganda. Brecht’s mistreatment of his collaborators, women, and especially 
women collaborators is infamous. Weiss’s omission of the word “Jew” from The Investigation 
led Elie Weisel to accuse of Weiss of being a Holocaust denier.25 How do we read their work in 
conjunction with these charges? Or apart from them? This is a question that is particularly 
pressing in the context of a generation of German authors and directors who lived, as Heiner 
Müller put it, in two dictatorships. In Germany, the past two decades have seen revelations about 
the collaboration of two of the most celebrated East Germany authors, Christa Wolff and Heiner 
Müller, with the Stasi. More recently, Nobel Prize winner Günter Grass revealed his membership 
in the Waffen-SS.  
Hannah Arendt, in an article about Brecht that I discuss at length in the first chapter, 
suggests that poets must be judged differently than the rest of us -- we must permit them more, 
and judge them by the quality of their work. A poet who sins deeply enough, she argues, will 
lose the gift of poetry. Arendt leaves it to the god of poetry to punish those who sin. I suggest 
instead that we let the poets judge themselves. In the pages that follow, I point to the ways that 
directors and playwrights appear in the trials they stage not only as judges as lawyers, but also as 
defendants. 
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From Aeschylus to Kafka: Hannah Arendt’s Judgments  
 
 Any interrogation of the relationship between postwar theatre and public trials 
immediately turns up a couple of usual suspects: Aeschylus’ Oresteia and Kafka’s The Trial. 
Each of these works attracted a great deal of attention in the decades following the Second World 
War: The Oresteia was both staged and rewritten (as in Gerhardt Hauptmann’s Atridae trilogy 
and Jean-Paul Sartre’s The Flies) and Kafka’s The Trial saw numerous stage adaptations by 
playwrights including André Gide and Peter Weiss. Each of these works and their adaptations 
offer an approach to political questions about the possibilities of human action and judgment 
central to the postwar period. The Oresteia provides hope for a new beginning after extreme 
violence through a public trial. In contrast, The Trial provides a vision of a fully automated and 
bureaucratized world from which there is apparently no escape. Though they give us different 
answers, both of these works are responding to the same question: under what conditions is it 
possible to act and under what conditions it is possible to judge? The Oresteia and The Trial are 
each about what we might call show trials, trials that appear to be scenes of deliberation and 
judgment, but are in fact ones where the judgment is already known in advance. Playwrights, 
directors, and audiences have used these works and their adaptations to reflect on the relationship 
between theatre and justice and the political role of the theatre.  
Starting with Max Reinhardt’s 1911 production of the Oresteia, the trilogy has become a 
central work for explorations of the political role of theatre and performance. The Oresteia 
culminates in a trial play, The Eumenides, in which Athena arbitrates between the Eumenides 
and Orestes (along with his defense lawyer Apollo). The Eumenides claim their right to chase 




Orestes of the crime. The trial that unfolds is certainly a case of victor’s justice, the new gods 
triumph over the old through questionable arguments and evidence. The jurymen who appear are 
silent roles. They are threatened in turn by the Eumenides and Apollo, and it is Athena who casts 
the deciding vote. It is ultimately only by bribing the Eumenides—offering them power over 
Athens—that Athena is able to get them to agree to the verdict she gives. The trial within The 
Eumenides is a theatrical one in the sense that it is clear from the beginning that the new gods 
will win out over the old ones. At the same time, Athena’s admonitions to the jury can be 
understood as performative: her speeches create the law of the polis Athens (“Men of Attica, 
hear my decree/now, on this first case of bloodletting I have judged./For Aegeus’ population, this 
forevermore/shall be the ground where justices deliberate.”26). Athena’s speeches within the play 
give Athens its foundational legislation. The Oresteia itself was written to reenact this 
foundational moment to an assembly of Athenians. Here we see a third conception linked to 
theatre, which is equivalent neither to theatricality nor to performativity, but instead is connected 
to the renovation of a political community—a moment that links the audience members as well 
as one that serves as a site of remembrance.  For this reason, the Oresteia has lent itself to 
projects that explore the relationship between theatre and community, and it is no coincidence 
that many of the recent Oresteia staging are explicitly conceived as intercultural performances 
designed to expand the boundaries of community feeling.27  
The Oresteia has offered directors fascinated with ritual and archaic political life a way to 
celebrate the transformative power of performance and theatre. Kafka’s The Trial might be read 
as a rebuttal to such celebrations and has strongly influenced another strain of twentieth century 
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theatre: the existentialist and absurdist plays of the postwar period. Josef K. has come to 
represent the modernist anti-hero, an anomic, alienated individual whose actions are meaningless 
against the totalizing machinery that controls his life. In productions ranging from André Gide’s 
adaption and production at Jean-Louis Barrault’s theatre (1947), Erwin Piscator’s production of 
an adaptation called The Scapegoat by John Matthews (New York Dramatic Workshop, 1950), 
to Peter Weiss’s plays The Trial and The New Trial (1950), the machinery of total bureaucracy is 
represented by the machinery of the theatre itself. Brecht described Gide’s production as a 
“brilliant performance, many tricks, instead of a representing confusion, only confused 
representations.” The machinery of the production was designed to “bring fear to the audience,” 
to overwhelm them and distract them from the play’s connections to actual political events.28 In 
these plays the classic metaphor of the world as a stage is used to convey the impossibility of 
action, the idea that people may be “mere players” subject to the constraints of a play whose 
narrative is already known and determined but never revealed to them or controlled by them.   
All of the plays examined in this dissertation have something of both Kafka and 
Aeschylus about them. On the one hand, Bertolt Brecht, Erwin Piscator, and Peter Weiss—each 
in their different ways—believe that theatre performance has the potential to open up new 
possibilities of political action and new relationships between actors and audiences. On the other 
hand, Brecht, Piscator, and Weiss are all concerned with the ways that certain forms of theatre 
may rob individuals of this very capacity for judgment and action. Brecht, Piscator, and Weiss 
each offer particular solutions to this problem. These varied solutions form the basis of the 
chapters that follow.  
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The most thorough exploration of the relationship between theatre and judgment in the 
postwar period, however, can be found in the work of Hannah Arendt. Arendt brings together the 
worlds of Aeschylus and Kafka to give an account of the relationship between performance, 
theatre, acting, and judgment. Arendt understands the theatre as a site for action, remembrance, 
and renovation. At the same time, she is deeply concerned about the rise of political systems 
whose machinery forestalls action, systems that force people to adopt and act out given roles. In 
other words, she is concerned with systems that appear inevitable and push people to act out 
predetermined narratives; systems that sound like the sort of theatre Brecht will term Aristotelian 
theatre. In the following chapters I use Arendt’s understanding of theatre and the public realm as 
an analytic guide to help make sense of the theories and techniques of postwar theatre. But as 
much as I use Arendt to read the playwrights, I use the playwrights to read Arendt, seeking to 
show how we can better understand Arendt through Brecht, Piscator, and Weiss, and 
contemporary theatre practice more broadly. 
Arendt understands the faculty of judgment in three different ways: the judgment of an 
actor, the judgment of a storyteller, and the judgment of an audience. The actor’s judgment is 
connected to action in the public realm and becomes a point of connection between political 
action and moral philosophy. The judgment of the storyteller corresponds to historiography, a 
way of judging the past. This is the judgment that Arendt herself enacts in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem by retelling the story of the trial for her readers. The third form of judgment is the 
judgment of the audience, which Arendt addresses in her late work on Kant and aesthetic 
judgment.29 Although each figure—actor, storyteller, audience—only exists in relationship to the 
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others, I will discuss each one separately to foreground the relationship between Arendt’s 
political philosophy and postwar political theatre. 
Bringing Arendt’s understandings of judgment together through the theatre means 
addressing the vexed question of Arendt’s modernity, or alternatively, her supposed nostalgia for 
the Greek polis. It also touches on recent debates about the meaning of performance in Arendt’s 
work. What sort of theatre does Arendt have in mind? Reading The Human Condition alone, we 
might assume that she is writing about the civic theatre of ancient Greece. But taking into 
account a fuller breadth of Arendt’s writings on literature, history, and politics, it becomes 
apparent that Arendt does not have the nostalgia for Greek tragedy that some might assume. She 
is not primarily concerned with actual theatre practice in classical antiquity. At the same time, 
though, Arendt also does not imagine performance in the sense of post-dramatic theatre, 
characterized by a primary emphasis on presence to the exclusion of narrative.30 Instead, 
Arendt’s is a particularly modernist form of theatre, closely aligned with Brecht’s epic theatre. 
Arendt brings together hope in theatre as a public space for action with a wariness of the 
structure of theatre itself, in particular the idea of casting and the predeterminacy of acting out a 
given role. While Arendt gestures toward to the Greek theatre as a site of public action, she also 
rejects what Brecht would call Aristotelian theatre. I will begin with a discussion of theatre in 
relation to Arendt’s conceptions of action to draw out the modes of judgment in the actor, 
storyteller, and audience. Through these three modes of judgment, Arendt gives us a way to think 
about the relationship between theatre and justice and what it means to enact (or reenact) justice 
in a theatre rather than a courtroom. 
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Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham/New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 
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Theatre as Praxis 
Arendt argues that three activities define and condition human life: labor, work, and 
action. In her account, labor corresponds to the biological processes of the human body and work 
to the ways that humans fabricate the world around them. While labor and work are activities of 
the individual, action relies on human plurality, “the fact that men, not Man, live on earth and 
inhabit the world.”31 While labor and work are simply means to other ends, action is an end in 
itself. Action and speech constitute the public realm, making it a “space of appearance” where 
the “sheer actuality” of human plurality emerges.32 It is through acting and speaking that people 
(or, for Arendt, “men”) disclose who, rather than merely what they are.33 What someone is 
depends on classifying a person based on general criteria (including, for example, a person’s 
occupation, race, or gender). Who someone is, is completely particular and unique to that single 
person. 
This conception of action has been one of the most widely disputed aspects of Arendt’s 
philosophy. Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib have claimed that Arendt’s conception of 
public action and speech can be understood as rational debate oriented toward consensus. This 
interpretation has been strongly challenged by a range of scholars who emphasize that action 
must only be an end in itself (not a means to attaining consensus, justice, or law), and emphasize 
the event-character of action: that is, action as a performance.34 Adriana Cavarero takes Arendt 
in the opposite direction of Habermas and Benhabib, suggesting that Arendt’s public realm, 
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because it engages not with what a person says, but who a person is, must be concerned with 
voice over speech. The voice, for Cavarero, is the repository of the uniqueness of every “who” 
who is speaking, and as such can open the way for a relational politics that evades the 
domination of reason or rationality.35  
Each of these approaches—speech as rational debate, speech as voice—can only be 
supported through a selective reading of Arendt. Arendt’s argument in The Human Condition 
that action demands to be judged by its greatness, or the virtuosity of its performance, rather than 
by moral standards or by its consequences cannot be squared with the Habermasian reading.  At 
the same time, however, Arendt’s account of the Eichmann trial, and in particular her infamous 
mockery of the testimony of K-Zetnik, make it clear that not all forms of speech and 
performance are welcome in Arendt’s public realm. As Shoshana Felman puts it, for Arendt, “a 
courtroom is indeed no place for cries.”36 Inarticulate expression—voice alone—has no place in 
the public realm. We can resolve some of these paradoxes by re-conceptualizing what 
“performance” means for Arendt. Arendt’s conception of performance has typically been 
understood through a conception of performativity rooted in J.L. Austin’s work, a sociological 
conception of dramaturgy, or a metaphor of the “world stage.”37  I want to suggest that instead, 
Arendt’s notion of performance can be best understood in relation to historical theatre practice; 
first, in conversation with Enlightenment understandings of theatre, and second, within a history 
of German theatre studies scholarship that we can trace back to the work of Max Herrmann in 
the first decades of the twentieth century. In other words, for Arendt, theatre figures not as a 
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metaphor for the world or the public realm at large, but rather as one particular site of action and 
plurality, and as such, is a vital institution for political life. 
There are four late eighteenth century philosophical arguments about theatre that become 
central to Arendt’s conception of performance: first, the experience of theatre as one predicated 
on plurality (Hume); second, the primacy of speech and aural expression over visual 
representation (Rousseau); third, the temporality of aural performance (Lessing); and fourth, 
theatre as action that does not produce any product (Smith).38 Each of these approaches to theatre 
is clearly grounded in and reflects on the actual experience of theatre, rather than on a 
metaphorical understanding of the world stage. 
In Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume describes how a man who 
enters the theatre, 
is immediately struck with the view of so great a multitude participating of one common 
amusement; and experiences from their very aspect a superior sensibility or disposition of 
being affected with every sentiment, which he shares with his fellow-creatures… He 
observes the actors to be animated by the appearance of a full audience and raised to a 
degree of enthusiasm, which they cannot command in any solitary or calm moment.39  
Certainly, Arendt is not seeking a public realm based on compassion, sentiment, or enthusiasm. 
But what Hume reveals is an exchange between the stage and the audience bound up in the 
interrelations between the participants. An audience member is moved not only by what is on the 
stage, but by watching other spectators react as well. There is no fourth wall in Hume’s 
eighteenth century theatre—the actors respond to the audience and the audience watches the 
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action in the auditorium as well as on stage. The reception of theatre is always contingent on 
being part of an audience, watching the theatre among others; a spectator makes meaning of the 
action on stage in constant relation to others.  
Rousseau’s writings on theatre privilege verbal expression over visual representation. 
Rousseau’s emphasis on vocality is primarily a way to solve the problem of mimesis and 
representation, both of which Rousseau distrusts. While Rousseau condemns theatre as spectacle 
in his Letter to D’Alembert, Rousseau was also an opera composer. Rousseau differentiates 
between spectators and audience: visual materials on a stage are always perceived only as 
representations, but Rousseau understands vocal expression as creating unmediated relationships 
between the speaker or singer and audience. In the series of debates about opera known as the 
Querelle des Bouffons, Rousseau condemns French opera for its intricate harmony, and praises 
Italian opera for its direct expression through melody and vocal line, eventually composing his 
own opera in the Italian style. In his discourses on both The Origin of Inequality and The Origin 
of Languages, Rousseau insists that the expressiveness of the voice—rather than discursive 
speech—is the foundation of relationships between people in their natural states. Nevertheless, 
when Rousseau discusses political speech, he emphasizes the conjunction of voice and language: 
it is both what is said and how it is said that is important. In On the Origin of Language, 
Rousseau writes, 
 There are some tongues favorable to liberty. They are the sonorous, prosodic, 
 harmonious tongues in which discourse can be understood from a great distance. Ours 




 understood to the people assembled is a slavish tongue. It is impossible for a people to 
 remain free and speak in that tongue.40  
It is essential to both make oneself heard—to speak with a sonorous, prosodic, harmonious 
tongue—and to make oneself understood by others in order to engage in politics. 
If Hume and Rousseau are most concerned with theatre in relation to plurality and the 
relationships between audience and actor (or speaker), Lessing and Smith are primarily 
concerned with the medial character of performance.  Lessing’s Laocoon, of course, is not about 
theatre specifically, but about the distinctions between poetry and painting. We can understand 
the poetry in Lessing’s account as performed poetry. The central feature of poetry, according to 
Lessing, is its temporality: whereas painting is best suited to represent a scene at any given 
moment, poetry is ideally suited to convey action occurring over time. This temporality also 
means that a performance exhausts itself in its process and does not leave any product behind. It 
is for this reason that Adam Smith, in On the Wealth of Nations, classes “players, buffoons, 
musicians, opera singers, opera dancers, etc.” (along with churchmen, lawyers, and the sovereign 
himself) as unproductive laborers, “like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, 
or the tune of the musician, the work of all of them perishes at the very instant of its 
production.”41 
Arendt is part of this lineage, of this long tradition of political philosophers who refer to 
theatre practice in their work and whose understandings of political and social interactions derive 
in part from the public space of theatre. In conversation with accounts of eighteenth century 
theatre, Arendt develops an idea of theatre as a realm of action that reflects and constitutes 
plurality through voice and speech and which does not leave behind any product. Like Brecht, 
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Arendt finds little to admire in the theatre of the nineteenth century, and particularly the 
Wagnerianism of its final decades. Arendt’s understanding of theatre jumps from the theatre 
practice of the eighteenth to that of the twentieth century, and is linked to both the practice of 
theatre during her lifetime and the development of the discipline of theatre studies 
(Theaterwissenschaft) in Germany. Between 1910 and 1930, Max Herrmann developed a new 
discipline of theatre studies that understood performance, rather than a dramatic text, as the 
defining quality of theatre. In Herrmann’s account, theatre is constituted through the relationship 
between actors and spectators during a performance: “the shared experience (miterleben) of the 
actual (wirklichen) bodies and the actual space.”42 This shared experience is not simply a matter 
of imagining the same story, but of bodily sensibilities (Körpergefühl) and energy that passes 
between the actors and audience and among audience members. As Erika Fischer-Lichte has 
shown, Herrmann developed these theories of theatre and performance in conversation with the 
theatre practice of his day, and in particular the innovations of Max Reinhardt.  Fischer-Lichte 
points to Reinhardt’s stagings of Oedipus Rex (1910) and the Orestia (1911) as crucial moments 
for the development of Herrmann’s concept of performance. Both of these productions broke the 
fourth wall: actors would speak and act from within the auditorium, implicating the audience in 
the action, forcing audience members to watch each other as they watched the actors, and 
emphasizing the “actual” bodies of the actors over the characters they were supposed to 
portray.43  
Following these insights by Herrmann, Fischer-Lichte proposes an understanding of 
performances (both aesthetic and cultural) as events constituted by the co-presence of actors and 
audience members. Theatre performances create both semiotic and phenomenal meanings, the 
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former bound to the world of a play, and the latter instatiated in the embodied co-presence of 
actual bodies in an actual space. The meanings of a performance are neither determined by the 
text of a play, nor are they reducible to language and narration after the fact. The performance 
creates itself and its meanings through what Fischer-Lichte calls an “autopoeitic feed-back loop,” 
that is, through the exchanges and interactions of each participant (both the actors and audience 
members). Understood in this light, a performance cannot be controlled by its organizers, nor can 
the participants be understood as purely passive; no one can determine the course that a 
performance takes, but at the same time, everyone shares responsibility for it. These two 
qualities of performance can help us to better understand Arendt’s arguments about action and 
speech. First, the two simultaneous forms of meaning (semiotic and phenomenal) can help us 
better understand the importance of both speech and voice for Arendt. Arendt conceives of 
performance in the public realm as necessarily having both semiotic and phenomenal meanings. 
People gather to speak about something, and some communication is necessary. But speech in 
the public realm cannot be reduced to communication: there is always an element of experience 
and voice that evades discursive meaning. Further, the condition of both actors and audience 
members as neither fully autonomous nor completely passive can help us understand the 
condition of action as an expression of plurality. Each action in the public sphere is conditioned 
by and emerges from a web of other actions, and each action is acted with others in mind. All 
those who are present share a responsibility for the course that the performance takes.  
Arendt distinguishes between the semiotic and phenomenal aspects of performance in her 
discussion of theatre in The Human Condition. Theatre is, for Arendt, “the political art par 
excellence; only there is the political sphere of human life transposed into art.”44 While a number 
of different forms of art might attempt to portray the story of a life, only theatre can convey “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




specific revelatory quality of action and speech, the implicit manifestation of the agent and 
speaker.” Arendt suggests that this is achieved through “a kind of repetition, the imitation or 
mimesis,” which “according to Aristotle prevails in all arts but is actually appropriate only to the 
drama, whose very name (from the Greek verb dram, “to act”) indicates that playacting actually 
is an imitation of acting.” The immediate impulse is to read imitation through Plato: playacting is 
a pale shadow of actual acting, a fallen enterprise. But we have to understand this discussion of 
imitation through Arendt’s conception of history. The examples that Arendt gives for what is 
“imitated” on stage—most importantly the heroic acts of the Trojan War—can hardly be 
understood as true or real history in contradistinction to their on-stage imitations. Imitations of 
these events are not simulacra of true original events, but a way of engaging with the stories of 
history. For this reason, “the drama comes fully to life only when it is enacted in the theatre. 
Only the actors and speakers who re-enact the story’s plot can convey the full meaning, not so 
much of the story itself, but of the ‘heroes’ who reveal themselves in it.”45 The theatrical here 
emerges not as the opposite of truth but as a way of drawing the past into the present.  
Arendt’s conception of reenactment is in some ways similar to the one that Rebecca 
Schneider proposes in her recent book on Civil War reenactments. Schneider suggests that “to 
ask how to do things with mimesis might be to ask how to engage with historical process—with 
history—with the antecedent and subsequent real at/on any given stage of time.”46 Schneider is 
primarily concerned with theatrical reenactments rather than reenactments in the theatre. In other 
words, she is interested in reenacted behavior in the sense of Richard Schechner’s “twice-
behaved behavior” and the enactment of what Judith Butler has called “sedimented acts.” 
Arendt, in contrast, conceptualizes of the relationship between reenactment and history primarily 
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as a relationship between a performance and a composed script: in between the event and the 
reenactment, there is a playwright or a storyteller. Reenactment for Arendt is not so much re-
performance as it is staging, a way of acting out a story in reference to both a given script and a 
particular audience.  
The drama comes fully to life through the conjunction of the telling of the story and the 
revealing of the heroes. The story is told through the semiotic aspects of the staging that convey 
the story’s plot; the heroes are revealed through the phenomenal presence of the actors-as-heroes. 
The most important semiotic component of Greek tragedy for Arendt is the diegesis of the 
chorus, which reveals the “direct and universal meaning” of the drama through “pure poetry.” 
The chorus tells the audience what the meaning of the story is. In contrast, the identities of the 
agents within the story can only emerge through “an imitation of their acting.” Through this 
imitation, the actors convey to the audience not simply what they were, but who they were, and 
are.  
One of the most striking elements of Arendt’s discussion here is the ontological slippage 
between the hero represented in the play and the actor who plays the hero. Arendt declares that 
we know who the hero is through this performance (though it is not the hero doing the 
performing). At the same time, the actor appears as two unique people simultaneously, hero and 
actor. In this sense, the playactor enacts plurality itself. At the same time, through this 
reenactment, the playactor carries the remembrances of history. It is crucial here that Arendt is 
talking about performed drama and not postdramatic theatre: the significance of performance for 
giving meaning is still understood within the frame of a story. Theatre becomes a site of 
remembrance which “assures the moral actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness 




before an audience of fellow men, who outside the polis could attend only the short duration of 
the performance and therefore needed Homer and ‘others of his craft’ in order to be presented to 
those who were not there.”47 At the same time, though, the reenactment of old stories within the 
theatre is not simply an act of repetition. Theatre is a way of relating to the past that allows actors 
to beget new action from old.  
 
The Actor 
 Taking this view of the playactor, characterized by a condition of plurality and a 
remembrance of the past as a model for the human actor, we can begin to connect the actor of 
The Human Condition with historical actors of On Revolution and Eichmann in Jerusalem. Here 
we move closer to a metaphorical understanding of theatre, but one connected to particular 
nineteenth and twentieth century techniques of acting. On Revolution and Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, written at the same time, are both preoccupied with the idea of enactment and 
embodiment and the relationship of performance to script. In these works, Arendt sets up an 
opposition between action to embodiment -- embodiment here understood in the specifically 
theatrical sense of actors completely identifying with the characters they portray, becoming their 
characters. The difference between enacting a role and embodying it, I will argue, is one 
connected to the relationship between an actor and a script (a predetermined narrative given to 
the actor to act out). While an actor may enact a given role in a number of ways, to embody it 
would mean to completely absorb him or herself in the role and to believe that there is some 
essential truth to the role; that it can only be properly acted out in one way. Such embodiment, 
for Arendt, is a mode of performance that precludes judgment. As an alternative to embodiment, 
Arendt turns to a form of acting, and of being in the world, that insists on a certain critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




distance between actors and roles they play: it is this critical distance that allows for the exercise 
of judgment.  
Both Arendt and Brecht develop their understandings of the relationship between theatre, 
performance, and history in direct conversation with Karl Marx’s famous first paragraph of the 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, that all great world historical facts and personages 
appear twice, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.48 Marx argues that the 
Revolution of 1789 clothed itself in the costumes and rhetoric of the Romans. But the 
revolutionaries of 1789 always knew that they were not actually Romans; they maintained 
enough distance between their costumes and critical capacities to find “the spirit of revolution” 
in the Romans, while acting according to their own circumstances. They played a role without 
actually embodying it. The 1848ers did not maintain this distance. Instead they sought to make 
the ghost of the 1789 revolution “walk again,” embodying the earlier revolutionaries to the 
extent that they forgot their own historical context, “recoiling from its solution in reality.”49  
Arendt echoes the central argument of Marx’s analysis to discuss subsequent revolutions 
in France and Russia: 
The trouble has always been the same: those who went into the school of revolution 
learned and knew beforehand the course a revolution must take … They had acquired the 
skill to play whatever part the great drama of history was going to assign them, and if no 
other role was available but that of the villain, they were more than willing to accept their 
part rather than remain outside the play.50  
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While Marx emphasizes the props, costumes, and borrowed rhetoric of revolution, Arendt 
focuses on the script. The problem for Arendt goes deeper than it does for Marx. Marx wishes 
his revolutionaries knew the course that a revolution should follow; for Arendt, the problem is 
that they already do. By studying and emulating the course of the revolutions, rather than the 
revolutionary spirit of their predecessors, these men were simply reviving a stale drama. But 
whereas for Marx this repetition of history is apparently inevitable (“all great world-historical 
events occur twice”), Arendt emphasizes choice: actors can step out of the play.  The ability to 
step out of the play and begin a new story is, for Arendt, the fundamental condition of human 
action. Arendt terms this possibility of human action—that each individual has the capacity to 
begin something new—the condition of natality. People can step out of the script if they choose 
to. The choice to either step out of the play or play along, as well as the choice of how one plays 
the role that one is given, relies on the faculty of judgment. Actors can use a pre-existing script to 
perform virtuosically by adding their voices and presence; an actor who simply replicates the 
script verbally will never be great. 
 It is no coincidence that Arendt was working on Eichmann in Jerusalem and On 
Revolution simultaneously. Eichmann comes to represent for her the paradigmatic example of an 
actor who completely embodies the role he is given, and is never able to step out of that role or 
judge his own actions.51 Eichmann’s incapacity to step out of his role also makes him incapable 
of understanding any perspective but his own. Arendt describes how Eichmann fails to 
understand that the Israeli police officer interrogating him will not be sympathetic to his hard 
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luck story about failing to rise in the ranks of the SS. When Eichmann confronts evidence that 
contradicts the story that he tells about himself and his role, he simply disregards it: “it was as 
though this story ran along a different tape in his memory, and it was this taped memory that 
showed itself to be proof against reason and argument and information and insight of any 
kind.”52 Eichmann is stuck within a cycle of mechanical reproduction, one that Arendt invokes 
with her own staccato repetitions (“and…and…and”) in this passage. Eichmann is no longer 
even a live actor, speaking and acting in real time, but instead a sort of automaton.   
 Arendt is particularly interested in the way that language itself scripts Eichmann’s 
actions. Eichmann conceives of the world through the catchphrases and clichés of the Nazi party, 
which he deems “winged words” (geflügelte Wörter). Eichmann’s only language is officialese 
(Amtsprache) and by Arendt’s account he “was genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence 
that was not a cliché.”53 Both Eichmann and his lawyer understand reality through the language 
rules of the Nazi regime. During the proceedings the defense attorney himself referred to gassing 
as “a medical matter,” and stood by this designation even when challenged by the judge.54 The 
true insidiousness of the language rules formulated by the Nazi leadership was not simply in how 
they were used to hide the truth from foreign powers, but rather in how they were fully believed 
by men like Eichmann. As Arendt understands him, Eichmann is not a strategic man deploying 
euphemism, but a true believer. Eichmann had no distance from the role that he played; every 
line that he was given to speak became truth for him. As in literary theatre, all of the meaning 
was in the language of the script he was given. The meaning that really mattered to him was in 
the words, not in the very different reality of what happened right in front of him.  
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 In On Revolution, Arendt traces the word hypocrisy back to the Greek, meaning “play-
actor.” 55 The hypocrite:  
plays a role as consistently as the actor in the play who also must identify himself with 
his role for the purpose of play-acting; there is no alter ego before whom he must appear 
in his true shape, at least not as long as he remains in the act. His duplicity, therefore, 
boomerangs back upon himself, and he is no less a victim of his mendacity than those 
whom he set out to deceive.56 
In other words, the hypocrite is like Eichmann, an actor who completely embodies the character 
he or she plays on stage. The French Revolution’s “favored metaphor was that the Revolution 
offered the opportunity of tearing the mask of hypocrisy off the face of French society.”57 The 
problem with this is that a hypocrite in Arendt’s sense loses an ego behind the mask. Unmasking 
a hypocrite would reveal “nothing behind the mask.”58  
Following her discussion of the hypocrite, Arendt introduces the concept of persona, 
whose etymology she likewise traces back to classical theatre. Originally, the word referred to 
masks worn by ancient actors, which had two purposes: it replaced the actor’s face with a new 
one, but also allowed the actor’s voice to sound through. Because of this double meaning, the 
term was appropriated from the theatre by legal discourse: “the distinction between a private 
individual in Rome and a Roman citizen was that the latter had a persona, a legal personality, as 
we would say; it was as though the law had affixed to him the part he was expected to play on 
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the public scene, with the provision, however, that his own voice would be able to sound 
through.”59  
 In Arendt’s analysis, one of the great mistakes of the French Revolution was that in its 
preoccupation with hunting for hypocrites, the men of the Revolution forgot that there was a 
positive use for the mask of the persona, “so that the Reign of Terror eventually spelled the exact 
opposite of true liberation and true equality; it equalized because it left all inhabitants equally 
without the protecting mask of a legal personality.”60 The French Revolution went off course, 
then, by conflating the bad form of embodiment (hypocrisy) with the necessary quality of 
politics as theatre and role-play. It is not as a private individual that one can articulate political 
demands, but through a particular persona. Only by playing a role without embodying it can one 
speak as a citizen. In other words, it is not the voice alone that engenders action and speech, but 
rather a relationship between the voice and the role one in playing. In this sense, the voice 
expresses how one chooses to perform a role.  
 What Arendt is claiming is that we can understand the relationship of judgment to action 
without necessarily requiring that action be understood as moral action, or action directed toward 
another end. In one sense, judgment is deciding whether to act out the role given to you, or to 
step out of the play. But Arendt is well aware that stepping out of the play is not always possible. 
In Eichmann in Jerusalem she rebukes the prosecution for asking survivors why they did not 
rebel. Even in less extreme cases, simply stepping out of the play does not always solve the 
problem of personal responsibility. As Arendt argues in her essay “Collective Responsibility,” 
even if we escape collective responsibility by leaving a community, we must join another 
community, exchanging one kind of responsibility for another (for this reason, she argues, only 
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refugees and stateless people are “the absolutely innocent ones”).61 But there may also be a way 
of playing one’s role—a technique of acting—that connects judgment to action. Here we move 
toward Kant’s conception of judgment, the faculty that, as Arendt glosses it, “decides about the 
relation between a particular instance and the general, be the general a rule or a standard or an 
ideal or some other kind of measurement.”62 This is the judgment of a playactor, deciding how to 
perform his or her particular role.  
Arendt’s philosophy is directly influenced by Brecht’s theories of epic theatre, 
transmitted to her most importantly through Benjamin’s writings on Brecht. We should note, to 
begin, that Arendt’s essays on Brecht do not focus on his theorization of epic theatre. In fact, in 
her essay “What is Permitted to Jove?” she confuses epic theatre with Brecht’s learning plays 
(Lehrstücke), which she criticizes. She contrasts the “the so-called epic theatre” of The Measures 
Taken unfavorably with later plays (The Good Person of Szechuan, Mother Courage, The 
Caucasian Chalk Circle, Galileo, i.e. those plays we commonly understand as “epic theatre” 
today) that are “part of the repertoire of good theatre inside and outside of Germany.”63 Despite 
this issue of nomenclature, it is clear that Arendt engaged closely with Brecht’s theories of 
theatre through Walter Benjamin’s writings. In 1946, while she was assembling material for the 
collection of Benjamin’s essays that would eventually be published as Illuminations, Arendt 
wrote to Brecht for his help. She suggested publishing Benjamin’s “Conversations with Brecht” 
in this edition, and asked if Brecht could share his commentary on the conversations, and 
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possibly write an essay for the volume.64 Ultimately, “Conversations with Brecht” was not 
published in German or English until a decade after Brecht’s death. Arendt instead selected 
“What is Epic Theatre?” for the collection that was published in West Germany in 1955, perhaps 
out of an awareness of the difficulty that Brecht’s sharp criticism of Soviet cultural policy in 
“Conversations” would cause him now that he had settled in East Germany.  
“What is Epic Theatre?” begins by describing the relationship between the action on 
stage and the audience, which “always appears as a collective,” and “as a collective, will usually 
feel impelled to react promptly.” Brecht’s idea of audience reception is based on what Arendt 
will later call the “web of relationships” that connects audience and actors through action and 
reaction.65 Benjamin emphasizes that this reaction, according to Brecht, must be a “well-
considered and therefore a relaxed one.” In other words, that there must be a process of judgment 
that bridges the action and the reaction.66 The audience’s ability to judge is predicated on 
techniques of acting that demonstrate the actor’s own stance of critique vis-à-vis the role that he 
or she is playing.  
For both Brecht and Arendt, the actor’s critical stance depends on not embodying one 
single position or attitude, but instead maintaining a distance between his or her voice and the 
mask that he or she wears. In his acting theories, Brecht criticizes the forms of psychological 
realism in the melodrama of the nineteenth century and the theories of Stanislavsky in the Soviet 
Union in which the actor is asked to embody the character he or she plays fully because it robs 
both the actors and the audience of their capacity for thinking and judgment. Instead of fully 
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embodying a given role, Brecht tells his actors to perform the actions and gestures required by 
the role, while simultaneously remaining distant enough from these actions to critique them.  
One of Brecht’s most famous examples of this form of epic acting is that of an 
eyewitness who sees a car accident and recounts to a crowd of bystanders what happened. As the 
eyewitness recounts what happened, he acts out certain parts of the events, demonstrating, for 
example how the one driver steered his car. But the people watching him never confuse him with 
the driver he imitates, and the witness is able to give his own opinion on what happened as he 
tells and even reenacts the story. His presentation thereby encourages those watching to judge 
what happened for themselves.67 The judgment of an actor is thereby directly connected to the 
judgment of an audience. There is also one more figure in both Arendt’s and Brecht’s 
understanding of theatre and judgment: for Brecht this is the director, for Arendt the storyteller. 
Arendt argues that an actor cannot make meaning of his or her story; instead “action reveals 
itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backwards glance of the historian.”68 Only the 
storyteller can convey the full story.  
 
The Storyteller 
 Arendt steps into the role of the storyteller in her account of the Eichmann Trial. Whereas 
discussion and debates about The Human Condition have largely centered on the problem of 
action and performance, the much more widely spread controversy of Eichmann in Jerusalem 
has focused on how Arendt tells the story of the trial. Influential readings of Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, including Shoshana Felman’s The Juridical Unconscious, understand Arendt’s 
account as a rejection of all forms of theatre and theatricality in the courtroom. Arendt does 
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criticize some of the theatrical elements of the trial, and in particular its quality of tragic drama. 
But at the same time, Arendt sees a central role for theatre in justice. Justice and judgment must 
occur not only in the courtroom, but also in other public spaces like the theatre. Instead of 
collapsing the difference between the theatre and the courtroom, Arendt makes a claim for 
multiple processes and sites of judgment.  A courtroom can offer a legal judgment, but as Arendt 
emphasizes throughout her account of the trial, there is a difference between legal judgment and 
human judgment. If we are to judge both legally and humanly we need not only the courtroom 
but also additional sites of poetry, storytelling, and theatre to supplement the courtroom. Many 
critics read this argument as an exclusion of suffering and individual stories from the public 
realm.  What I want to suggest, though, is that Eichmann in Jerusalem is a plea for a poetic realm 
of remembrance in public life. Eichmann in Jerusalem criticizes the trial not for its use of theatre 
per se, but for its particular mode of theatre: tragic drama. At the same time, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem is itself a highly theatrical, albeit textual, restaging of the trial.69  
Eichmann in Jerusalem begins in medias res with the line, “Beth Hamishpath!” (“the 
House of Justice”), shouted by the court’s usher, which has “the effect of a rising curtain” both 
within the trial, and for Arendt’s book. Arendt begins by setting the scene. The courtroom, she 
writes, must have been designed with “a theatre in mind, complete with orchestra and gallery, 
with proscenium and stage, and with side doors for the actors’ entrance.” Arendt is right: the 
building was originally constructed as a theatre, converted into a courtroom for the Eichmann 
Trial, and converted back into a theatre directly afterwards.70 Journalists from around the world 
gathered at this theatre-turned-courtroom “to watch a spectacle as sensational as the Nuremberg 
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trials.”71 In his influential book, The Memory of Judgment, Lawrence Douglas uses these opening 
passages to claim that Arendt is an opponent of any form of theatre within a courtroom. Douglas 
sets Arendt up as a “critical foil” to his own argument that Holocaust trials require stagings that 
go beyond the purely legal framework of the trials. He calls for what he terms “didactic legality,” 
a mode of staging that exceeds the question of guilt or innocence and serves “as a tool for 
collective pedagogy and as a salve to traumatic history.”72 Douglas situates his argument from 
the start of the book as an argument against Arendt’s criticisms of the Eichmann Trial. He claims 
that Arendt uses the term “show trial” in conjunction with the Eichmann Trial to disparage the 
process, and “raise the spectre of a Stalinist fraud.” Douglas dismisses Arendt by claiming that 
“to call Holocaust Trials show trials… is to state the obvious. After all, that is what there trials 
were—orchestrations designed to show the world the facts of astonishing crimes and to 
demonstrate the power of law to reintroduce order into a space evacuated of legal and moral 
sense.”73 Douglas makes a crucial argument here, and one that will emerge in various ways 
through this dissertation. But his charges against Arendt are unfounded. Arendt never actually 
calls the Eichmann Trial a show trial. After describing the theatricality of the proceedings in the 
passages that Douglas quotes, Arendt comes to her comparison of the Eichmann Trial with a 
show trial: 
If the audience at the trial was to be the world and the play the huge panorama of Jewish 
sufferings, the reality was falling short of expectations and purposes… It was precisely 
the play aspect of the trial that collapsed under the weight of the hair-raising atrocities. A 
trial resembles a play in that both begin and end with the doer, not with the victim. A 
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show trial needs even more urgently than an ordinary trial a limited and well-defined 
outline of what was done and how it was done. In the center of the trial can only be the 
one who did—in this respect he is like the hero in the play—and if he suffers, he must 
suffer for what he has done, not for what he has caused others to suffer.74  
Arendt is not condemning the Eichmann Trial for being a show trial, but for failing to be an 
effective show trial, for failing to follow the demands of dramatic form: “the trial never became a 
play, but the show Ben-Gurion had had in mind to begin with did take place.”75 Arendt comes 
back to this point several chapters later, in describing the testimony of witnesses brought forward 
to draw “a general picture”: during this testimony, the atmosphere was “not of a show trial but of 
a mass meeting, at which speaker after speaker does his best to arouse the audience.”76 The 
spectacle of suffering and broad historical narratives of anti-Semitism throughout history distract 
from “what was done and how it was done” and, more importantly, “the one who did.”  
The distinction between Arendt and Douglas is not so much in their ideas about the 
proper relationship between trials and theatre, but in their conception of drama. Arendt does see 
a role for theatre both within the trial and for theatre as a separate public site for judging in ways 
that a legal trial alone cannot. Douglas never fully delineates the characteristics of the kind of 
drama or theatre he wants to bring into the courtroom, but they are generally connected to 
Aristotelian theatre in the sense that Brecht would use it (that is, not in close reference to the 
Greeks, but a catch-all term for the melodrama and mainstream commercial theatre of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which theatre seeks to embody a literary text). These 
characteristics include excitement, suspense, catharsis, and tragedy. The conception of the 
Eichmann Trial as tragic drama is one that was articulated both within the trial itself and in many 
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contemporary and subsequent accounts of the trial. Susan Sontag described the Eichmann Trial 
as “the most interesting and moving work of art of the past ten years.” The trial was a tragic 
event, as was the calamity it sought to judge, “an event—piteous and terrifying in the extreme—
whose causation is super-charged and over-determined.” For Sontag, as for Douglas, the function 
of the trial went beyond any strictly legal justifications because it was “not Eichmann alone who 
was on trial,” it was both Eichmann the individual and Eichmann “the cipher, standing for the 
whole history of anti-Semitism, which climaxed in this unimaginable martyrdom.” The trial 
recorded “a great outcry of historical agony” and its function “was that of the tragic drama: 
above and beyond judgment and punishment, catharsis.” In order to respond to the 
unprecedented crimes of the Holocaust, Douglas and Sontag both look to well-worn conceptions 
of drama and tragedy. Sontag is aware of this irony, adding that “We live in a time in which 
tragedy is not an art form but a form of history. Dramatists no longer write tragedies.” 77  
In Sontag’s analysis the fact that dramatists no longer write tragedies reads simply as a 
question of fashion. Sontag fails to recognize the political reasons why dramatists in the 1960s 
have come to reject the model of tragic drama and public catharsis.78 Unlike Sontag, Arendt is 
well aware of why dramatists no longer write tragedies. Arendt might add to Adorno’s famous 
dictum, that there can be no lyric poetry after Auschwitz, that there can also be no tragic drama 
of suspense, shock, and catharsis after Auschwitz. The crises of the twentieth century demanded 
a new form of political theatre. This new dramaturgy was the dramaturgy of Bertolt Brecht, 
whose poem “O Germany!” Arendt uses as the epigraph of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Arendt, like 
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Brecht, believes that a tragic, Aristotelian drama can only serve to forestall the critical capacities 
of its spectators. There are two different, but interrelated, forms of judgment that tragic drama 
precludes. The first is judgment about one’s own actions or responsibility. The second is 
historical judgment.  
Arendt rejects the idea that the trial could offer catharsis for the survivors and suggests 
that a trial staged to affect catharsis would simply be an opportunity for “hysterical outbreaks of 
guilt feelings” among German youth who are “trying to escape from the pressure of very present 
and actual problems into a cheap sentimentality.”79 In other words, the catharsis of the trial could 
only deflect actual considerations of responsibility at the present moment. Arendt compares the 
reactions to the Eichmann Trial to “the Diary of Anne Frank hubbub” in Germany. Arendt is 
likely thinking here not about the publication of the diary itself, but about the diary’s stage 
adaptation, which was first produced on Broadway and then premiered in seven German cities 
simultaneously in 1956. The Diary of Anne Frank lent itself to pity and empathy, allowing young 
Germans to identify with Frank. For Arendt, as for Brecht, empathy and pity are the opposite of 
judgment. As Benjamin describes Brecht’s theatre, “instead of identifying with the characters, 
the audience should be educated to be astonished at the circumstances under which they 
function.”80 For Brecht, identification and education are mutually exclusive for two reasons. 
Arendt’s own position on identification is at times very similar to Brecht’s. For her, 
identification and recognition are opposites: to identify with someone is to fail to recognize that 
person as an individual. Anne Frank, in this sense, becomes a something instead of a someone. 
Furthermore, identification means living through the story alongside the actor, and thereby 
forfeiting the power of a historian to make sense of that story in retrospect. Only by not 
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identifying with a person is it possible to gain a distance necessary to “be astonished at the 
circumstances under which they function,” rather than to understand those circumstances as 
given or part of an irresistible progression of history. At the same time, though, Arendt 
emphasizes that Eichmann’s crimes derived in part from his inability to see from the perspective 
of someone else, to put himself in someone else’s shoes. The ability to see the world from 
another perspective is central not to Brecht’s epic theatre, but rather to epic theatre as conceived 
by Erwin Piscator. Arendt’s shares in the approaches of both directors, whose work I will discuss 
at length in the following two chapters. 
Arendt’s strongest objection to the trial was that it told the story of the Holocaust as a 
tragedy bound to an inexorable historical narrative redeemed only in the foundation of Israel. At 
the outset of the trial, the chief prosecutor, Gideon Hausner, began his opening address by 
claiming his own identification with the victims: 
When I stand before you, judges of Israel, in this court, to accuse Adolf Eichmann, I do 
 not stand alone. Here with me at this moment stand six million prosecutors. But alas, they 
 cannot rise to level the finger of accusation in the direction of the glass dock and cry out 
 J’accuse against the man who sits there…Their blood cries to Heaven, but their voice 
 cannot be heard. Thus it falls on me to be their mouthpiece and to deliver the heinous 
 accusation in their name.81 
The prosecution claims to simply be the mouthpiece of six million prosecutors. The speech 
moves from the plural—six million—to a single finger, a single blood, a single voice, and a 
single name. It assumes that they would all speak with one single voice, the voice of the State of 
Israel. At the time, this was a new way of understanding the relationship between victims of the 
Holocaust and the Israeli state. It was only with the Eichmann Trial that Israel began to speak in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the name of the survivors.82 Arendt is deeply disturbed by this claim. Collapsing the multitude of 
individuals who perished at the hands of the Third Reich into one voice is, for Arendt, the 
opposite of remembrance of those individuals. It is also a conception of the nation that refuses 
plurality, and instead poses the state as a reflection of one single, general will.   
 In giving Israel the voice of the victims, the trial also draws the Holocaust into a 
historical narrative of tragedy and redemption, beginning with the Pharaoh in Egypt. Arendt calls 
this “bad history and cheap rhetoric.”83 For Arendt, presenting the Holocaust as no more than the 
climax of millennia of anti-Semitism was problematic for a number of reasons. First, it 
undermined the culpability of the Nazis: if it was fate, how could Eichmann be held accountable? 
Second, it cast the death of millions of Jews as a necessary step in Israel’s creation. Third, and 
perhaps most significantly, Arendt believes that an acceptance of tragic fate and inevitable 
persecution contributed to the devastation of the Holocaust. Arendt writes that only a belief in 
this persecution as tragic fate can explain the willingness of the German Jewish community to 
negotiate with Nazi authorities in the early years of the regime.  At the same time, it was only by 
convincing the German population that World War II was the “battle of destiny” that average 
Germans came to believe that the only choice they had was to “annihilate their enemies or be 
annihilated.”   
Both Shoshana Felman in The Juridical Unconsious and Yasco Horsman in Theatres of 
Justice take Arendt’s clear rejection of the trial’s tragic drama to mean that Arendt is writing in 
the mode of comedy or farce.84 In her discussion of Arendt’s mockery of the testimony given by 
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K-Zetnik, Felman connects this comic mode specifically to Brecht, writing: “For some, this 
courtroom drama and the suffering it unfolds both in the past and in the present of the courtroom 
constitute a tragedy, a shock. For Arendt, this is a comedy. Pain is translated into laughter. If this 
is theater, sometimes potentially sublime or tragic, it is a Brechtian theater. Keeping her distance 
is for Arendt key.”85 Felman’s account focuses on Arendt as a spectator. “This courtroom 
drama,” “this comedy,” “this theatre” all refer to how Arendt perceives the trial itself, from 
which Arendt keeps her distance. I want to suggest, instead, that Arendt saw the trial as staged in 
the mode of tragic drama, and posed herself not as a spectator, but as a storyteller who could 
retell the story in a different mode. What Arendt is doing in Eichmann in Jerusalem, in other 
words, is restaging a tragedy as epic theatre, using epic theatre to understand the substance of the 
trial better and to reveal the theatrical techniques of the Jerusalem trial that sought to cast 
Eichmann as an Iago, Macbeth, or Richard III.86  The anti-climax of Arendt’s famous last phrase 
before the epilogue—“the banality of evil”—deflates the trial’s rhetoric of tragic drama. It has 
the same ring as the stage directions at the end of Drums in the Night: “he throws the drum at the 
moon, which was a paper lantern, and the drum and moon fall in the river, which has no 
water.”87 
Benjamin argues in “What is Epic Theatre?” that an old story can serve epic theatre better 
than a new one. Because of this, epic theatre becomes a theatre of natality rather than mortality; a 
theatre that, instead of assuming history’s inevitable, tragic course, points to the possibility of 
new beginnings.88 To make this point, Benjamin discusses Brecht’s epic presentation of the life 
of Galileo in which the main emphasis is not on Galileo’s recantation, but on the revolution his 
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work begins: “the truly epic process must be sought in what is evident from the labeling of the 
penultimate scene: ‘1633 to 1642: As a prisoner of the Inquisition, Galileo continues his 
scientific work until his death. He succeeds in smuggling his main works out of Italy.’”89 In this 
way, epic theatre, in Benjamin’s words, “is in league with the course of time in an entirely 
different way from that of tragic theatre.”90 
Eichmann in Jerusalem retells the story of the Eichmann Trial in an epic mode. Benjamin 
describes the relationship that epic theatre has to the story it transforms as the relationship “a 
ballet teacher has to his pupil: his first task would be to loosen her joints to the greatest possible 
extent.”91 In this rather gruesome analogy, we see the sort of violence that many critics attribute 
to Arendt’s language in Eichmann in Jerusalem. Arendt’s account is not a simple legal 
investigation of Eichmann’s personal culpability, but is the result of loosening the joints of the 
way that the court trial itself proceeded in order to tell a new story.  
Throughout Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt employs the sorts of captions and historical 
asides that characterize epic (and documentary) theatre. Despite her insistence on the importance 
of keeping Eichmann and his actions at the center of the proceedings, she even supports such 
digressions within the trial itself. Arendt is not opposed to digressions extraneous to Eichmann’s 
individual guilt that explain how Eichmann’s crimes could have come about. Regarding 
discussions of Eichmann’s personality, she writes:  
One was perhaps entitled to be glad that this was no ordinary trial, where statements 
without bearing on the criminal proceedings must be thrown out as irrelevant and 
immaterial. For, obviously, things were not so simple as the framers of the law had 
imagined them to be, and if it was of small legal relevance, it was of great political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






interest to know how long it takes an average person to overcome his innate repugnance 
toward crime, and what exactly happens to him once he has reached that point.92  
Arendt is also particularly glad of some legally non-pertinent testimony about the Warsaw 
Uprising precisely because it proved that history could have turned out otherwise: “Legal 
considerations aside, the appearance in the witness box of the former Jewish resistance fighters 
was welcome enough. It dissipated the haunting specter of universal cooperation, the stifling, 
poisoned atmosphere which had surrounded the Final Solution.” 93  She emphasizes the 
importance of hearing not only about the Jewish resistance, but also about Christian Polish 
families who risked their lives to save Jewish children, and a sergeant in the German army who 
helped Jewish partisans in Poland and was eventually caught and executed. The importance of 
these exceptions, for Arendt, is to show that even in the unlikeliest of circumstances, there were 
still individuals who maintained their capacity to judge for themselves, to act humanly even 
when it meant stepping out of the role they had been asked to perform.  
Arendt concludes Eichmann in Jerusalem with a monologue. She switches from the 
previous voice of her account to a speech, presented in quotes, that the judges should have given 
in their sentencing of Eichmann. As Judith Butler has recently argued, this speech incorporates 
the language and voices of the prosecutor, judges, and even Eichmann himself along with 
Arendt’s own voice. Butler proposes that in this passage Arendt theatrically enacts the plurality 
of judging alongside others whom one has not chosen, and with whom one may be in conflict. In 
other words, Arendt uses “textual theatre”—this is Butler’s term—to model the very form of 
cohabitation that Eichmann had worked to eradicate.94 In contrast to Eichmann, Arendt can enact 
multiple roles and can judge among others. For this reason she can also depart from the scripts 
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that are given to her and write her own judgment instead of relaying the actual judgment of the 
court. She rejects the grand historical narrative of the chief prosecutors and is also unwilling to 
simply transmit the transcript of the final ruling. 
The monologue Arendt presents here is an epic one full of “quotable gestures”: she 
reenacts both her own gestures from earlier in the account as well as the gestures of its other 
characters. In doing so, Arendt interrupts her own story. This interruption through the “quotable 
gesture” is, in Benjamin’s account, the fundamental characteristic of epic theatre and the one that 
gives the audience the opportunity to reflect on and to judge the actions on stage. In other words, 
Arendt’s own performance of judgment is designed to open the space for her audience to judge. 
Arendt offers this judgment not in the manner of a courtroom, but in the manner of a play.  
After the controversy following Eichmann’s initial publication in The New Yorker, 
Arendt compared the response to her trial reports to the controversy surrounding Rolf 
Hochhuth’s play The Deputy in both the postscript of the book version of Eichmann in Jerusalem 
and in her essay “Some Questions on Moral Philosophy.” The Deputy is a documentary play 
about the complicity of the Vatican in the Holocaust. Arendt attributes the anger against her and 
Hochhuth to an unthinking anger against those “who dared to sit in judgment; for no one can 
judge who had not been in the same circumstances under which, presumably, one would have 
behaved like all others. This position, incidentally, coincided oddly with Eichmann’s view on 
these matters.”95 Everyone, Arendt insists, has the right to judge: the moment that you ask “who 
am I to judge?” you are lost. Eichmann in Jerusalem restages the trial as textual theatre not only 
to judge the past, but to teach its audience how to judge for themselves. And not every form of 
theatre or theatrical device can do this: Arendt believes that tragic drama forestalls judgment, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




while Brechtian dramaturgy teaches it. This brings us to the third type of judgment, the judgment 
of audience members.  
The Audience 
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt suggests that the courtroom must issue a legal 
judgment on Eichmann’s actions, not on the personal suffering of survivors. Within her account 
of the trial, though, she indicates how difficult this position is to hold. Arendt describes the 
testimony of one witness, Zindel Grynszpan whose,  
story took no more than perhaps ten minutes to tell, and when it was over… one thought 
foolishly: Everyone, everyone should have his day in court. Only to find out, in the 
endless sessions that followed, how difficult it was to tell the story, that—at least outside 
the transforming realm of poetry—it needed a purity of soul, an unmirrored, unreflected 
innocence of heart and mind that only the righteous possess.96 
Arendt criticizes the pretensions and theatricality of some witnesses in sharp terms. Yet during 
this testimony Arendt feels—foolishly because she knows it contradicts her own complaints 
against the court—that all survivors should have their day in court. She therefore has a good deal 
of understanding for the judges who, although they quarreled with Hausner’s ambition to “paint 
a general picture,” could not bring themselves to interrupt the testimony of survivors, for, 
Who were they, humanly speaking, to deny any of these people their day in court? And 
who would have dared, humanly speaking, to question their veracity as to detail when 
then they ‘poured out their hearts as they stood in the witness box,’ when though what 
they had to tell could only ‘be regarded as by-products of the trial.’?97  
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Arendt approvingly cites the judges’ comment that “sufferings on so gigantic a scale were… ‘a 
matter for great authors and poets.’”98 It may initially seem that Arendt is exiling personal 
experience of suffering from political life. But her late work on Kant suggests that, in fact, art 
and aesthetic judgment are closely bound to the public realm. 
 The Eichmann trial led Arendt to her final project, the volumes on thinking, willing, and 
judging that were published posthumously as The Life of the Mind. In these lectures, Arendt 
argues that Kant’s Critique of Judgment is more closely connected to the political than either of 
his other critiques. Whereas the moral laws articulated in the Critiques of Pure and Practical 
Reason are “valid for all intelligible beings,” the Critique of Judgment is about “human beings 
on earth.”99 Only the Critique of Judgment and its conception of taste correspond to the condition 
of plurality; it is bound up in communicability and thus the relationship between humans.100 
Arendt argues that to judge aesthetically means to judge in the company of others: “when 
somebody makes the judgment, this is beautiful, he does not mean merely to say this pleases 
me… but he claims assent from others because in judging he has already taken them into account 
and hence hopes that his judgments will carry a certain general, though perhaps not universal, 
validity.” Nevertheless, aesthetic judgment does not presuppose conformity to prevailing 
opinions: “I still speak with my own voice and I do not count noses in order to arrive at what I 
think is right. But my judgment is no longer subjective.” 101 Aesthetic judgment is a process of 
the “enlargement of the mind”—being able to compare one’s own judgment to the judgment of 
others, precisely the faculty that Eichmann lacked.  
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 Arendt conceives of audiences as critics rather than passive spectators. An actor judges 
how to act by taking into account the judgment of the audience. Indeed, “the public realm is 
constituted by the critics and the spectators and not by the actors or the makers.”102 Art has an 
uneasy place within Arendt’s scheme of praxis and poeisis. On the one hand, The Human 
Condition suggests that this might be a question of media: theatre is the political art par 
excellence because it is enacted by living individuals in a public arena. On the other hand, 
Arendt also distinguishes between different types of artists, even within the same medium, 
contrasting “the large class of professional writers” to “poets [Dichter],” who are “something 
altogether different.”103 She suggests that while the professional writer works, the poet acts; the 
poet is therefore subject to a different sort of judgment than that of the professional writer.   
 Poets exist between praxis and poeisis, and for this reason there is a particular difficulty 
in talking about and judging poetry. Poets are a concern both privately and politically, and make 
demands on us both as private readers and as citizens: “The voice of the poets… concerns all of 
us, not only critics and scholars; it concerns us in our private lives and also insofar as we are 
citizens.”104 In order to demonstrate how to judge poets, Arendt stages a second trial within the 
pages of the New Yorker three years after her trial reports from Jerusalem. In an essay titled 
“What is Permitted to Jove…Reflections on the Poet Bertolt Brecht and His Relation to Politics,” 
Arendt presents the “case” of Brecht, a case that is “of concern to all citizens who wish to share 
their world with poets.” Judging the case of Brecht “cannot be left to the literature departments 
but is the business of the political scientists as well.”105 
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Arendt takes the title of her essay from the phrase, “what is permitted to Jove is not 
permitted to an ox,” suggesting from the beginning that poets are subject to their own particular 
form of judgment. From the beginning of the essay, Arendt discounts any moral judgment of 
Brecht’s beliefs, stating that “Brecht’s doctrinaire and often ludicrous adherence to the 
Communist ideology as such need hardly cause serious concern.”106 At the same time, the 
example of Ezra Pound suggests that it must be necessary to pass some sort of judgment on 
poets, that we must attend not only to their voices, but to what they say; “they obviously can’t 
get away with everything.”107 This presents a challenge to Arendt. It is clear that insofar as poets 
act and speak within and to the public they cannot be condemned either on moral grounds or in 
ways that would understand their speech as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.  
Instead, we must judge them by the virtuosity of their performance. As she puts it, “a poet is to 
be judged by his poetry, and while much is permitted him, it is not true that ‘those who praise the 
outrage have fine-sounding voices.’”108 In other words, their performance depends not only on 
the quality of their voice but on what they praise. The point Arendt makes is not the intuitive one 
(that poetry praising outrage is bad poetry), but that poets who praise outrage in their poems will 
lose their gift of poetry.   
Arendt uses “the case of Brecht” to argue two important points. First, although “more is 
permitted to the poet than to ordinary mortals, poets, too, can sin so gravely that they must bear 
their full load of responsibility.”109 Bearing their load of responsibility means ceasing to be able 
to write, the worst thing that can happen to a poet and precisely what—in Arendt’s account—
happened to Brecht in the final years of his life (I will offer an argument against this 
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interpretation of Brecht’s “silence” in the next chapter).  Second, “the only way to determine 
unequivocally how great [poets’] sins are is to listen to their poetry—which means, I assume, 
that the faculty of writing a good line is not entirely at the poet’s command but needs some help, 
that the faculty is granted him and that he can forfeit it.”110 We determine the sins of a poet 
through aesthetic judgment of his or her poetry (whether the poet is able to write a good line).  
But this judgment comes after the poet has already been punished; ours is actually the second 
judgment against the poet. There must also be a first judgment that is based on what he says, that 
is a moral judgment, and that results in taking away the faculty of writing that he has been 
granted. But who makes this first judgment and how is it reached? 
Arendt is only able to emerge from this paradox through a deus ex machina: Apollo 
enters the essay, and he becomes the first judge. Apollo, the god of poetry, is the one who doles 
out the punishment; Brecht like all poets lives not under the laws of the rest of us but “under the 
laws of Apollo.” These laws are in some sense more permissive than ours, but if the poets sin 
gravely enough, they are deprived of their “divine gift.”111 While “what is permitted to Jove [or 
those a bit like him, those blessed by Apollo] is not permitted to an ox,” the inverse is also true: 
“what is permitted to an ox is not permitted to Jove.” Mere writers can sin without being 
punished by a loss of talent because “no god leaned over their cradle, no god will take 
revenge.”112  
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Arendt describes in her essay how Brecht came to sin out of compassion. Like the French 
revolutionaries of On Revolution, his compassion led him to the Party, and the need to be 
merciless in order to be compassionate. Arendt points to The Measures Taken, which she calls 
Brecht’s only truly communist play, as the moment in which he praised the outrage and 
“sinned.” Although Brecht wrote the play before the Moscow Trials, Arendt emphasizes that it 
was written just after Stalin had announced the beginning of the liquidation of the old guard of 
the Bolsheviks during the Sixteenth Party Congress (1929): “Brecht felt that what the Party 
needed right then was a defense of killing one’s own comrades and innocent people.”113 But, at 
the same time, the play is not a bad play.114 On the contrary, in The Measure Taken, Brecht “had 
done what poets will always do if they are left alone: He had announced the truth to the extent 
that this truth had become visible.”115 Notwithstanding the intentions that Arendt imputes to 
Brecht here, the Party hated the play for speaking the truth, and so Brecht’s “poetic luck” did not 
leave him just then.  
Although Brecht was able to speak the truth about the Party, Arendt writes that his 
allegiance to the Party prevented him from understanding the situation in Germany—that the 
Nazis were not persecuting workers, but Jews -- “that it was race, not class, that counted.”116 
Here the sin of following the Party and promoting it in his verse resulted in the “wooden prose 
dialogue in Fear and Misery in the Third Reich” and a selection of “so-called poems, which are 
journalese divided into verse lines.”117 But even after this, while in exile, Brecht was able to 
write some of his greatest works. The punishment caught up to him once he returned to East 
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Berlin: “his poetic faculty dried up from one day to the next.”118 It was not when he himself 
sinned, but when he came to see the actual life under Communism that he lost his gift. Arendt is 
rather unfair to Brecht here. She knew Benjamin’s “Conversations with Brecht,” and even cites 
one passage from it in the essay. She knew very well, therefore, that Brecht sharply criticized the 
official party literature of the period and was disturbed by the purges and repressions in the 
Soviet Union. She also knew that this essay had never been published because she was the one 
who had considered and decided against publishing it. Her reading of Fear and Misery in the 
Third Reich also ignores one of the most powerful vignettes within the play: “The Jewish Wife,” 
built around long monologues by a Jewish woman preparing to flee from Germany. Finally, 
Arendt’s claim that Brecht wrote “odes to Stalin” was publically challenged by both John Willett 
and Irving Fletscher after the essay’s publication.119  
While most of Arendt’s essay is dedicated to Apollo’s punishment of Brecht, which robs 
Brecht of his capacity to speak as a poet, the conclusion of her essay is about forgiveness: 
The equality before the law whose standard we commonly adopt for moral judgments … 
is no absolute. Every judgment is open to forgiveness, every act of judging can change 
into an act of forgiving; to judge and to forgive are but two sides of the same coin. But 
the two sides follow different rules. The majesty of the law demands that we be equal—
that only our acts count, and not the person who committed them. The act of forgiving, 
on the contrary, takes the person into account; no pardon pardons murder or theft but only 
the murderer or the thief. We always forgive somebody, never something…we forgive for 
the sake of the person, and while justice demands that all be equal, mercy insists on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Ibid., 253	  




inequality—an inequality implying that every man is, or should be, more than whatever 
he did or achieved.120  
While judgment according to the law relies on general standards, forgiveness is about the 
particular. Forgiveness is also a relationship between people—you forgive somebody not 
something. Forgiveness, like aesthetic judgment, is about the particulars; it always speaks 
humanly.  
 Apollo’s judgment brings us back to the Oresteia. Apollo is known to take away the gift 
of poetry; he is brutal in his punishments against artists and musicians who trespass against him. 
But the Oresteia shows us that he is also a god who can open the way for forgiveness.  The 
Eumenides demand equality before the law: all matricides must be punished or justice will mean 
nothing. Apollo argues against them that Orestes must be forgiven because of the particularities 
of his case. While Orestes is a matricide, he is also the avenger of his father’s death. The 
Oresteia reveals what Arendt calls the process character of action: each action unleashes a chain 
of consequences the doer did not intend. This process character is a tremendous challenge, it is 
“reason enough to turn away with despair from the realm of human affairs and to hold in 
contempt the human capacity for freedom, which, by producing the web of human relationships, 
seems to entangle its producer to such an extent that he appears much more the victim and the 
sufferer than the author and doer of his deeds.”121 The play relies heavily on the same metaphor 
that Arendt uses—that of webs and nets—to convey this entanglement. Orestes’ murder of 
Clytemnestra is part of a chain of action and retribution that leads back two generations, to the 
quarrel between the brother Atreus and Thyestes, the seductions of Atreus’s wife, the murder of 
Thyestes’ children, the curse he placed on the house of Atreus, the sacrifice of Iphigenia, and the 
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murder of Agamemnon. As Arendt argues, there are two ways out of this unending chain: 
forgiveness and promising. The Oresteia features both of these acts: Apollo forgives Orestes, as 
does Athena. To sate the furies, Athena also has to make a promise to them, offering them 
domain over the Athenians.  
 I return to the Oresteia because its significance is not limited to the story it tells. It is also 
written to reenact this story in the public sphere and reconstitute the original polis that Athena 
creates at the end of the trilogy. Although the judgment within the play is theatrical, that is, we 
know the outcome of the trial before it begins, the play gives audiences a common place for 
judgment. Judging the performance aesthetically—discussing how well the actors performed 
their roles—is what actually constitutes and reconstitutes the public as a plurality, each judging 
the action in the company of others.  In the German version of “What is Permitted to Jove…”, 
Arendt describes how, interned in a concentration camp by the French government, she heard 
Brecht’s yet unpublished poem about Lao Tzu’s road into exile: “the poem spread like wild-fire 
in the camps, passed from mouth to mouth like a Gospel, which God knows was needed nowhere 
more urgently than on those straw mats of hopelessness.”122 Not only was the poem able to offer 
solace to those in the camps, but writing about the poem allows Arendt to speak of her own 
personal experience during the war. While Eichmann in Jerusalem may seem to exile narratives 
of personal suffering from public discourse altogether, this essay on Brecht offers a place for 
personal experience of the war within the public realm. If the public realm is indeed constituted 
by critics and spectators, art does more than relegate personal experience and suffering to a non-
political space. On the contrary, through art, suffering and personal experience becomes 
admissible to the public realm because they are translated into a form that can be spoken about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




and judged. Art is not outside of public life, it grounds the possibility for judgment in the public 
realm.  
 Arendt sees the possibility of public life not only in Aeschylus, but also in Kafka. Arendt 
reads Kafka’s The Trial as a warning against the forfeiture of the capacity to act. The story it 
tells is of a man who is “transformed until he is fit to assume the role forced upon him, which is 
to play along as best he can in a world of necessity, injustice, and lies.”123 Josef K. comes to fully 
embody the role forced upon him, eventually believing in his own guilt. He adopts this role 
because he comes to believe that there is a “divine necessity” to the world order. He does not 
stop to judge the role that he has been given, and therefore also fails to consider whether the 
world order could be otherwise. Arendt insists that Kafka wrote the novel to demonstrate the 
process through which the world is “deified”: how the world order is able to claim that it is a 
divine necessity and prevent action that would herald the new. Arendt strongly rejects the 
“readings of the twenties” that saw Kafka’s The Trial as a portrayal of the world as it necessarily 
was and complains that “no one paid the slightest attention to Kafka’s sarcastic and bitter remark 
about the mendacious necessity and the necessary mendacity which together constitute the 
‘divinity’ of this world order—a remark that clearly provides the key to understanding the 
construction of the plot of the novel.”124 By this reading, The Trial portrays both a deified world, 
and the process through which it is produced.  By revealing this machinery, Kafka seeks to show 
how people can change it. Kafka imagines “a possible world that human beings would construct 
in which the actions of man depend on nothing but himself and his spontaneity, and in which 
human society is governed by laws prescribed by man himself rather than by mysterious 
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forces.”125 Arendt reads Kafka as a Brechtian here: revealing the machinery behind the scene to 
show audiences how they themselves could change the world.  
 Arendt’s reading of Kafka here is not just a Brechtian reading, it is actually very close to 
the reading that Brecht discusses with Benjamin in “Conversations with Brecht” (the piece that 
Arendt originally proposed to publish in Illuminations). Here Brecht sharply criticizes 
Benjamin’s essay on Kafka for spreading “the darkness surrounding Kafka instead of dispersing 
it,” and insists that “it is necessary to clarify Kafka…to formulate the practicable suggestions 
which can be extracted from his stories.” Brecht calls this darkness in common readings of Kafka  
“Jewish fascism;” Arendt terms it “satanic theology.”126 The difference between Brecht and 
Arendt in their writings on Kafka, though, is that Brecht claims that Kafka “never found a 
solution” to his nightmare visions. Arendt, in contrast, believes that Kafka did see a solution, one 
that required the destruction of the present world. Unlike Brecht, Arendt refuses to see Kafka 
simply as a prophet. Prophets only foretell doom; Kafka opens the possibility of action that can 
reinvent the world: “Only salvation, and not ruin, depends upon the freedom of man and his 
capacity to change the world and its natural course.” Kafka shows his readers how to reject “the 
fatal belief… that the task of man is to submit to a process predetermined by some power or 
other can only hasten the natural process of ruin.”127  
Arendt concludes her essay on Kafka by arguing that Kafka saw this reinvented world in 
the “happy ending” of America. This world is a theatre, “The Nature Theatre of Oklahoma,” 
where “all are welcome.” 128  Arendt’s essay was originally published on the twentieth 
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anniversary of Kafka’s death, and implicitly references Benjamin’s essay published ten years 
earlier (the essay whose draft Brecht had so strongly criticized). Benjamin’s essay discusses the 
arrival of Karl Rossman at “The Nature Theatre of Oklahoma” at length.  Benjamin describes the 
“Nature Theatre of Oklahoma” as one whose techniques hark back to Chinese theatre. It is a 
gestic theatre, which is to say, it is a Brechtian theatre. Benjamin goes even further than 
suggesting that the protagonist finds his home in this theatre. He suggests that many of Kafka’s 
works themselves “are seen in their full light only when they are, so to speak, put on as acts in 
the ‘Nature Theatre of Oklahoma.’”129 These works are composed of gestic moments and 
constellations, ones whose meaning becomes apparent only on the stage. Benjamin writes: 
Kafka’s world is a world theatre. For him, man is on stage from the very beginning. The 
 proof of the pudding is the fact that everyone is accepted by the Nature Theatre of 
 Oklahoma. What the standards for admission are cannot be determined. Dramatic talent, 
 the most obvious criterion, seems to be of no importance. But this can be expressed in 
 another way: all that is expected of the applicants is the ability to play themselves.130  
For those who join the Nature Theatre of Oklahoma, it is both their last refuge and their 
salvation. During the celebrations for new members, extras from the theatre dress up as angels; 
Benjamin notes “but for the fact that their wings are tied on, these angels might be real.”131 At 
the Nature Theatre, actors are able to tie on their own wings. They are theatre wings, but they 
still open the way for a new beginning.  
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Bertolt Brecht: Staging the Law 
 
 On the eve of the Nuremberg Trials, judges, attorneys, and dignitaries from the Allied 
Powers gathered for a reception at the city’s Soviet headquarters. Several drinks in, Iona 
Nikitchenko, chief judge representing the Soviet Union, proposed a toast. He raised his glass, “to 
a speedy conviction and execution of the defendants!” The French, British, and American judges 
cheered and drank heartily; only a few moments later did they begin to realize, abashedly, the 
implications of toasting to executions before the trial began. 
 Meanwhile, in Santa Monica, Bertolt Brecht was having an argument with Leo 
Feuchtwanger about the novelist’s decision to decline a post writing about the trials for the 
Associated Press. 
 “I’m not good at that sort of thing,” Feuchtwanger complained. 
 “Then do it as well as you can, you’re the only one who was asked” rejoined Brecht. 
 “You overestimate the trial.” 
“For the first time in modern history, a government is standing before a court because of 
its crimes.” 
Feuchtwanger remained skeptical:  
“It’s not actually meant seriously.” 
“That’s why you should go, so that the crimes of this government against its own people 
are also remembered.” 
Changing tactics, Feuchtwanger replied:  




“Through luck you find yourself in a position where you are invited to speak, to represent 
the German anti-Nazis. You have no right to keep writing your novel. Speak badly, 
stutter, let yourself be gagged, but appear in the arena.”   
“You know,” said Feuchtwanger, “it isn’t cowardice.”  
“I know worse,” replied Brecht, “it’s complacency.”132 
A decade earlier, Feuchtwanger had already watched Nikitchenko and other members of the 
Soviet Union’s legal team for the Nuremberg Trials preside over the Moscow trials of alleged 
Trotskyists.133 In his essay “Moscow 1937,” Feuchtwanger defended these trials against the 
criticism of Western observers, writing that while the trials had seemed incredible from the 
vantage point of Western Europe, once he actually attended the trials he “was forced to accept 
the evidence of my senses, and my doubts melted away as naturally as salt dissolves in water.”134 
All the same, eight years later, Feuchtwanger refuses to attend the Nuremberg trials: he does not 
think that watching them live will make any difference to his understanding of them. 
Unlike Feuchtwanger, Brecht was relatively unconcerned that the Nuremberg Trials 
might not be “meant seriously,” that the judges may have toasted to the convictions of the 
defendants before the trial began. For Brecht, the importance of a public trial in which a 
government must stand before a court for its crimes could not be underestimated, regardless of 
the self-interest of the judges. Brecht is not only unconcerned with the “show” element of the 
trials, but in fact sees the element of show and theatre as an integral parts of these trials. And, 
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moreover, he is less concerned with the verdicts of the judges than with the verdicts of spectators 
around the world.  
Brecht’s debate with Feuchtwanger brings Brecht’s position on trials and theatre into 
sharp contrast with that of many of his contemporaries. In his account of the Moscow trials, 
Feuchtwanger attempts to convince his readers of the fairness of the Moscow Trials by indicating 
how real they are, that is, how much unlike theatre they are. Feuchtwanger writes that before he 
attended the trials, “the hysterical confessions of the accused seemed to have been extorted by 
some mysterious means and the whole proceedings appeared like a play staged with 
consummate, strange, and frightful artistry.” But upon experiencing them himself he is struck by 
their lack of theatricality, noting that, “judges, public prosecution, and accused all spoke calmly 
and without emotion, and not one of them ever raised his voice.” He remarks that it is only as an 
audience member at these trials that he came to understand their authenticity and deems it “a pity 
that the laws of the Soviet Union forbade photographs and gramophone records to be made in 
court. If one could have reproduced for the whole world not only what the prisoners said, but 
how they said it, their intonations, their faces, I think there would be very few skeptics left.” 
Feuchtwanger would go on, in 1947, to write a now almost forgotten play, Delusion, or the Devil 
in Boston (Wahn, oder der Teufel in Boston) about the Salem Witch Trials, trials in which 
emotion and theatricality were closely aligned with superstition, persecution, and injustice.135 
Importantly, unlike Feuchtwanger, Brecht does not differentiate between theatrical and authentic 
trials. For Brecht, all trials are theatrical, but that does not mean they are unjust. It does, however, 
mean that we need to watch and critique trials as we would epic theatre, thinking about the 
disjuncture between the defendants and the roles they play in a trial, and not just taking the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




judge’s verdict as truth, but approaching the evidence ourselves and making our own 
decisions.136  
For Brecht, the trial exists not only in its initial iteration, but in its interpretations and re-
stagings, and this is part of why he reacts to Feuchtwanger as he does. While Brecht is not 
altogether concerned with the judges, he is deeply dismayed by Feuchtwanger’s reluctance to 
cover the trial for the Associated Press. As he sees it, the trial does not end with the judges, and 
Feuchtwanger has both an opportunity, and obligation, to extend the life of the trial through his  
reportage. Although Feuchtwanger is offered a position to report for the AP, Brecht speaks of 
Feuchtwanger’s role as though the latter were himself a witness called at the trial, urging him to 
“speak badly, stutter, let yourself be gagged, but appear in the arena.” Feuchtwanger’s voice in 
and of itself adds new evidence to the trial, evidence that there were Germans who spoke out 
against the Nazi regime. Brecht urges Feuchtwanger to go as a representative of the German anti-
Nazis not out of a nationalist desire to show that there were good Germans, but rather because 
the existence of German anti-Nazis proves that the rise of Hitler was never irresistible, but that it 
was also possible for an individual to judge for himself and act against the Nazis while they were 
in power. As discussed in the previous chapter, Brecht places the same emphasis as Arendt does 
on resistance as damning proof that the defendants could have acted differently. 
Brecht’s position on the Nuremberg Trials in his conversation with Feuchtwanger allows 
us to recover a central element of Brecht’s theatre practice and political convictions that the 
strange confluence of his Marxism and his estate’s strict control over his intellectual property has 
led critics to overlook: a conviction that scripts—historical and dramatic—are always open to 
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reinvention and reinterpretation. In this chapter I will address the ways that Brecht uses the 
model of courtroom testimony to design a new form of theatre that offers multiple interpretations 
of the action and encourages the audience to become a jury, in which they judge the outcome of 
the play and make its course contingent on human choices rather than fate. In this sense, the law 
itself is presented as a text open to interpretation and performance. By interpreting and 
performing the law, epic theatre not only changes how audiences understand theatre, but how 
they understand their political circumstances. The first half of the chapter, discusses the ways 
that Brecht’s plays and theories of theatre are in dialogue with the political trials of the mid-
twentieth century, and provide commentary on the respective public roles of theatre and law 
courts. In the second half of the chapter, I discuss Brecht’s staging of The Caucasian Chalk 
Circle at the Berliner Ensemble in 1954 in order to understand what judging and judgment meant 
to Brecht in the immediate aftermath of the June Seventeenth workers’ uprising, and how the 
Berliner Ensemble came to position itself as an East German institution.  
 
Epic Theatre as Trial Theatre 
Public trials were a fundamental aspect of political life throughout Brecht’s life. Brecht 
was born the same year that Emile Zola published “J’accuse.” In the year that Sacco and 
Vanzetti were executed, Brecht began his first collaboration with Kurt Weill on The Rise and 
Fall of the City of Mahagonny, an opera about the American West and the lumberjack Jimmy 
Mahoney, who is tried and executed for inciting anarchy and, more importantly, failing to pay 
for his drink. The political trials of the 1930s and 1940s challenged Brecht’s political convictions 
(as he followed the plight of friends executed during the Stalinist purges and Moscow Show 




Activities Committee). But at the same time, the experience of widely varied political trials 
provided Brecht a wealth of material for his plays and theories of theatre.   
Brecht uses trials in his plays so often that Günter Anders compares him to Kafka, noting 
that like Kafka, Brecht creates a judicial world, and that, “every Brecht play could also be called 
The Trial.” 137 But Anders emphasizes that, unlike Kafka, Brecht “wants to make the observer 
capable of judging.” If not all—as Anders claims—certainly the majority of Brecht’s canonical 
plays could be re-named The Trial: The Measures Taken, The Good Person of Szechuan, Galileo 
Galilei, The Caucasian Chalk Circle, Man is Man, The Trial of Lucullus and The Rise and Fall 
of the City of Mahagonny. In many of his plays, Brecht includes trial scenes that emphasize the 
injustice of actual courtroom proceedings. Indeed, what is so often put on trial on Brecht’s stage, 
is first and foremost, the trial itself. The trials in Man is Man show the perversion of justice 
within a colonial context; the trial in The Good Person of Szechuan portrays the interest that 
figures of authority (including gods) have in maintaining the status quo through their legal 
rulings; the trial in The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny shows that judges and 
prosecutors have the same class interests, and will ally against defendants out of economic self-
interest. In many cases—including The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny, The Good 
Person of Szechuan, and Man is Man—Brecht even includes an onstage audience who is 
behaving as a bad jury (refusing to acknowledge evidence, adopting the claims of those in power 
without question, enjoying the trial in direct proportion to their intoxication).  
 Brecht’s plays, then, are full of scenes of unjust trials. These trials are theatrical in a 
purely negative sense, offering mere spectacle instead of justice. But at the same time, he uses 
the courtroom trial as a formal model for epic theatre, modeling both audience reception and 
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theatre’s relationship to history. Brecht’s political theater seeks to do more than pronounce 
judgments. It is designed not simply to accuse and condemn, but to teach audiences methods of 
judging. To this end, Brecht proposes non-Aristotelian, or epic, theater that will engage the 
audience not through sympathy, but through its critical capacities. For example, in Brecht’s 
“Street Scene,” Brecht uses the model of a trial and courtroom testimony to explain epic acting.  
In the essay, Brecht compares epic theater to an eyewitness recounting what has just occurred in 
a car accident to a group of onlookers. In the process, the eyewitness may step into various roles 
of the people involved to mime what happened, but there is always an element of distance 
(Verfremdung, or estrangement) separating him and the onlookers from the actual accident.  
When the witness demonstrates the way in which the driver drove, the onlookers are never 
compelled to believe that he himself is the driver.  Brecht argues that were this witness to then be 
brought before the court, his performance would become yet closer to that of an epic actor in that 
he would now be performing memorized and practiced text (einstudierte Text). 138  The 
conception of theatre as trial remains throughout Brecht’s writings on epic acting styles.139   
 The model of a trial was crucial both to Brecht’s articulation of new modes of acting and 
audience reception (the actor as witness, the audience as jury) and his notion of a particular 
relationship between theatre and history. In Brecht’s tabulation of the characteristics of epic 
theatre, published as “Notes on the Opera The Rise and Fall of the City Mahagonny,” epic 
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theatre is distinguished from dramatic theatre as an after-the-fact repetition of past events. 
Whereas dramatic theatre seeks to draw audiences into staged action designed to seem 
contemporaneous with the performance, epic theatre restages past actions as a trial might: 
through descriptions and commentaries on actions that ended before the performance of them 
began.140 Brecht’s theatre is predicated on repetition and distance, wherein the audience is 
supposed to perceive the action as action that happened before, and at the same time to 
consciously understand the action as a restaging. By staging past actions as a trial would, that is 
to say, critically and dialogically, epic theatre is designed to forestall Aristotelian theatre’s 
perpetual reproduction of existing structures of power. These restagings adapt the way that the 
story is told to the particular conditions in which it is told. Because epic theatre is restaged to suit 
contemporary conditions, epic theatre is always connected to particulars, like Arendt’s 
conception of aesthetic judgment. This dynamic of restaging and reenactment also implies a 
shifting sense of justice. Just as texts must be interpreted and staged by particular actors and for 
particular audiences, the letter of the law must be actively interpreted to suit the particulars of the 
case.  
 
The Resistible Repetition of History 
Brecht created a theory of theatre that lay bare not only the technologies of staging, but 
their historicity. In one scene of The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui, we watch a gangster with 
political ambitions take acting lessons. Arturo Ui realizes after his first few attempts at extortion 
that he needs a directorial intervention. His bodyguards find an unemployed actor at a bar, who is 
hired to show Ui how to walk, stand, sit, and speak. One by one, the tips that the actor gives Ui 
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turns him into an incarnation of Hitler. The scene ends with Ui and the unemployed actor 
reciting Mark Antony’s funeral oration from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Brecht’s critique here 
does not rest simply on the theatricality of Arturo Ui, but on the ways that the theatricality is 
outdated. Even the bodyguards realize that the actor’s style is “passé” and that the text has not 
been adapted to suit contemporary audiences.141 The problem, it seems, is not simply the 
theatricality of Ui’s political speech, but Ui’s application of outmoded aesthetics to 
contemporary problems.  
This scene plays on the opening of Marx’s “Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon.” 
Like Arendt, Brecht sees the distinction between the tragedy of the Revolution of 1789 and the 
farce of 1848 as a problem of embodiment: the revolutionaries forgot that their props and 
personas were only theatrical accessories, and lost themselves in their parts. Arturo Ui attempts 
to imitate the Roman Mark Antony as he also attempts to imitate outdated styles of acting, in a 
sense repeating tragedy as farce both historically and stylistically. While Arendt’s rewriting of 
the “Eighteenth Brumaire” emphasizes the necessity of actors to judge the roles they are asked to 
perform, Brecht focuses here on the role of the director. Part of the problem is that the 
unemployed Shakespearean Arturo Ui has hired only knows how to act the part, not how to come 
up with his own interpretation. The actor is unaware that it is necessary to actively interpret and 
restage the play, and instead knows only how to “make the ghosts walk again.”  
 The problem for Brecht, as for Arendt, is not that we borrow the language or costumes of 
the past (which is inevitable), but that we forget to approach them critically, with a view toward 
current political circumstances. For Brecht the uncritical embodiment of given roles, both within 
the theatre and on the world stage, forestalls progress toward revolutionary change. The job of a 
director is not simply to interpret the drama for actors, but to change it: to adapt the story for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




present. Through a focus on this conjunction between Brecht’s views of history and political 
action and his theories of the theatre, it becomes possible to understand Brecht’s innovations in 
relation not only to the aesthetic and political theories that he explicitly rejects, but also to Soviet 
and later East German policies that he was reluctant to publically critique.  
 
Formalism and History 
The relationship between history, text, and performance in Brecht’s work can only be 
understood within the shifting political and cultural political landscapes of the different periods 
of his career. Brecht’s new techniques of acting and their relationship to history evolved not only 
in reference to the qualities of bourgeois melodrama and Aristotelian theatre that Brecht targeted 
explicitly, but also to the realism debates of the 1930s. This series of debates on politics and 
aesthetics sought to appraise the historical and political value of both expressionism in particular, 
and modernism in general, and marked the shift of Soviet and Comintern cultural policy from the 
avant-garde experiments of Weimar Germany and the early years of the Soviet Union toward 
socialist realism. The motivating questions of the debate concerned the political utility of art, its 
populism, and its ability to reflect the totality of the current historical moment.  
In his account of conversations with Brecht in 1938, Walter Benjamin describes Brecht’s 
rising concern with art in the Soviet Union. Brecht and Benjamin agree that they can no longer 
read new Soviet novels, and discuss the plight of artists in the Soviet Union. Brecht sympathizes 
with Soviet poets and the constraints on their work: “if Stalin’s name doesn’t occur in a poem, 
it’s interpreted as intentional.”142 Brecht is very concerned with the increasing strength of Georg 
Lukács’ anti-formalist position as well as the violent purges of his own friends and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




acquaintances. 143  Ernst Ottwald, Brecht’s former collaborator, who had been attacked in 
Linkskurve by Lukács, had fallen victim to the purges. Brecht’s friend Sergei Tretiakov was also 
presumed dead. Brecht asks Benjamin to read several essays on Lukács that he is considering 
publishing.  He asks Benjamin’s opinion, concerned that “Lukács’ position ‘over there’ is at the 
moment very strong.” Benjamin asks if Brecht has any friends in Moscow. Brecht replies, 
“Actually, no, I haven’t. Neither have the Muscovites themselves—like the dead.”144  
These essays were ultimately only published posthumously in West Germany. In his 
essays, Brecht challenges Lukács’ elevation of the classical novels of the nineteenth century over 
modernist experimentation. Brecht turns the debate on its head to accuse Lukács himself of 
formalism, of preserving the style of nineteenth century novels without paying heed to the 
changes in historical circumstances that demand new forms of realism.145 In this sense, Lukács is 
like a revolutionary of 1848, imitating the style of the bourgeois revolutionaries of the nineteenth 
century instead of realizing that the times have changed, that it is impossible to keep staging 
revolution in the same style. Discussing Balzac and Tolstoy, Lukács’ novelists of choice, Brecht 
insists, “realism is not a mere question of form. Were we to copy the style of these realists, we 
would no longer be realists...Reality changes; in order to represent it, modes of representation 
must also change.”146 To attend to current political circumstances, artists must at all costs avoid 
the temptation to simply make the ghosts walk again,  
With the people struggling and changing reality before our eyes, we must not cling to 
‘tried’ rules of narrative, venerable literary models, eternal aesthetic laws. We must not 
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derive realism as such from particular existing works, but shall use every means, old and 
new, tried and untried, derived from art and derived from other sources, to render reality 
to men in a form they can master.147  
For Brecht, deeming one particular (outmoded) literary form to be the model of realism was to 
create an ahistorical formalism. Instead he urged that artists use any and all means necessary to 
express the truth of current political circumstances. These means might include old forms as well 
as new ones, provided that all of these forms are used to convey contemporary truths. When 
presented within new frames of critique and commentary, a wide range of older forms as well as 
non-artistic documentary materials can become a new, popular art expressing the “real” 
circumstances of the proletariat. In his essay “Popularity and Realism,” Brecht gives as his 
examples for this Piscator’s “great theatrical experiments” as well as his own play, The Measures 
Taken, written in 1930.148 
 The Measures Taken is itself a play in the form of a trial, and has often been read as an 
apologetic for the (subsequent) Stalinist purges. The Measures Taken is a learning play 
(Lehrstück), written to be performed without a conventional audience. Instead, the play features a 
mass chorus of workers who participate directly in the production. Within the play the chorus 
adopts the role of a people’s court. The play begins when four Communist agitators have just 
returned to the Soviet Union from spreading propaganda in China. They appear before the court 
to explain and justify having killed a young comrade who sought to help them, but had 
ultimately let his personal sympathy for individuals undermine the Party’s work. The agitators 
re-enact what happened in China before the court, alternately playing the role of the young 
comrade. In this learning play, the four agitators are not simply on trial; they are also teaching 
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the chorus how to judge. From the beginning, the chorus is inclined to agree with the agitators 
too quickly; the agitators in contrast take the trial very seriously, and push the chorus to 
interrogate their motives.  
 Brecht’s claims that this play is better understood and more higher valued by workers 
than any of Lukács’ beloved novels is a direct rebuff to Lukács’ dismissal of the play for 
emphasizing ethical dilemmas over the more expedient and concrete concerns of class 
struggle.149 Brecht uses masks (worn by the agitators in The Measures Taken while they reenact 
the story of the Young Comrade) to discuss formal experimentation: “The actors may not use 
any make-up—or hardly any—and claim to be ‘absolutely natural’ and yet the whole thing can 
be a swindle; and they can wear masks of a grotesque kind and present the truth.”150 Brecht 
insists that outwardly grotesque and superficially unrealistic art can touch truths that mere 
surface realism obfuscates. The actual use of the masks in The Measures Taken is in part to 
emphasize the distance between the event (the death of the Young Comrade) and the portrayal of 
that event before the court. Not through a realistic portrayal, but through a self-conscious 
reenactment of the event are people able to judge what happened critically. More than that, it is 
through theatre—the ways that the comrades reenact the actions of the Young Comrade—that an 
appropriate interpretation of the law can be reached. 
 
The Moscow Trials, or, The Importance of Not Being Earnest 
The formalism debates were simultaneous to and, for Brecht, interwoven with the Soviet 
purges and the Moscow Trials of the late 1930s. Discussions about formalism and the Moscow 
trials played out contemporaneously in the same German exile journals, most notably Die Neue 






Weltbühne (The New World Stage) and Das Wort (The Word, of which Brecht was at least 
nominally an editor). While these debates are replete with silences (particularly when it comes to 
criticism of the purges), they nevertheless represent a strikingly international exchange, and 
moreover an exchange between philosophers and artists living outside of the Soviet Union and 
the protagonists of the trials themselves. Ernst Bloch, in his essay on Bukharin’s confession, 
describes how Bukharin, while composing his confession, studied Feuchtwanger’s essay 
“Moscow 1937,” which in turn had cited Bloch’s earlier essay “Critique of a Trial Critique” 
(“Kritik einer Prozesskritik”).151 One clear connection between the formalism debate and the 
trials, of course, was the repression of so-called “formalist” artists. But these links must not be 
overstated -- Ernst Bloch, the prime defender of expressionism, also strongly defended the 
Moscow Trials, while Lukács was able to avoid publicly condoning the trials despite living in the 
Soviet Union.152 Aside from the causal connection between the purges of artists and official 
cultural policy, there was also a connection between the trials and aesthetic debates, including, 
the questions of mimesis, authenticity, and the relationship between form and content were all 
central to the trials themselves. 
Two years before the most widely publicized series of Stalinist trials began, Brecht had 
already begun to think about the relationship between show trials and aesthetics with regard to 
one particular author and work, Kafka’s Trial. In July 1934, Benjamin describes his series of 
conversations with Brecht that Arendt would later seek to publish in Illuminations. Benjamin 
records a conversation with Brecht that begins with a discussion about the efficacy of political 
art. Brecht wonders whether naturalists like Gerhart Hauptmann, those who are “completely in 
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earnest,” are the only ones who “get anywhere.” Brecht and Benjamin differentiate between the 
visionary artist and the “cool-headed rational man”: the former is completely in earnest, the latter 
is not. Benjamin asks which category Kafka falls into. To Brecht, Kafka is a visionary, but one 
whose sight is imprecise: he sees the nightmare, but not its solution. Brecht explains, Kafka “was 
terrified by the empire of ants: the thought of men being alienated from themselves… He 
anticipated certain forms of this alienation, e.g. the methods of the GPU [the Soviet secret police 
agency, formerly “Cheka”] but he never found a solution and never awoke from his 
nightmare.”153  
When Benjamin brought Brecht his essay on Kafka a month later, Brecht sharply 
criticized it for “spreading the darkness surrounding Kafka instead of dispersing it.” Brecht told 
Benjamin that he should, in his essay, make Kafka useful. According to Brecht, Benjamin must 
“formulate the practicable suggestions which can be extracted” from the stories, which “should 
be sought in the direction of the great general evils which assail humanity today.”154 In his 
discussion of Kafka’s usefulness, Brecht looks first and foremost to The Trial. He suggests that 
The Trial not only offers an expression of individual petty bourgeois experience and alienation, 
but also that it is “a prophetic book”: “By looking at the Gestapo you can see what the Cheka 
may become.”155 Kafka’s world reflects the fascist situation of the day, the petty bourgeois 
individual lost within the disciplinary machine of his own creation. But this is also a prophetic 
vision, of what the Cheka could, and indeed did, become. Kafka is useful for critiquing the 
Soviet Union, trying to forestall the Cheka from becoming identical to the Gestapo.156  
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During their conversation about the respective capacities of the visionary artist and 
thinking man, Brecht tells Benjamin about his own Kafkaesque vision:  
I often imagine being interrogated by a tribunal. ‘Now tell us, Mr. Brecht, are you really 
in earnest?’ I would have to admit that no, I’m not completely in earnest. But having said 
‘no’ to that important question, I would add something still more important: namely, that 
my attitude is permissible.157  
Here Brecht is defending both his personal attitude and his conception of art. The quality of not 
being completely in earnest is the foundation of epic theatre. It is only when the actors are not 
completely in earnest, when they begin to critique their own actions as they act, that they become 
epic actors. Similarly, the audience must learn to become “cool-headed rational” spectators, in 
order to ask questions and offer critiques.  
During the Stalinist Trials, the question of earnestness became the central question for 
many of the defendants. On the one hand, there were the actual charges brought against the 
defendants of conspiracy, sabotage, espionage, and murder. On the other hand, though, were the 
charges of subjective crimes (doubting Stalin’s policies and the trajectory of the party, having a 
mechanical rather than dialectical understanding of history, etc.) that the defendants brought 
against themselves. The most famous and discussed defendant was Nickolai Bukharin, a favorite 
of Lenin and the Bolsheviks’ leading theoretician until he fell afoul of Stalin. In Bukharin’s final 
plea as well as in a number of letters to the Politburo, Bukharin denied the specific charges 
against him (that he tried to arrest Lenin, kill Sergei Kirov and Maxim Gorky; that he was 
conspiring against the Soviet Union with foreign powers). Bukharin did, however, confess to 
opposing Stalin’s policies during the Five Year Plan, and thus contributing to Soviet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




“degeneration.” He also admitted to defeatism, pessimism, doubt, and—like a number of other 
defendants—to a “peculiar duality of mind.”158  
In his defense of Bukharin’s trial, Bloch places particular emphasis on this duality of 
mind as an expression of Hegel’s “unhappy consciousness.”159 In Bukharin’s final plea, much of 
which is reprinted in Bloch’s essay, Bukharin explains that his long months in prison, suspended 
between life and death, enabled him to understand his failings, to overcome his duality of mind, 
and to embrace to Soviet Union: 
There was nothing to die for, if one wanted to die unrepentant. And, on the contrary,  
everything positive that glistens in the Soviet Union acquires new dimensions in a man’s  
mind. This in the end disarmed me completely and led me to bend my knees before the 
 Party and the country. . . . And at such moments, Citizens Judges, everything personal, all 
 the personal incrustation, all the rancor, pride, and a number of other things, fall away,  
disappear.160     
Bukharin focused on his earnestness, claiming that only through the process of the trial had he 
become completely committed to the Soviet Union. The prosecution at the trial was uninterested 
in Bukharin’s internal struggles and his conception of historical dialectics: they wanted to 
convict him of the criminal charges against him. Bukharin’s last plea was continually 
interrupted. Vyshinsky, the chief prosecutor, insisted that he would cut Bukharin’s testimony 
short if Bukharin continued his tactics of “hiding behind a flood of words, pettifogging, making 
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digressions into the sphere of politics, of philosophy, theory and so forth—which you might as 
well forget about once and for all, because you are charged with espionage.”161  
 In his final speech, Vyshinsky would accuse Bukharin and the other defendants of having  
“spent their entire lives behind masks.”162 In claiming that the prosecution was tearing off the 
masks of the defendants, Vyshinsky posed his own role as an anti-theatrical one. The defendants 
had been play-acting and the trials would reveal the reality behind their masks. It is this anti-
theatricality that convinces Feuchtwanger of the courtroom’s justice. The prosecution was 
evidently so anti-theatrical that is did not even provide props like signed documents or 
surveillance transcripts at the trial. Feuchtwanger suggests this lack of evidence during the trials 
speaks to the authenticity of the trial and its close connection to the Soviet people, as he puts it, 
“Details of circumstantial evidence, documents, and depositions may interest jurists, 
criminologists, and historians,” but for the Soviet people, “the plain confessions were more 
intelligible to them than any amount of ingeniously assembled circumstantial evidence” that 
would benefit “foreign criminologists” rather than the Soviet people.163 Feuchtwanger goes on to 
insist that the whole proceedings were simply too realistic to be fake, that it would be almost 
impossible to reproduce the trials as theatre, “If a producer had had to arrange this court scene, 
years of rehearsal and careful coaching would have been necessary to get prisoners to correct one 
another eagerly on small points and to express their emotions with such restraint.”164  
 Bukharin gave his final plea in March 1938 and in May of that year Bloch published his 
essay defending the trial’s proceedings, reprinting and explaining much of Bukharin’s last plea in 
Die Neue Weltbühne. Brecht showed Benjamin his essays on Lukács just two months later. We 
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can read in these essays a response not only to Lukács, but also to the Moscow Trials. In his 
essay, “On the Formalistic Character of the Theory of Realism” Brecht suggests that, in order to 
understand what is at stake in the term formalism, we look to the everyday uses of the term, and 
develop multiple definitions of the term:  
Let us take the expression: Formally he is right. That means that actually he is not 
right…. When I read that the autarky of the Third Reich is perfect on paper [auf dem 
Papier perfekt ist], then I know that this is a case of political formalism. National 
Socialism is socialism in form—that is, case of political formalism… We are then in a 
position, if we return to literature (without this time abandoning everyday life altogether), 
to characterize and unmask as formalistic even works which do not elevate literary form 
over social content and yet do not correspond to reality. We can even unmask [entlarven] 
works which are realistic in form. There are a great many of them.165  
For Brecht, “everyday” formalism means being a certain way on paper, but not necessarily in 
reality—that is, in text but not performance. In contrast to the “grotesque masks” through which 
works like The Measures Taken are able to convey the truth, Brecht speaks here of those masks 
that are outwardly realistic and yet, “do not correspond to reality.” Without mentioning the 
Soviet Union he encourages the reader to think about other political formalisms aside from the 
National Socialists, and to consider not only the disjuncture between the National Socialist on 
paper and in reality, but also the same disjuncture of the Bolsheviks. 
 The emphasis here on medium—on paper realism versus reality—is also significant. 
Brecht begins the essay by pointing out that Lukács’ conception of realism only refers to one 
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particular genre, the novel, and cannot be so easily applied to lyric poetry or drama.166 Lukács 
fails to understand or explore the formal characteristics of dramatic literature that gains both 
form and meaning on a stage rather than on paper. 167 Through his emphasis on the difference 
between on paper realism and reality, Brecht also makes a case for theatre as an art whose 
processes of production connect it more closely to social reality than written literature. In the 
essay “Populism and Realism,” Brecht points to the actual production of a play (i.e., its staging 
through a rehearsal process) as the site where its meaning is made and, moreover, as the site 
where the proletariat can engage with and co-create the work. He describes a discussion with a 
worker during the rehearsal process of The Measures Taken, and insists on the importance of the 
worker’s suggestions to the final version of the work, claiming that, “The workers were not 
afraid to teach us, and they themselves were not afraid to learn.”168 For Brecht this rehearsal 
process is how the work gets produced; Lukács’ notions of individual authorship and the work of 
art as a closed form are at odds with socialist production. Lukács and his supporters, Brecht tells 
Benjamin, are “enemies of production [Feinde der Produktion]. Production makes them 
uncomfortable. You never know where you are with production; production is the unforeseeable. 
You never know what’s going to come out.”169 Departing from the party line (if nothing else, the 
Five Year Plan depended on the predictability of production), Brecht emphasizes that production 
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is open and does not follow predetermined scripts.. In their roles as jurors in The Measures 
Taken, workers were taught to see events critically, and to interrogate each particular episode, 
judging whether actions could have been taken that were different than the ones that were 
actually taken, and even advising Brecht to revise his script.  
 Although Lukács did not personally lend his support to the Moscow Trials, Brecht saw in 
both Lukács’ anti-formalism and the trials themselves an attention to superficial realism and a set 
narrative that were antithetical to the progress of history. As Lukács’ anti-formalism was 
beginning to gain traction, Brecht conceived of a new form of theatre that would encourage 
audiences to understand history dialectically, and to think of and judge current politics with 
historical perspective. Brecht wanted to build a “panopticon theatre,” constructed like an 
assembly hall that would perform multiple historical trials every evening. Sergei Tretiakov  
published Brecht’s plans for this theatre in a 1934 essay.170 One evening of performances would 
begin with the trial of Socrates, followed by a short witch trial featuring a group of armored 
knights who condemn the witch to be burnt at the stake. The knights remain on stage when the 
scene changes to a contemporary trial from Weimar Germany. As a prosecutor begins to accuse 
the artist George Grosz of blasphemy for his drawing “Christ in a Gas Mask,” there is “a terrible 
clattering, as though twenty three-gallon samovars were applauding. It is the knights, who are 
stirred to clap their iron-gloved hands and praise the defender of the vulnerable God.”171 Like the 
majority of trials within his plays, none of the historical trials Brecht imagines staging are just, 
few of them are contemporary. This theatre would reveal how contemporary courts used 
outmoded language and postures, condemning contemporary trials for repeating the crimes and 
perpetuating the injustices of centuries past. 
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 Tretiakov was attacked for his formalism and was executed five years after the essay’s 
publication. Brecht eulogized Tretiakov in a poem entitled “Are the people infallible?” which 
begins, “My teacher Tretiakov / The big, the friendly / Was shot, sentenced by a people’s court 
(Volksgericht)/ as a spy.” Brecht never returned to his idea of the panopticon theatre, though both 
the idea and Tretiakov himself were resurrected during Brecht’s own hearing before the House 
Un-American Activities Committee. The chief investigator, Robert E. Stripling, questioned 
Brecht about his relationship with Tretiakov, a “leading Soviet critic”—evidently unaware that 
he had been purged and executed. The prosecutor read aloud Brecht’s plans for his panopticon 
theatre from Tretiakov’s essay. Unlike the other works from which Stripling read—The 
Measures Taken, Brecht and Hanns Eisler’s marching song “Forwards, and never forget!”—
these plans made no reference to communism or socialism. But they did challenge the authority 
of courts, revealing the theatricality and posturing of the law, as well as its tendency to repeat 
worn-out narratives. Stripling showed an acute aesthetic sense in realizing that, though it may 
have little to do with promoting communism, a witch trial in historical dress could challenge the 
legitimacy of the House Un-American Activities Committee itself—as indeed, Arthur Miller 
would show five years later in The Crucible. 
 
The Caucasian Chalk Circle 
When Brecht was brought before the House Un-American Activities Committee, he 
defended himself by emphasizing that the meaning of his works could not be found in the texts 
alone.  First, he claimed that it was necessary to understand the context in which the works were 




the 1930s, Brecht insisted that at the time they were written they were anti-Hitler rather than pro-
Communist:     
STRIPLING: Mr. Brecht, is it true that you have written a number of very revolutionary 
poems, plays, and other writings? 
BRECHT: I have written a number of poems and songs and plays in the fight against 
Hitler and, of course, they can be considered, therefore, as revolutionary because I, of 
course, was for the overthrow of that government.172  
In a similar vein, when discussing The Measures Taken, Brecht emphasized that in the play he 
sought to “express the feelings and the ideas of the German workers who then fought against 
Hitler.”  
 Brecht’s defense at HUAC relied not only on contextualizing his work historically, but 
also on flipping the way that he otherwise thought of the relationship between his source material 
and his adaptations, claiming that the real meaning of the play was determined by the source 
material. Brecht emphasized that The Measures Taken was an adaptation of an “old religious 
Japanese play” that “follows quite closely this old story which shows devotion to an ideal until 
death.”173 Stripling was incredulous that the play could be set in Germany, yet not actually be 
about Communism, and pressed Brecht on this point: 
STRIPLING: You say it [The Measures Taken] is about China, though, it has nothing to 
do with Germany? 
BRECHT: No, it had nothing to do about Germany174 
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In answer to all of Stripling’s questions about the death of the young comrade Brecht referred 
him back to the “old Japanese play” disavowing his own authorship of the story’s ending.175 
When asked to recite the song “In Praise of Learning,” Brecht pointed out first that the song was 
an adaptation from a play by Gorki.  
Finally, Brecht rejected the translations that the prosecution provided, claiming that they 
distorted the actual meaning of his original poems. When Stripling read aloud from the 
translation of one of Brecht’s poems, Brecht interrupted him, telling him that it was the wrong 
translation. Stripling tried a different poem, and Brecht insisted that here too the meaning had 
been changed in translation: 
STRIPLING: Did you write that, Mr. Brecht? 
BRECHT: No. I wrote a German poem, but that is very different than this. (Laughter)176 
Brecht was dismissed and complimented on his performance by the HUAC chairman: “you did 
that very well, much better than the others.” Brecht did not waste any time in leaving the United 
States. Four days later he was in Paris, disapproving of André Gide’s adaptation of Kafka’s 
Trial. Brecht would eventually settle in East Berlin, where he and Helene Weigel were given 
control of the Berliner Ensemble. It was at the Berliner Ensemble that Brecht would go on to 
premiere his only trial play that focuses specifically on postwar arbitration: The Caucasian Chalk 
Circle. 
 Brecht wrote The Caucasian Chalk Circle in the United States during the final years of 
the Second World War. Its first professional production took place in the United States in 1948 
(directed by Eric Bentley); the Berliner Ensemble production of 1954 was the first production of 
the original, German text. The play and the production are thus situated in extremely different 
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political circumstances. While Brecht wrote The Caucasian Chalk Circle in anticipation of 
Germany’s defeat, he chose to premiere it in East Berlin in the direct aftermath of the June 
Seventeenth workers’ uprising. This uprising began as a workers’ strike in East Berlin and 
quickly escalated to insurrection across the GDR. Protestors gained control of radio stations, 
public buildings, police stations, and prisons. Propaganda was stripped from the walls of public 
spaces; children threw Russian textbooks out of school windows. The uprising was only quelled 
through brutal repression and the help of the Soviet army. During the protests, between 60 and 
100 civilians were either shot or run over by tanks. In the aftermath of the uprising, at least 
twenty other civilians were executed and some 12,000-15,000 more arrested.177 
The two themes of the play—postwar arbitration and failed revolution—speak directly to 
the two historical moments of the play’s composition and its 1954 production. The Caucasian 
Chalk Circle and its production are a test case for Brecht’s own conception of epic theatre and 
history: did the script that Brecht wrote in 1944 allow for a transformation and application to 
changed historical circumstances a decade later? If we take the uprising of 1953 as a test of 
Brecht’s political convictions, to analyze this play is, in a sense, to put Brecht on trial. Many 
critics claimed Brecht failed this test by lending his support to the regime rather than the 
workers, a decision that inspired Günter Grass’s 1966 play The Plebeians Rehearse the Uprising, 
which I will return to at the end of the chapter. Before getting to Grass’s interpretation of Brecht, 
though, I will offer my own trial, playing both prosecutor and defense to interpret the play and 
Brecht’s relationship to the GDR in two possible ways.  
 The Caucasian Chalk Circle begins with postwar arbitration somewhere in the Caucasus. 
During the Second World War, a nomadic tribe was displaced from its homeland, to which it 
now seeks to return. In the meantime, a second tribe has settled in the land. The dispute is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




arbitrated by an official from the central government and continues until the first tribe realizes 
that the second tribe will make better use of the land, and rescinds its claim. After this settlement, 
a singer is called in to recount a story related to the dispute. The members of the tribe that now 
lives in the disputed valley play the roles of the characters within it. The story they perform is 
about Grusha, a maid who rescues the son of a governor during a revolution, and makes 
tremendous sacrifices for him. Years later, the biological mother seeks to get the child back for 
reasons of inheritance, and the two appear in the court of the judge Azdak. Azdak orders that 
they draw a chalk circle on the floor, and each try to pull the child out of the circle. When the 
maid drops the child’s hand, refusing to injure him, Azdak gives the child to her. The moral of 
this story corresponds to the dispute over the valley: just as the biological mother was not the 
best person to care for the child, the original tribe was not the most suitable tribe to make use of 
the land.  
This story of the chalk circle, though, is only one part of the inside play. The second part 
is the story of Azdak himself, which actually carries the main dramatic weight of the play as a 
whole. When we first meet Azdak, he has taken a beggar into his house, only to realize that the 
beggar is, in fact, a nobleman fleeing the revolution. Azdak, who is evidently also in trouble with 
the law for poaching rabbits, considers turning the beggar over to a local policeman but decides 
against it. He realizes later that this supposed beggar was actually the Grand Duke and marches 
to the court to turn himself in for his counter-revolutionary action. Azdak arrives at the court 
only to realize that the tide of the revolution has turned. He is told that an uprising by the textile 
workers was brutally suppressed and realizes that, as Brecht puts it, with the fall of the old 




The beginning of Azdak’s story has certain parallels with The Measures Taken: a figure 
with revolutionary ideals inadvertently damages the revolution and willingly asks for judgment, 
even execution. Whereas in the earlier play the execution takes place before the play begins, and 
is retroactively justified by the agitators before the court, in The Caucasian Chalk Circle, the 
man who has acted against the revolution not only lives, but because he lives and, crucially, 
because he gives up on the ideals of the revolution, he is able to oversee “a golden time, of 
something close to justice.”178 In this difference between the two fables, we can read a shift not 
only in Brecht’s formal techniques, but also in his political views. The Measures Taken was 
written in 1930 (that is, more than five years before the start of the major Stalinist purges and 
show trials). Whereas the revolution of The Measures Taken has only just begun, the revolution 
of the inside narrative of The Caucasian Chalk Circle is portrayed as a historical disappointment 
from the very beginning. The theme of failed revolution became even more important after 
Brecht returned to East Germany. While producing The Caucasian Chalk Circle at the Berliner 
Ensemble in 1954, Brecht wrote that roles such as Azdak needed particular actors, in this case 
Ernst Busch, whose “entire life, from the childhood in proletarian hamburg through the struggles 
in the weimar republic and in the spanish civil war, through the bitter experiences after ‘45 were 
necessary to bring forth this azdak.179 To understand Azdak’s disappointment required the 
experience of a German political exile who had been a Communist Party member in the Weimar 
Republic, and who was now bitterly disappointed by the new communist society. Although 
Brecht displaces the disillusion of “a time of new rulers” to the age of imperial Russia, Azdak is 
certainly a figure who reflects contemporary disappointments following the June Seventeenth 
Uprising.  
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Just as Azdak is disabused of his hopes for a new, just society, a fat prince arrives with 
his nephew, whom he hopes to install as the new judge. Assuming that he can manipulate the 
soldiers into choosing his nephew, the prince tells them that they, as “the people” have the 
authority to elect the judge. The soldiers, looking for a bit of fun, ask Azdak his opinion. Azdak 
initially satirizes the role of the judge, explaining to the soldiers that judgment is a question of 
formalized procedure and convention rather than individual reason or morality. He tells them, “A 
judge’s robe and hat are better able to pass a judgment by themselves than a person could 
without those things.”180 This mode of justice fetishizes props and costumes as the arbiters of 
justice. But Azdak immediately contradicts his own cynical view of the law by suggesting that 
they stage a practice trial with the nephew as judge to test him out. Azdak, in other words, 
suggests that perhaps there is a necessary component of interpretation and performance for those 
who seek to take on the role of a judge. 
In the practice trial—“People of Georgia v. the Grand Duke”—Azdak plays the role of 
the Grand Duke on trial for waging aggressive war (Kriegsstiftung). In the role of the Grand 
Duke, Azdak rejects the accusation that he was responsible for the failed war with Persia. He 
blames the war on the lesser nobility (i.e. the fat prince himself) because of their greed for 
acquiring government contracts for soldiers and arms. The fat prince quickly forgets that this is 
merely a practice trial and becomes hysterical. This short scene is unrelated to the Grusha story 
that forms the backbone of the inner narrative. This play-trial within a play, within another play, 
does not contain a lesson for the nomadic tribes within the framing narrative (as the story of 
Grusha does), but reaches beyond the frame of both narratives to mirror the situation of the 
postwar trials against Germany, in particular the questions of superior orders (Oberbefehl) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




aggressive war (Kriegstiftung).181 In 1954, this discussion of the interconnection between the 
greed of political elites and military spending also echoed the 1953 protests. During the uprising 
the workers were well aware that their wages were being cut in part to afford extravagant 
military spending. A popular slogan among the protestors was “We don’t want an army: we want 
butter!”182  
This scene is itself narratively parenthetical to the play’s action. In 1944, Brecht included 
the scene—with its clear reference to the war crimes of World War II—to show that  
trials, and postwar trials in particular, may be consciously produced as theatre, and yet still 
provide a necessary forum for public dialogue. Although this trial is only a sort of theatre, it has 
actual results within the play: Azdak convinces the soldiers of the true causes of the war and is 
elected judge instead of the nephew. Soon thereafter we see the fat prince’s head go by on a 
stake.   
 In 1954, however, the reference to post-revolutionary trials could only be understood in 
connection to the GDR’s judicial system and the arrests and trials of participants in the 1953 
Uprising.  Although most accounts of the 1953 Uprising point to the increased work quotas and 
decreased pay of workers as its primary cause, anger at political repression and harsh sentencing 
of minor crimes was also a driving force behind the protests.183 Alongside their material 
demands, workers quickly began to challenge the regime more fundamentally, insisting on free 
elections and new leaders. In cities across the GDR, the main targets of demonstrators were 
police houses, court houses, and prisons. Between the sixteenth and twentieth of June, there were 
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protests in front of over sixty prisons and protestors stormed dozens of prisons, detention centers, 
and courthouses, freeing around 1,400 prisoners. At the end of June, the Minister of Justice, Max 
Fechner, publically called for a strengthening “of our democratic adherence to the law,” 
admitting that, “in the recent past, verdicts have been handed down which have no relation to the 
crime committed.”184 Shortly thereafter, Fechner was himself arrested and sentenced to eight 
years in prison. 
One of the strongest images of the entire 1954 production is of the courtroom when 
Azdak enters, immediately after the revolution. The former judge is dangling from the gallows 
directly in the middle of the stage. The image would have drawn associations both to Fechner’s 
downfall and to the violent attacks on judges and public prosecutors during the Uprising--in 
other words, both to the government’s harsh repression and to the violence of the protests. Above 
all, though, the image reflects the carnivalesque reversals during the uprising, in which people 
came to prosecute and judge their prosecutors and judges. One of the first books to be published 
after the uprising, Der Aufstand by Stefan Brand (likely a pseudonym), recounts one such 
judgment scene from the small city of Brandenburg. At 11 am on June Seventeenth, workers 
occupied a building containing both the prison and court, and released thirty political prisoners 
from their cells. The “People’s Judge” Harry Benkendorf—infamous for his harsh sentencing—
was seen through the window of the building. He hid and when found, begged to be locked in a 
cell to protect himself from the protestors. The protestors, however, dragged both the judge and 
the public prosecutor into the market square in handcuffs, violently beat them, and then carried 
the men onto a raised tribune normally reserved for ceremonial occasions and the visits of 
political dignitaries. As the two badly beaten men stood on this stage, five thousand protestors 
put the judge and prosecutor on trial, interrogating them about their miscarriages of justice. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




judge used the famous defense of Nazi defendants and the fat prince: he claimed that he was “in 
duty bound to act according to instructions from superiors.” The crowd called to hang both the 
judge and prosecutor; this proved unnecessary, both died of their injuries.185  
 Azdak embodies precisely this revolutionary and carnivalesque practice of judgment. He 
is a common criminal, made judge for the day. He goes almost naked under his robes and metes 
out seemingly arbitrary justice. He makes a show of sitting on his law books, singing and leering 
at female defendants. Azdak is a bad judge. He is full of prejudices, he is selfish, he asks 
defendants for sexual favors and bribes. He eschews the rules and rational categories of the law, 
and in order to emphasize this to the audience, Brecht makes him “the most degenerate of 
judges.”186 Yet, he provides the protection of the law to those who need it most. It is useful here 
to refer to Max Weber’s classification of forms of justice. Azdak is what Weber would call a  
Kadi judge. As opposed to legal codified justice, the standard formulation of Kadi justice follows 
the schema “It is written… But I say unto you.” It is precisely because he abandons the letter of 
the law that Azdak is able to help the poor through his judgments. His court is a case in point of 
Weber’s argument that: 
the propertyless masses especially are not served by a formal “equality before the law” 
 and a “calculable” adjudication and administration, as demanded by “bourgeouis” 
 interests. Naturally, in their eyes justice and administration should serve to 
 compensate for their economic and social life-opportunities in the face of the propertied 
classes.  Justice and administration can fulfill this function only if they assume an 
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informal character to a far-reaching extent.  It must be informal because it is substantively 
“ethical.”187  
In Weber’s analysis, the practice of ethical (rather than formal) justice embodied by a Kadi-judge 
has an ambivalent relationship to democracy. On the one hand, democracy is predicated on 
equality before the law and freedom from arbitrary rulings. On the other hand, Weber argues that 
the masses might themselves take up a stance on a particular individual (or question) that is 
opposed to formal adjudication and equality. The GDR claimed to resolve this tension by 
rejecting the law of bourgeois democracies, and instead instituting a legal code that would 
formally serve “the propertyless masses,” thus bringing together the ethical demands of the 
masses with formal law. Of course, the GDR was democratic only in name, and the 1953 
Uprising strongly shook the legitimacy of its legal system. 
The subtitle of Elizabeth Hauptmann’s essay in the 1954 program asks the most pressing 
question of the play:“Must judges be this way? Is justice always against the law?” The play 
displaces this tension to the feudal realm, but in the wake of attacks on judges in the streets, the 
contemporary relevance is clear. Hauptmann describes how Azdak was only able to rise to power 
through civil war in which “the power of the aristocracy has been broken, and the new Lords 
were still questionable.” Despite being protected by the oppressive new regime, Azdak uses his 
power as a judge against the interests of the new regime and for the poor and oppressed.  How, 
Hauptmann asks, “can [Azdak] distribute justice (Recht) in a society where injustice is legal?” 
The question brings together a central problem of post-World War II trials with the challenges of 
the 1954 Uprising: How do we judge the judges? And more generally, what does personal 
responsibility mean under dictatorship? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 Brecht’s intense preoccupation with Azdak is easy to understand; the latter is obviously a 
stand-in for Brecht himself in a number of ways. Azdak stages his trials much like Brecht stages 
his. As in Brecht’s panopticon theatre, Azdak always tries two cases at once and will conflate the 
two cases in his judgment. Azdak is, as the Russian writer Ossip Brick described Brecht, “an 
adept and cunning casuist.”188 I will return later to the links between Azdak’s demonstrative 
performance of justice (his turn away from the law books) and Brecht’s conception of his own 
practice of staging. The question of Azdak’s character, then, is also the question of Brecht’s 
character. I will argue that through framing the story of Azdak within Soviet postwar 
arbitrations, Brecht seeks to redeem and resurrect the Kadi judge of the old regime as the theatre 
director of the new one. Brecht does this, first, by casting Ernst Busch both in the role of the 
Singer of the outside narrative and as Azdak (suggesting that the Kadi-judge of feudal regimes 
will become the singer of Soviet ones); and second, by emphatically drawing parallels between 
himself and the Singer throughout the rehearsal process.  
There are two ways to read Azdak’s transformation into the Soviet singer (and by 
extension into Brecht himself). First, we can say that Brecht is offering his services to the GDR 
regime, demonstrating how his theatre can work with the regime to stem dissatisfaction with the 
undemocratic legal decisions of the government. Second, that Brecht is posing himself and his 
theatre as the only true judicial institution in a land where injustice is legal. Brecht wants it both 
ways, and he is able to have it both ways because of the trial format of the play. Brecht’s 
theoretical writings and The Measures Taken may suggest that the trial format is for the benefit 
of the audience—a didactic practice that will help them to think critically. But The Caucasian 
Chalk Circle reveals how the trial format of a play is of greatest benefit to Brecht himself, 
allowing him to evade the critical position that he seeks to instill in his audience. In The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Caucasian Chalk Circle, Brecht enacts his fantasy of being brought before a tribunal. And of 
course, he stages the trial to issue the verdict he desires: that not being completely in earnest is 
permissible.  
 
Sitting on the Books 
To link himself to Azdak, and the practice of ethical justice, Brecht draws an analogy 
between the judge’s practice of interpreting written law and the director’s practice of staging a 
written script. Azdak’s ethical practice of justice is expressed visually throughout the play by his 
sitting on the law books, while the Singer represents a form of popular oral culture that is not 
bound in literary texts. When Busch shifts between the roles of the Singer and Azdak he 
connects the practices of legal and artistic interpretation as a departure from written text.  
Brecht’s 1954 staging, and the relationship that it sets up between text and performance 
can be understood in part through the counterexample of Eric Bentley’s translation and staging 
of the play. Bentley’s version leaves out the framing narrative for the play, and begins with the 
inner narrative (a choice often repeated in American productions of the play). This choice has 
usually been interpreted in light of the political circumstances of the United States at the time: as 
HUAC was destroying theatre careers across the country, it would be imprudent to begin a 
play—written by a suspicious author—with an idyll of postwar life in the Soviet Union. Another 
explanation may be that setting the play in the Soviet Caucuses would be too estranging to the 
audience, that it would not serve to engage their critical capacity to draw lessons from the play. 
Yet another reason, and one that has not been thoroughly explored, is that the frame broke with 
Bentley’s assumptions about the primacy of text in dramatic performance. The Caucasian Chalk 




in the prologue. The play is about the role of an itinerant performer, travelling from town to 
town, performing from his repertoire of stories. As we learn, he has worked with the villagers 
themselves to put on the play, creating a performance uniquely tailored to the situation, just as 
Azdak’s law would be tailored to the defendants. Bentley, for all his engagement in theater 
praxis, is engaged first and foremost with the playwright as thinker.189 By Bentley’s account the 
dramatist “not only charts out a plan of procedure, he conceives and realizes a work of art which 
is already complete—except for its technical reproduction—in his head, and which expresses by 
verbal image and concept a certain attitude to life.” 190  Brecht included the prologue to 
demonstrate the openness of theatre production: that theatre is always created in particular 
circumstances, that it is grounded in staging and performance rather than in text. It is no wonder, 
then, that Bentley did not grasp the importance of this narrative frame.  
Throughout the rehearsal process for the 1954 staging, Brecht doggedly insisted on the 
difference between playwright and director, and the ultimate power of the latter in creating The 
Caucasian Chalk Circle. Brecht’s rehearsals at the Berliner Ensemble were open to the public. 
They included students, journalists, interns, actors travelling from a variety of countries. These 
rehearsals were themselves performances, opportunities for Brecht to play himself—to show 
what a director is and how a director interprets a script.  
His performances left some spectators confused. In a meeting with the theatre’s 
dramaturges, the interns on the production team discussed how at first it seemed to them that the 
rehearsals were “appallingly unplanned,” but then came to understand  Brecht as a director who 
“comes to every rehearsal completely naïve,” perceiving the work anew each day.191 The 
dramaturges explained Brecht’s rehearsal method, his changes of mind from one day to the next, 
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as “dialectic made visible.”192 Brecht’s employees and interns were compelled to cast the chaos 
of his rehearsals for the Caucasian Chalk Circle in as positive terms as possible and fell back on 
standard philosophical tropes: Brecht as a naïve poet, Brecht enacting historical dialectics in his 
self-contradictions.  
 During the rehearsal process, Hans-Jochim Bunge, a dramaturg at the Berliner Ensemble, 
kept a detailed diary in which the tension between text and authorial intentions and the stage 
director’s interpretation appears again and again. Bunge seems rather confused about stage 
director Brecht’s dismissal of both playwright Brecht and theorist Brecht. As a good dramaturg, 
Bunge has closely read the play and Brecht’s theoretical writings. Bunge is rather dismayed at 
how quickly Brecht dismisses this sort of dramaturgical work: “The playwright had, incidentally, 
stipulated [certain things], but this was not taken into account during the staging.”193 As in his 
conversations with Benjamin, Brecht still believes that production is an unpredictable endeavor: 
“We want to begin now and then see how everything develops.”194 At times Bunge remarks on 
how little Brecht the director remembers about the intentions of the author. In the evening after 
the first day of rehearsals, a co-worker brought Brecht a note he had written about The 
Caucasian Chalk Circle years before, discussing the ways in which the play is not a parable.  
BRECHT: Yeah, so what? 
WORKER: This morning you said in your introduction: “The play is a parable!” 
BRECHT: Did I say it was a parable? Really? Well, naturally that was wrong… let’s set  
      the parable aside.195   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Notate von Mitarbeitern Brechts über Kaukaische Kreidekreis, Bertolt Brecht Archive, Folder 944/37.	  
193 “Tagesbuch einer Inszenierung,” BBA Folder 943/73.	  
194 “Tagesbuch einer Inszenierung,” BBA Folder 944/53.	  




As the rehearsals continued, Bunge remarked that “Brecht seems to have forgotten that he wrote 
the play himself,” giving an example from a particular staging question in one of Azdak’s 
scenes. It was unclear from the stage directions when the lawyers are supposed to hand their 
bribes to Azdak. Brecht asked Busch what he thought: 
 BRECHT: So how should this actually work? 
 BUSCH (laughing): I don’t know that. I’m not the poet. 
 BRECHT: You can’t always turn to the poet.196 
It is in trials scenes such as this one that Brecht most strongly urged the actors to consider the 
relationship between text and performance. Strikingly for a playwright, Brecht is eager to 
dismiss all of the various sorts of texts that are built into these scenes: the books that appear 
onstage are always counter-revolutionary.  
 When staging the trial scenes, Brecht went to great lengths to emphasize the connections 
between trials and theatre. An actor playing the lawyer for the Governor’s wife suggested that he 
read the speech from a piece of paper and was quickly rebuffed, “No, for his 500 piasters he has 
to have memorized it, it must come ‘from the heart.’ This is a very delicate part of the trial.”197 
As the lawyer gave this speech, the actor (Helena Weigel) playing the governor’s wife cried. In 
the initial rehearsals, Weigel cried as though the governor’s wife were faking her tears to sway 
the judge. Brecht told her: “You have to really cry.  You are deeply moved—by this good text.” 
Here, Brecht is less interested in showing the governor’s wife to be bad or calculating, than in 
using this trial scene to demonstrate the wrong mode of both theatre and justice, that is, by 
reacting to texts and speeches purely through emotion rather than through rational consideration.  
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 What is striking about this scene is how memorizing a text becomes linked to Aristotelian 
theatre. In Brecht’s “Street Scene” from a couple of decades earlier, there is not the same 
connection of text with reactionary politics. Text almost seems an afterthought: whether a 
witness explains what he saw live or memorizes a text that he then recites in a courtroom, the 
fundamental principle is the same. The point has little to do with the media used to create this 
performance, and more to do with the critical capacities of the bystanders and jury members. In 
Azdak’s courtroom, however, text is cast as counterrevolutionary. Azdak sits on the law books; 
only the expensive lawyers write and then memorize their speeches. Azdak’s good judgments are 
not given in spite of his sitting on the law books, but because he sits on the law books and 
instead of sticking to the letter of the law, changes it to suit to case in front of him. In the 
penultimate scene of the fourth act, Azdak and his assistant Schauwa sing a subversive song 
together. Busch suggested that Schauwa read the text of the song while singing to show that he is 
learning the song as he sings. Brecht hated the idea but was not fully able to articulate why: 
 BRECHT: No, he can’t do that, Schauwa does not know how to read and write. 
 BUSCH: Of course he knows how to read and write. He’s transcribing the cases for me. 
 BRECHT: Yes… but this here is an illegal song.  You don’t let it out of your hands. 
 BUSCH: But Azdak says: “Don’t be scared, you can listen, it has a famous refrain!” 
 BRECHT: Yes… but why should you write it down then? 
In subsequent rehearsals, Schauwa learned the song by listening to it, rather than by reading the 
book. Although Schauwa transcribes cases from the oral speeches in the court, he must not learn 
a subversive song from a book; the text comes second.  
 




In his staging, Brecht is concerned with three different conceptions of form. First: the art-
form of theatre as an art whose meaning is created through staging rather than written text; 
second, formal law in Weber’s sense as rational, codified law (as opposed to informal, ethical 
justice); and third, formalism as a preoccupation with the outward style of art over attention to 
expressing reality. Brecht’s staging collapses these three notions of form to create a binary 
between written text/codified law/formalism and staging/ethical justice/realism.  
Brecht used The Caucasian Chalk Circle to convey his critique of “anti-Formalism” in 
the unpublished (and unpublishable) essays on Lukács from almost two decades earlier. This 
production premiered at a moment when East German cultural policy had turned away from the 
relative artistic freedom of its early years and toward a consolidation of party control over artists 
and writers. The program book of the Caucasian Chalk Circle was a platform for the Berliner 
Ensemble to engage a debate that is seemingly unrelated to the action of the play: the case of 
Picasso. The Berliner Ensemble’s season opening poster for 1954 used the image from Picasso’s 
scarf design, “Pour le Festival Mondial de la Jeuness et des Etudiants pour la Paix,” (to 
commemorate the third annual World Festival of Youth and Students held in East Berlin in 
1951).  The famous design features a dove in the middle of faces representing four races, 
surrounded by the phrase “peace for all peoples” in myriad languages.  
 At once a communist and a modernist, Picasso had long been a contentious figure in the 
GDR. In the early years of the GDR (1946-1948), when there was still a relatively high degree of 
freedom granted to the arts, Picasso was praised in the press for his political engagements. This 
reception changed with the beginning of a second round of debates on formalism and realism 
inaugurated by a series of articles beginning in 1948 published in the Taegliche Runddchau (the 




time). The attacks on formalism, carried out in part by party functionaries, drew heavily on the 
very terms National Socialists had used to condemn contemporary art— degenerate (entartet), 
enemy to the people (volksfeindlich)—and aimed to bring the arts under party control and to 
align the cultural policy of the GDR more closely with that of the Soviet Union. These aims were 
realized in 1951 at the Fifth Congress of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, 
which issued a resolution bringing all arts under control of the party and laying the groundwork 
for the State Commission for Art (Stakuko).198  
In the article that launched the GDR attacks on formalism, Alexander Dymschitz targeted 
Picasso in particular, calling him the “idol of Western-European formalism.” Yet Dymschitz had 
to account for the seeming contradiction between Picasso’s formalism and his communism. 
Dymschitz argues that Picasso was drawn “through falsely understood newness (Neuertum) 
down the path to formalism.” Picasso mistakenly adopts “antihumanism” in his style: 
Thus Picasso the artist becomes sharply opposed to Picasso, the committed fighter for the  
freedom of humanity and for humanism…This opposition cannot be felt as anything other 
than tragic. This one case by itself, the tragic character of creative opposition between the 
fighter Picasso and the artist Picasso, should serve as a first warning for the uncritical 
imitators of Picasso.199     
The implicit claim to be understood through the case of Picasso’s tragedy is that artists—even 
those who are communists—can seriously err in their art, and presumably need strong guidance. 
By drawing art under party control, the Social Unity Party (SED) could prevent most tragedies 
like that of Picasso. Brecht, however, would disagree. Picasso was not tragic, he was epic. The 
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challenge that he presented, the disjuncture the party saw between his ideological position and 
his art, was the very substance of epic characters.  
 The Berliner Ensemble’s season poster directly challenged the new direction in cultural 
policy. The program book for the Caucasian Chalk Circle reprints one attack on the theatre from 
a letter to the Berliner Zeitung, written by Inge Schmidt-Tewes from the Central Headquarters of 
the Young Pioneers (Zentralhaus der Jungen Pioniere). Schmidt-Tewes bemoans the Berliner 
Ensemble’s use of a formalist like Picasso, writing that she “cannot understand why such a 
poster would be used as a signboard for a progressive (fortschrittlichen) theatre.” In defense of 
the Berliner Ensemble, articles from Theaterdienst (3. April 1954) and the BZ am Abend (22. 
April 1954), also reprinted in the program, point out that the poster was forbidden in the subway 
stations in the Western sectors of the city because of the West’s ostensible fear of the poster’s 
message of peace.200 For good measure, the program also included stories about Picasso 
showcasing his anti-fascist credentials.201 
 The Caucasian Chalk Circle is at once about legal arbitration (formal versus ethical 
justice) and about aesthetic policy (socialist realism versus epic theatre). The staging links formal 
arbitration to socialist realism and ethical justice to formal experimentation through the 
respective backdrops of the outside frame and inside story.  The backdrop of the prologue looks 
remarkably un-epic, portraying a mountain range of the Caucasus in a socialist realist style. The 
backdrops of the inside play provide a sharp contrast to this socialist realist style: the image of 
the city on the backdrop is, in fact, almost Cubist. 
Through these two backdrops, Brecht emphatically connects and juxtaposes the socialist 
realism of the party (connected to formal law) with his own epic theatre (connected to ethical 
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justice).  An essay in the program, “Realism and Stylization” (signed simply “b.”), attacks the 
principles of socialist realism. It does this obliquely enough to be published, but is clearly a 
reiteration of Brecht’s unpublished articles against Lukács. Here Brecht does not use the word 
“formalism,” but instead “stylization,” arguing that in seeking to provide a model of reality itself, 
artists have distanced themselves from “the unique, particular, contradictory, coincidental” and 
instead simply imitate other styles. They end up presenting not reality, but rather “copies of 
copies,” which evacuate reality from art.  
Just as the backdrops of the production create a binary between formal law/formalism on 
the one hand, and ethical justice/realism on the other, the program also draws the qualities of 
theatre as a particular art-form into this binary. The program reprints a propaganda photograph of 
a Caucasian village from the Soviet Union. We see that the backdrop of the prologue is simply a 
copy of this propaganda photograph. In contrast, Brecht concludes “Realism and Stylization” 
with the suggestion that the actor playing Katja Grusche should study the beauty of Breugel’s 
“Tolle Grete,” and includes an image of the painting. The inclusion of this painting sharply 
differentiates the methods of theatre from the “stylization methods” that would produce a copy of 
a copy. It is clear that the actor cannot simply mimic the painting, but must instead study and 
interpret it, before creating a performance that reflects not the images of the painting, but its 
underlying reality.  
 Following the Uprising of 1953, the relationship between artists and the government 
became a source of greater unease for Brecht. In his famous poem about the uprising, Brecht 
emphasizes the relationship between repressive party policies and party artists.  The poem, “The 
Solution” reads in its entirety: 




The Secretary of the Writers Union  
Had leaflets distributed in the Stalinallee  
Stating that the people  
Had forfeited the confidence of the government  
And could win it back only 
by redoubled efforts. 
Would it not be easier  
In that case for the government  
To dissolve the people  
And elect another?202  
 Here Brecht writes not about the repressive actions of the police or state security forces, but of 
the secretary of the writer’s union. Indeed immediately after the uprising, Brecht wrote a 
notorious note, whose final sentence was reprinted in the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland, 
stating that: 
History will respect the revolutionary impatience of the Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany. The great debate with the masses about the rhythm of socialist construction 
will help to sift and secure our socialist achievements. At this moment, I feel the need of 
expressing my solidarity with the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.203 
Brecht does not attack the party or the government for its actions on June Seventeenth, but he 
does attack the Writer’s Union simply for speaking in the language of the party. The Writer’s 
Union evidently no longer produces literature, but instead writes propaganda flyers. While 
internal party memoranda suggest that the intelligentsia for the most part supported the regime 
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during the uprising, a report by the top Soviet officials in Berlin did note demands for artistic 
freedom. The report notes that “Among workers in art, an aspiration is noted to review the earlier 
decision of the party on the question of art, and under the banner of ‘creative freedom’ to 
liquidate any party and state leadership in the area of art and literature and to give freedom to 
formalistic trends.”204    
 
Judging Brecht 
 How do we judge Brecht for the support he gave to, and benefits accrued from, the GDR 
government? Brecht has been submitted to literary and dramatic trials both in print, as in 
Arendt’s New Yorker essay, and on stage, most recently in Frank Castorf’s production Die 
Massnahme//Mauser (2008). Staying within the framework Brecht establishes in The Caucasian 
Chalk Circle, the case seems to hinge on the relationship between written text/formal 
law/formalism and staging/ethical justice/realism: is Brecht positioning the Berliner Ensemble in 
opposition to the government, or as a twinned judicial institution that could support the 
government by providing justice suited to those emotions that formal law cannot resolve?  
 The final scene of The Caucasian Chalk Circle makes it clear that the story of Grusha is 
told to legitimate the formal arbitration of the prologue. The celebrations bring us back into the 
framing narrative, and the Singer comes to a close, telling his audience to understand that “what 
is there should belong to those that are good for it, so/ The children to the motherly, so that they 
thrive/ The wagons to the good drivers, so that they are driven well/ And the valley to the 
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irrigators, so that it bears fruit.”205 By recounting the story of the chalk circle, the Singer helps to 
lay a foundation for the new, Soviet society. The Singer does not tell the tribes anything they 
don’t already know: indeed, the one tribe concedes their rights to the valley before the song even 
begins. Yet the story is still necessary. From the beginning it is clear that the dispute cannot be 
adequately settled by recourse to purely rational categories. It is the government official who 
first articulates the tension between the dispute at hand and the sort of reason that is necessary to 
resolve it: 
THE OFFICIAL: Comrades, why does one love one’s homeland? Because: the bread 
tastes better there, the sky is higher, the air is fresher, voices sound more powerful there, 
the ground is easier to trod there… It is correct that we must see a piece of land as a tool, 
with which once can produce something useful, but it is also true that we must recognize 
love of a particular piece of land.206  
The arbitration in the outside frame of the story is not just about reason, but about emotion. It 
demands not formal, but ethical justice. While Azdak is a figure of ethical justice in the inside 
narrative, Brecht is very clear that he is not the model for judgment to emulate. Instead, Brecht 
presents a second possibility for how these modes of justice can be brought together in two 
complementary figures: the government official who adjudicates rationally and the Singer who is 
able to reconcile opposing sides through theatre.  
 The Singer and the official represent two separate modes of authority, each crucial to 
constituting a new postwar community.  Upon first mention of the Singer, one of the tribesmen 
suggests to the official that the government should ensure access to singers: 
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THE OLD MAN, LEFT: You in the planning commission should take care that he comes 
to the North more often, Comrade. 
 THE OFFICIAL: We are actually more concerned with the economy. 
THE OLD MAN, LEFT smiling: You bring order to the re-distribution of grape-vines and 
tractors, why not of songs?207 
The old man suggests that songs are as important a part of the new economy as grapevines and 
tractors.208 If the purpose of theatre becomes simply to provide support for the regime by 
speaking to the emotions and particular demands of individuals, it comes to sound a lot like the 
Aristotelian theatre that Brecht so harshly condemns: instead of offering catharsis, it offers 
dialectics, but the relationship between theatre and power remains the same.   
 In this prologue, Brecht would seem to be making a plea directly to the SED about the 
usefulness of his theatre to their regime. The program even included a request for the 
government to allocate more resources to the theatre. In a statement in the program entitled 
“Difficulties with Materials,” the costume designer Kurt Palm described the difficulties of 
working with the cheap materials available to the theatre. Echoing the old villager who requests 
that the central planning commission pay more attention to the distribution not only of 
grapevines and tractors, but also of songs, Palm’s purpose is to “draw the attention of public 
authorities to a problem that remains partly unsolved,” the distribution of quality fabric to 
theatres.209 The program makes its plea through demonstrating how the theatre can supplement 
the efforts of the government (as the Singer does with his song). Brecht argues that in order to 
best support the party, theatre needs its artistic freedom. The program uses Picasso not as a 
model for artistic freedom because of his art, but because of his politics: his poster is useful to 
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East Germany because West Berlin is afraid of its promotion of peace. The message of the 
program is clear: party bureaucrats must give artists their freedom if they want the artists to do 
their job. It is a message that would have echoed once again for the audience in the opening 
scene of the play. The Soviet official asks if the Singer can please make his play a bit shorter 
because the official is hoping to return to the capital that night. The Singer refuses, and there’s 
simply nothing that the official can do. The official is not allowed any control over the form the 
Singer’s story takes, even when it comes to something as seemingly superficial as its length.   
 We must also remember that the artistic freedom (both of artists from the government, 
and directors from the script) that Brecht promotes here has its limits. The Caucasian Chalk 
Circle was one of many plays for which Brecht created a “model book.” These books are 
composed of a series of tens of photographs from each scene and notes on body postures, 
movements, directorial instructions, suggestions, and conversations from the rehearsal process. 
These model books were designed to help stage revivals at the Berliner Ensemble and also lent to 
other theatres with fewer resources and shorter rehearsal periods. While Brecht was so 
ostentatious about bucking the authority of the play’s author during rehearsals, he was 
simultaneously creating a model book that would offer other theatres the authoritative staging of 
the work. Seen within the context of the cultural politics of the German Democratic Republic, 
this was certainly an exercise of political as well as artistic authority. Brecht saw promise in the 
model books insofar as they showed how theatre can indeed be a preeminently rational exercise, 
submitted to scientific procedures and notations just like experiments in the natural sciences. But 
at the same time, Brecht had his own reservations about the efficacy of the books: it was 




because it is impossible to tell what elements were important except in retrospect) and 
furthermore, the notes could never reconstruct the “original spirit of the work.”210 
 Despite director Brecht’s downplaying of the playwright Brecht and theorist Brecht, it is 
essential to remember that it was still all Brecht all the time: the model books suggest that when 
it came to a different director interpreting one of Brecht’s plays, Brecht might see the 
relationship between playwright and director somewhat differently. In such cases the other 
directors would be beholden not only to the script, but to its exegesis at the Berliner Ensemble. 
In this sense, one might say that productions of Brecht’s plays in theatres aside from the Berliner 
Ensemble were destined not to be true performances, but rather reproductions of Brecht’s own 
staging. Similarly, Brecht’s emphasis on production as an unpredictable process did not 
necessarily translate into staging as a democratic process. The 1954 program featured a blurb 
about the rehearsals entitled “With Astonished Eyes,” attributed to a journalist (“W.G.”) who 
claims to have known nothing about theatre before sitting in on rehearsals for The Caucasian 
Chalk Circle. W.G. describes with astonishment how “In this theatre, everyone is allowed to join 
the conversation. The actors make all sorts of recommendations to the director. The director is all 
ears, and praises the suggestion a great deal. But then, it is done how the director wants.” A 
democracy this certainly is not, the journalist ends with irony: “In constitutional law, one would 
call this the separation of powers.”211 This “separation of powers” sounds a lot like the structure 
of the hearing in the prologue of the story: all of the villagers know before the hearing begins 
that the decision has already been reached by the central government. But they are still allowed 
to make their recommendations. The dramaturge’s notes on the rehearsal tell how Brecht 
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conveys the principle of arbitration between the tribes: “Everyone knows the decision from the 
start, but it first needs to be found.”212  
Brecht’s rehearsals mirrored the arbitration of the prologue (everyone can give his or her 
input and be taken seriously, even though the conclusion is predetermined), as well as the 
“separation of powers” in the GDR (the people voluntarily vote to accept decisions already made 
by the government). Publishing this description of the rehearsal process in the program can itself 
be understood as an act of classic Brechtian theatre: demonstrating how an undemocratic system 
works in order to make the audience critique this sort of exercise of power. While Brechtian in 
structure, this move was nevertheless a strong critique of Brecht himself. The W.G. blurb might 
have come from an actual journalist with his or her own critique to make of Brecht and GDR 
policy, or it could very well have been Elisabeth Hauptmann’s own dig at Brecht, challenging his 
authoritarian and patriarchal control over the theatre.  
Did the journalist W.G. actually exist? Did Hauptmann write this account to reveal 
Brecht’s hypocrisy?  Or is it possible that W.G. is, in fact, Brecht, encouraging his audiences to 
critique his own rehearsal process? Perhaps the only way that we can defend Brecht, then, is by 
understanding the entire performance—not just the production, but the rehearsals as well—as an 
exercise in estrangement. Brecht the director and Brecht the poet are just characters that Brecht is 
using to teach his audiences how to judge. This might seem unlikely, but at the same time, it 
might be our only possible conclusion if we take seriously Brecht’s insistence that he is not 
completely earnest.      
In 1966, Günter Grass published a play about Brecht’s rehearsals on June 17th based on 
accounts of the uprising and Brecht’s preparatory materials for Coriolan. In the play, The 
Plebeians Rehearse the Uprising, Brecht (referred to only as “Boss” in the play) is rehearsing his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




adaptation of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus when workers burst in from the street. They ask him to 
sign a document of support on their behalf. Instead of taking the side of the workers, though, the 
Boss uses them to help him stage the plebian uprising in the play.  He records them on a tape 
recorder and steals their slogans to put on stage. Refusing to help them politically, he turns their 
struggle into theatre. The first acts of the play suggest that Brecht’s practice of staging and his 
use of estrangement is a tool to distance himself from the current historical moment and from his 
own personal responsibility. Instead of using the spirit of the Romans to engage in contemporary 
politics, the Boss projects contemporary struggles onto Rome: turning the tragedy of the uprising 
into a farce. The Boss is unable to respond to contemporary circumstances directly.  The actress 
playing Volumina, who has a penchant for revising and deploying her old lines, tells the Boss: 
“there’s too much method in your method.”213  
In the final act of Grass’s play, the revolution has been suppressed, and a party 
functionary comes to demand a statement of solidarity with the SED. The Boss refuses to sign, 
and instead writes a letter. Volumina is so disgusted by the letter that the audience never gets to 
hear it:  
VOLUMINA: Why read this pussyfooting document aloud? Three succinct paragraphs. 
The first two are critical; you say the measures taken by the government, in other words 
the Party, were premature. In the third and last something makes you proclaim your 
solidarity with the same people you attacked in the first two… they’ll cross out the 
critical paragraphs and trumpet the solidarity until you die of shame.214 
This is the very letter that Brecht did write. Indeed, only the final sentence of solidarity was 
printed in Brecht’s lifetime, but the full letter was finally printed in Theater Heute in 1965. The 
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Boss knows this, and assures his friends that he has a carbon copy of the letter. To his assistant 
this is not enough: “Those things are locked up in archives; they get published with your 
posthumous papers when it’s too late.” The Boss knows this well; he is looking to the future to 
judge. He sends his carbon copies and unpublished essays to the archives, dreaming that his case 
will be tried again and again. Only the storyteller or historian who comes after will be able to 
make sense of the whole story and stage it for others.  
Grass is both that storyteller and the protagonist of his own story. In staging Brecht’s 
trial, Grass is also preemptively staging his own. Brecht’s manuscripts did not burn, and neither 
did the documentation of Grass’s membership in the Waffen-SS. Forty years after the publication 
of Plebeians Rehearse the Revolt, Grass publically admitted to serving in the SS. Perhaps while 
writing the play, Grass was also hoping for Apollo’s forgiveness, and asking audiences—through 





Erwin Piscator: Cases and Documents 
 
Up to now, I have told a story about the development of epic theatre through Bertolt 
Brecht. The narrative arc of epic theatre I have given is one that starts with Brecht’s early quasi-
expressionist works, his more dogmatic Lehrstücke, and ends with the high epic theatre of his 
exile years and late career at the Berliner Ensemble in East Berlin. While such an account is an 
important one, it is a partial one. It is also possible to tell a rather different story of epic theatre, a 
story in which Erwin Piscator is the protagonist.215 To understand Piscator’s later work in trial-
based theatre, we must begin with his early development of epic theatre. Often overlooked or left 
unexamined are the differences between Piscator’s epic theatre and the Brechtian conception of 
epic theatre. While the Brechtian version stands as the accepted definition, in Piscator we can 
uncover an alternative account of what epic theatre is and how identification and distance relate 
to an audience’s capacity for judgment.  
 As Piscator tells it, his engagement with political theatre begins in 1914. Piscator’s 
budding stage career as an actor is interrupted by a call to military service. He arrives to the front 
lines just before the Second Battle of Ypres, the first military encounter in which the Germans 
used poison gas. Piscator’s company is sent to clamber over the decaying bodies and fill out the 
trenches. As grenades fall around the men, their commanding officer shouts to spread out and 
burrow into the ground.  Piscator scrambles to dig but finds that he is unable to bury himself like 
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the other men. The officer crawls over to him and screams: “Forward, damn it!” “I can’t,” 
Piscator frantically responds. The officer demands to know what Piscator’s profession is. Aware 
of how trivial it will sound, in the midst of corpses and heavy artillery, of how little his life as an 
actor seemed to correspond to the shattered world around him, Piscator shamefully concedes that 
he is an actor.  In Piscator’s account, at that moment, his shame of his profession exceeded even 
his fear of the incoming grenades, as though he felt the shame might outlive him. For the rest of 
his life, Piscator would strive to create art that had no shame fighting on the front lines.216 
 Piscator’s drive to create political theatre remained constant throughout his career, though 
his politics would shift. In The Political Theater, Piscator writes that after 1915, he was no 
longer interested in art as an end in itself, but believed that it needed to become “active, 
struggling, political.”217 Returning to Berlin after two years working as a radio operator in the 
trenches of Ypres, Piscator became part of a circle that included Walter Mehring, Raoul 
Hausmann, John Heartfield, and George Grosz. After the murders of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa 
Luxemburg, they joined the Spartakusbund. In the following years, Piscator experimented with 
different approaches to political theatre. From early on he dismissed the Dada performances of 
Hausmann as “childish.”218 After founding a theatre called “Das Tribunal” in Königsberg in 
1919, Piscator returned to Berlin in 1920 where he became involved in the creation of a new 
“Proletarian Theatre” in Berlin. 
Throughout the 1920s, Piscator’s ideas about political theatre developed out of 
collaborative practice. Unlike Brecht, Piscator is quick to emphasize the role of his collaborators 
in the development of his theories of theatre, going so far as to describe the birth of epic theatre 
as emerging out of collective improvisation. For Piscator, epic theatre was born during a 
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production that his “Proletarian Theatre,” was performing at various meeting halls in working 
class neighborhoods in Berlin. In this production of a play called The Cripple, Piscator played 
the title role. At one performance, John Heartfield, who had designed the backdrop for the 
production was late arriving. Heartfield burst into the hall with the backdrop under his arm in the 
middle of the first act: “Stop, Erwin, stop! I’m here!” As the audience turned to look at 
Heartfield, Piscator set aside his role as the “cripple” for a moment, stood up, and yelled: 
“Where were you? We waited for almost half an hour” (murmurs of agreement from the  
audience) “and then started without your backdrop.” With the audience watching, Heartfield and 
Piscator began to argue. Heartfield blamed Piscator for not sending a car and became 
increasingly agitated as he described how he had to run through the streets and coax his way into 
a tram because nobody was willing to transport him with the large curtain. Piscator interrupted 
him with a little improv, “Be quiet Johnny, we have to play on!” (referencing Ernst Krenek’s 
recent opera Johnny Spielt Auf). But Heartfield insisted that they hang his backdrop before 
continuing the performance. What Piscator did next is remarkable, and provides a keen insight 
into what he meant by calling epic theatre “collective improvisation”: he put it to a vote among 
the audience members. An overwhelming majority voted for hanging the backdrop, which they 
did before starting the play again from the beginning.  
 In his account of the incident in The Political Theatre, Piscator jokes, “Today, I view 
John Heartfield as the founder of epic theatre.”219 In this founding story, we see a number of 
elements that cohere to the notion of epic theatre that we have received from Brecht: Piscator’s 
decision to step out of character, the breaking of the fourth wall, and self-reflexivity about the 
theatricality of the event. But there are also elements that indicate important differences in 
Piscator’s and Brecht’s conceptions of epic theatre. Brecht never opened up his plays to a vote. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In his epic plays, Brecht wanted the audience to react critically to the plays, to judge the 
characters, and to learn how to critique social and political circumstances. But this is primarily a 
retrospective practice of critique, a working-through for the audience that happens not during the 
action of the play, but during interruptions of the action within the play and after the play is over. 
In his learning plays, Brecht was more interested in communal learning through performance; 
but those plays do not have audiences, they only have actors who are learning through studying a 
script rather than discussing what they have seen impromptu.  
Piscator sought to transform the theatre into a meeting hall and to turn audiences that had 
not been prepared beforehand into actors in his performances. These performances took a variety 
of forms. In his production of Carl Credé’s play §218 (1929), advocating the legalization of 
abortion, Piscator planted actors in the audience to speak about abortion from different 
professional perspectives. He then opened the discussion to the audience in general, leading one 
reviewer to call the performance the first time “the ending of a play corresponded to a public 
meeting.”220 In this and other plays, Piscator experimented freely with different ideas of audience 
reception and participation. 
 Piscator’s notion of epic theatre was far more loosely defined than Brecht’s. For Piscator, 
epic theatre was “a broadening of the plot and the illumination of its background, in other words, 
an expansion of the play beyond the frame of the merely dramatic.”221 Unlike Brecht, Piscator 
does not oppose epic theatre to dramatic theatre, but rather sees epic theatre as an expansion 
beyond the dramatic core of a play. The two most important aspects of epic theatre for Piscator 
are first, providing historical depth through the introduction of documentary material, and second, 
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incorporating the audience into the action.222  For Piscator, unlike Brecht, epic theatre is 
necessarily documentary theatre; adequately revealing the “truth” about the historical moment 
required material evidence. Piscator’s on-stage documents included written documents and 
posters, films taken from newsreels, projections of photographs of historical figures, and even a 
parade of actual mutilated war veterans. When the former Kaiser Wilhelm II sued Piscator for 
libel because of his portrayal in Hoppla, We’re Alive!, Piscator had the actor who was supposed 
to play the role of Wilhelm read the court order forbidding the performance in place of his 
lines.223 
Piscator’s incorporation of documentary elements into his theatre in interwar Berlin can 
be exemplified by his production In Spite of it All, premiered at the Grosses Schauspielhaus in 
July 1945 as part of a Communist Party convention in Berlin. This was Piscator’s first 
production in which “the political document was the sole foundation of both the text and the 
design”224 The entire production was created through a montage of speeches, essays, newspaper 
clippings, calls to action, fliers, and photographs and films of World War I, the October 
Revolution, and historical figures. The title itself is taken directly from a quote by Karl 
Liebknecht. Piscator’s goal in the production was “not to propagate a world-view through cliché 
and poster-theses, but to present evidence that this world view and everything that derives from it, 
is the only adequate one for our time.”225 Piscator distinguished this production from mere 
propaganda because, he claimed, unlike propaganda, it argued for a worldview based on 
documentary evidence. The audience is not asked to believe “clichés and poster-theses,” but 
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instead to arrive at an objective judgment that communism is the “only adequate” ideology for 
our time based on the evidence before them. 
 Although Piscator emphasizes the importance of providing audiences with evidence that 
will let them judge the best political stance to adopt, he does not believe that a critical distance is 
necessary to make that judgment. In this way, In Spite of it All is a version of epic theatre that is 
in many ways diametrically opposed Brecht’s ideal of a distanced audience. Piscator celebrates 
the effect of In Spite of it All on the audience in the very same terms—“suspense,” “dramatic 
climax,” “shock”—that Brecht uses to criticize dramatic theatre. Piscator writes, “for the first 
time we were confronted with the absolute truth, that we ourselves had experienced. And it had 
moments of suspense and dramatic climaxes just like lyrical drama, and they caused just as 
strong a shock.” 226 In his repeated emphasis on how “we” experienced the production, Piscator 
imagines that there is no difference in the way that the director, actors, or audience experienced 
the event. Indeed, that the event itself is experienced not by individuals as individuals, but by 
collectives as collectives, brought about through the participation of everyone present:  
the masses took over the stage direction. For those who filled the house, who had for the 
most part actively experienced this epoch, it was their fate, their own tragedy, that was 
playing before their eyes. The theatre had become reality for them and very quickly it 
was no longer the stage versus the audience, but one larger meeting hall, a single large 
battle field, a single large demonstration. This unity, on this night, definitively proved the 
agitational power of political theatre.227  
This performance had the capacity to both teach history and to make audience members feel that 
they themselves were historical actors, present within history. For this to happen, Piscator 
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believes the theatre has to be place where a dynamic relationship is established between the stage 
and the audience, in which there is a transmission of energy between the stage and the 
audience.228 Through this energy the proletarian audience can gain class-consciousness: “An 
audience (Publikum) was always a collective. A thousand people who fill a theatre are no longer 
just a sum of individuals, but a new being, gifted with special emotions, impulses, and nerves.” 
This collective consciousness is achieved by pulling the audience into the stage, “The lifting 
(Aufhebung) of the boundary between the stage and the audience, the pulling of each individual 
spectator into the action fuses the audience completely into a mass, for whom collectivism does 
not remain a learned concept, but an experienced truth.”229 Such a performance sounds like 
Brecht’s nightmare. While Brecht’s epic theatre distances the spectators from the stage, Piscator 
draws them into the staged action; while Brecht wants to show the world as contingent on 
individual choices, Piscator shows the irresistible rise of the proletariat; while Brecht maintains a 
deep skepticism about theatrical politics, Piscator collapses the difference between the theatre 
and the meeting hall.  
Piscator’s conception of the theatre as a meeting hall has implications for both his ideals 
of audience reception and his conception of the relationship between theatre performance and 
history. Piscator’s theatre relies on the audience’s complete identification with the figures who 
appeared on stage. In this early period, this does not mean identifying with a fictional character 
(a Hamlet or an Emilia Galotti). Instead, the audience is asked to identify with itself as it is 
portrayed on stage. It is not a fictional world on stage, but the audience’s “own fate, their own 
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tragedy” playing out before them. In order to attain such a direct identification, Piscator 
pioneered the use for film reels. For example, through the footage of the First World War and 
workers’ demonstrations, he hopes audience members will believe that they themselves were 
within the masses of people captured in the film (indeed, they very well may have been). And by 
seeing themselves cast on stage within this historical drama, Piscator hoped they would identify 
with themselves as actors in this struggle. In other words, through recognizing themselves and 
their role on the stage in front of them, Piscator believed audience members could learn what 
their role must be on the world historical stage. This mode of pedagogy is what Arendt would 
call the “school of revolution” in which the audience members learn the role they are to play, and 
are sent out to reproduce it as actors. As the distance between the audience and the stage and 
among audience members breaks down, so too does the condition of plurality. All of the 
audience members are asked to identify with the same image, and shown that it is their own 
image: they become a unity. By presenting documentary material as evidence on stage, Piscator 
raises the audience’s consciousness, proving to them just who they are and what it is that they 
must do; the audiences task is now to embody its own historical destiny.  
Staged as part of the Communist Party convention, In Spite of it All made it clear that 
history and fate demanded one particular sort of action and revolution on the part of the audience. 
Piscator’s theatre at the time was concerned with connecting contemporary events (or very recent 
history) directly to revolutionary action. The actions portrayed on stage and the actions the 
audience was encouraged to perform after the production exist on a continuum; there is no break 
between history and present. For this reason, Piscator does not conceive of himself as a 
storyteller, as Brecht and Arendt do. Brecht would often doubly distance the “old stories” he 




use of Japanese and Chinese source material. Arendt, in turn, emphasizes that it is only a 
storyteller looking back on the entirety of the story who can fully understand it. Piscator, in 
contrast, was deeply skeptical about the possibility of learning from old stories. Instead, he 
wanted his theatre to be a site of immediate political action, bound to its specific historical 
moment. Even as a communist, Piscator was not much of a historical materialist and was 
suspicious of grand narratives of historical progression.   
Of course, like most directors, Piscator did not always have a choice of the play he was 
hired to stage. In plays for which he was hired that did not focus on contemporary events, 
Piscator drew criticism for his insistence on making them contemporary not only thematically, 
but through the integration of contemporary documents and other sorts of signifiers. For example, 
in his production of Schiller’s Robbers, he costumed the character Spiegelberg as Trotsky, and 
played the “Internationale” during his death scene; in his production of Ehm Welk’s play 
Thunder over Godland (Gewitter über Gottland), set in 1400, Piscator had his main character 
wear a mask of Lenin, while film footage of Moscow and Shanghai appeared over the set. In 
these Weimar days, Piscator was loath to depend on powers of analogy -- not once did he create 
a play that was about workers rights throughout history, or that conveyed the spirit of revolution 
from other historical periods. Rather, his theatre insisted on its contemporaneity and resisted any 
impulse to make universal claims that were not grounded in immediate political action. But what 
kind of theatre could achieve such immediate political action? Piscator had a very specific set of 
parameters in mind.  
First, he believed that revolutionary theatre required high production values, second that 
it needed mass audiences, and third, that it should have spectacular machinery. It was not enough 




theatre and the newest technologies of theatre machinery.  This quality of Piscator’s work drew a 
great deal of criticism from contemporaries, including Brecht. The scope of Piscator’s projects in 
the 1920s required both capitalist philanthropists and a wealthy bourgeois audience willing to 
pay high prices for theatrical novelty.230 When Piscator left the Volksbühne in 1927 to start his 
own, more stridently proletarian-revolutionary theatre, he began with 400,000 marks donated by 
a wealthy businessman Ludwig Katzenellenbogen, introduced to him by Tilla Durieux, an actress 
and grand dame of Berlin. To build the Totaltheater that he designed with Gropius, he asked 
Katzenellenbogen for 1.8 million marks (roughly 8 million Euros today). After a series of 
spectacular financial failures, and unable to repay his capitalist investors, Piscator asked his 
proletarian subscribers to help him rebuild the theatre. Around the same time, Gropius also 
designed a fashionable apartment for Piscator and his first wife, which was featured in a 
woman’s magazine, leading to more friction with Communist comrades. 231   
Brecht’s poem “Der Theater-Communist” is a thinly veiled attack on Piscator from this 
period:  
For 3000 Marks a month 
He is prepared 
To stage the misery of the masses 
For 100 Marks a day 
He shows 
The injustice of the world.”232  
Leaving aside the question of Piscator’s hypocrisy, the more important point is that Piscator 
thought that the technologies of the stage must be contemporary technologies, and that if a stage 
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was to be revolutionary, its machinery must be recognized by workers as the machinery of the 
future. Furthermore, the theatre required masses, the presence of thousands sitting side by side in 
order to reach the sort of energy of In Spite of it All. Taken together, Piscator’s theatre in this 
period can be characterized by the way that it sought to collapse distances: the distance between 
the stage and the world, the theatre and the meeting hall, the actors and the audience, and 
audience members with each other. 
 
Piscator in Exile 
Piscator’s comfortable life as Berlin’s “Theater-Communist” did not last long and neither 
did his image of what political theatre was. Piscator left Germany in 1931, and headed first to the 
Soviet Union and then, as Stalin’s purges began to decimate Piscator’s circle of friends and 
collaborators, to Paris. On the first day of 1939, Piscator and his wife Maria Ley Piscator sailed 
into New York’s harbor. The former star was now a political exile in search of both a new home 
and a new form of political theatre. The Communist revolution never arrived in Germany and 
Piscator watched as the great promise of early Soviet theatrical innovations was brutally dashed 
in the 1930s.  
The rise of Nazism in Germany and Stalinism in the Soviet Union were not just practical, 
but existential problems for Piscator and his political theatre. It was not that Piscator’s ideas of a 
revolutionary theatre were not realized, they were; but they were realized in ways that shook him. 
In the Nuremberg Rallies, Piscator saw a nightmare image of the collective energy and 
transfigurations he had hoped to affect in his own audiences. For leftists outside of the Soviet 
Union the sublimity of mass rallies and the promise of collective consciousness would 




had found to be so childish in the early 1920s at least had the grace of being decidedly unlike 
Nazi rallies. In terms of Piscator’s staging practice over the next decade, the problem of mass 
spectacle was something of a moot point: from the time Piscator left Germany in 1931 until he 
arrived in New York he did not have a theatre, much less the resources to create productions like 
In Spite of it All.  
Upon arriving in New York, Piscator was forced to reconsider both his political 
convictions and his theatre practice. Here, Piscator’s career began anew. He was no longer the 
great director and revolutionary, but a teacher, the head of small theatre program attached to the 
New School for Social Research. Most accounts of Piscator’s career see his exile in New York as 
a shift away from politics.233 But this is a fundamental misunderstanding of Piscator’s political 
engagement. Far from abandoning politics, Piscator’s work in the United States signaled a shift 
from communism to an engagement with the problems of racial and ethnic prejudice and 
discrimination. His work was no longer agitational, but it still aimed at political transformation in 
a fundamental sense: he believed his theatre would instill respect for individual difference and 
teach people how to live with others unlike themselves.  
We might see this shift toward individual judgment as a movement toward a more 
Brechtian epic theatre. Like Brecht, Piscator came to equate spectacular theatre and politics with 
totalitarianism and to search for a theatre that would transform audiences without forging them 
into a single unit. But Piscator reached this conclusion about theatre in a very different way than 
Brecht did. As I argued in the previous chapter, Brecht developed and refined his conception of 
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epic theatre in relation to aesthetic debates among leftist artists and critics, as well as to the 
cultural politics of the Soviet Union and East Germany itself. Piscator was not a theoretician as 
Brecht was, and was far more concerned with the immediate conditions he saw around him. 
Marxism was only useful for Piscator as long as it seemed to be the “only adequate world view” 
for that historical moment. Although Piscator had been a member of the Party, and Brecht never 
had, Piscator was much more prepared to give up its ideology when conditions changed. 
Piscator’s understanding of the Second World War was radically different than Brecht’s. Even 
after the Second World War, Brecht continued to conceptualize of struggle only in class terms. 
As Arendt argues, he fundamentally misunderstood Nazi ideology, understanding Fascism—as 
so many leftists of the mid-twentieth century—as simply the most extreme expression of 
capitalism and never accounted for role of anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology. Piscator, in contrast, 
saw very early on that anti-Semitism was central to the Third Reich in a way that could not be 
fully explained by an understanding of fascism as the apex of capitalism.  Later in his life, 
Piscator would also become increasingly concerned with anti-colonial struggles and Black 
liberation in the United States, issues that Brecht never completely grasped. 
 Piscator’s shift toward what we might call a plural audience developed primarily through 
a concern with anti-Semitism starting in the 1920s. The failure of Communist ideology to 
account for anti-Semitism shook Piscator’s faith in the Party even before his own experiences in 
the Soviet Union and the Stalinist purges of the 1930s. Brecht rejected spectacle because it 
tricked audiences into believing that the social and political condition were fated. Piscator was 
more concerned with the ways that Nazi spectacles furthered the mythology of an organic 
racially pure community.  Piscator’s main concern in his work during and immediately after the 




Piscator’s theatre in these years may come closer to Arendt’s vision of a public realm than 
Brecht’s in the sense that for Piscator, plurality becomes an end in itself.  
Piscator connected Jewishness to pluralism. Though Piscator was not himself Jewish, he 
sought to join Jewish organizations, assuming that they would be like the Nature Theatre of 
Oklahoma, places where “everyone is welcome.” During his years in the Soviet Union he hoped 
to be hired as a director for the Moscow Jewish Theatre and later tried to set up a “théâtre 
populair juif” in Paris.234 In 1949, Piscator staged an adaption of War and Peace at the Habimah 
theatre in Tel Aviv. In the 1950s, facing the threat of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee, he first sought to emigrate to Israel and only when his application received no 
response did he settle in West Germany. For Piscator, becoming part of such Jewish 
organizations, and even immigrating to Israel, meant engaging in pluralist communities free of 
anti-Semitism.  
Accounts of Piscator’s work tend to describe his engagement with anti-Semitism 
somewhat blandly, as an interest in toleration rather than as a political position.235 Piscator did 
not see it this way. After the 1963 production of The Deputy by Rolf Hochhuth, which brought 
Auschwitz to the stage for the first time in Germany and unleashed a tremendous controversy, 
Piscator gave a talk at the meeting house of the Jewish Community of Berlin in which he insisted 
that, “The concept of political theatre clings to me like a shirt. Even today, I cannot comprehend 
that there could be art without politics…There is nothing else. But there never has been anything 
else.”236  Plays addressing anti-Semitism, and later the Holocaust, were to him as political as his 
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Communist plays of the 1920s. This was not at all an obvious position for a German leftist to 
take in the 1940s. In the immediate postwar years, anti-Semitism was rife in the United States 
and Germany and there was no popular discourse about the Holocaust for at least fifteen years 
after the Second World War. This was as true on the left as the right: communists and fellow 
travelers downplayed anti-Semitism as a symptom of fascism, and by the late 1930s, Stalin’s 
purges began to disproportionately target Jews.  
 Because communism did not offer Piscator an adequate way to think about and condemn 
anti-Semitism, Piscator looked instead to the Christian humanism of his upbringing. Around the 
time that Piscator’s fame reached its height in Weimar Germany, a rumor began to circulate that 
his actual name was Samuel Fischer, and that he was an Ostjude, a pejorative term for Eastern 
European Jews. Piscator’s surname was, indeed, originally Fischer. But it was not Erwin who 
changed it. It was his forefather Johannes Piscator, who in first decade of the seventeenth century 
translated the Bible into German and, inversely, his surname into Latin. A strict Calvinist, 
Johannes Piscator’s Bible was also known as the God-punish-me-Bible (Gott-strafe-mich-Bibel). 
His convictions fell in and out of favor, and throughout his life, he was alternately branded a 
heretic and given professorships. He spent many of his years an exile—religious controversy, the 
Thirty Years War, and the plague driving him from one city to another.237   
In response to the rumors, Piscator wrote a letter to Die Welt am Montag that was 
published in the paper on March 1, 1927. He explains that “unfortunately it is not the case” that 
he is a Jewish immigrant. Piscator suggests that those interested in his “personal” ancestry 
should “honor him…with a visit so that I, supported by ‘my’ old Bible can show them that this 
very Bible was translated by my ancestor Johannes Piscator, Professor of Theology, first in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Strassburg, then in Herborn… with the task of improving Luther’s translation.”238 Piscator uses 
his own lineage to show that he himself is more connected to the German Lutheran tradition than 
his detractors. At the same time, he measures religious qualifications through learning, not race, 
emphasizing Johannes Piscator’s multiple professorships and his role in improving Luther’s 
Bible. By inviting his critics to “pay a visit,” Piscator invites them to challenge him on matters of 
theology, suggesting that is it not merely ancestry but individual knowledge that connects people 
to a religious affiliation.  
This invitation to “pay a visit” can also be read as an invitation to come and watch one of 
Piscator’s productions, and to see how they evince a deep knowledge and understanding of 
Christian traditions. Like his contemporaries Otto Dix (War Triptych) and George Grosz (Christ 
in a Gasmask), Piscator used Christian symbolism in his work in provocative ways, particularly 
to portray victims of war. Even in his communist days, Piscator never disavowed the values that 
he saw in the “real Christianity” of his grandparents and uncle: “forgiveness of the mistakes of 
others, understanding, goodness, tolerance.”239 Piscator’s father had hopes that he would become 
a minister, but to Erwin, “a different tribunal seemed more important.”240 Although Piscator 
identified with a certain tradition of Christian tolerance, he was ultimately interested in secular 
justice. Hochhuth wrote of Piscator that he was,  
the last surviving champion of the truly clean, sermon-on-the-mount type of socialism of 
the twenties… like his famous forebearer… he is a theologian, a man of Christian 
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nature—but as his God, like the God of many others, died in Flanders or before Verdun, 
his stirring Ethos is firmly surrounded in this earth.”241  
For Piscator, grounding his ethos in the earth meant a strong focus on the particular. Instead of 
relying on religious belief, he hoped to create a theatre that would offer its own ethical 
imperatives, as another friend put it during his memorial service: Piscator was “an insurgent 
preaching a new catechism: the trinity of society, stage, and idea.”242  
While Piscator’s plays about class struggle were conceived as strictly contemporary, 
Piscator’s new interest in opposing anti-Semitism drew him to older stories about the 
relationship between Judaism and Christianity. From the beginning of his exile, Piscator sought 
to stage Nathan the Wise, Lessing’s play about religious war and toleration, in every country he 
passed through. Written in the late eighteenth century, the action in the play is supposed to take 
place in twelfth century Jerusalem. In its second season, the Dramatic Workshop presented 
Nathan the Wise, which would remain the workshop’s biggest success, and which was picked up 
by the Belasco Theatre on Broadway for twenty-eight performances in 1942 and remounted at 
the Dramatic Workshop in 1943 and 1944.243 Piscator produced Nathan the Wise while the Nazis 
were perpetrating genocide, but also at a time when he saw anti-Semitism growing in America. 
As he had in Berlin, Piscator expanded the functions of his stage in New York. In connection to 
Nathan the Wise, he organized a public symposium and series of talks calling for freedom, 
humanity, and toleration “because these occurrences in this land, at this time, are an uncanny 
reminder of the beginnings of Nazism in Germany”244  
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The following year, Piscator directed a pageant by his old friend Walter Mehring at 
Madison Square Garden. The pageant, The Golden Doors, included one thousand Jewish 
schoolchildren and was part of a “Rally for Hope,” organized to bring attention to atrocities 
against the Jews in Europe. This pageant was in many ways a complete reversal of the 
revolutionary mass rallies that Piscator had directed in Berlin. The rally was carefully designed 
to emphasize the loyalty of American Jews to the Unites States and began with a “Declaration by 
the Jewish Children of America to the President of the United States” promising to defend the 
United States constitution. The rally spoke in the language of rights and the American political 
tradition. The rally demanded that Americans not only heed the plight of the Jews, but also that 
“the homeless Jewish wanderers must be given the right to live the life of a free nation in 
Palestine, under their own government.” It made this demand through recourse to American 
ideals: “we beg of our President, our Congress, and our fellow citizens to help us, in line with the 
glorious American tradition of carrying freedom to all the oppressed, in the salvation of our 
defenseless brethren and their rehabilitation as free and independent people.”245 The rally’s 
program combined appeals to American ideals with strikingly Christian language, begging 
salvation for the defenseless Jewish wanderers.246  
The Golden Doors featured a series of vignettes (Children of Europe in Wartime, 
Children from Czechoslovakia, Children in the Train, The Goose-Steppers and Ballad of the 
Battlefields and Song of the Sea) that tell the story of children driven by the Nazis from one 
country to another until they are “lovingly received” in Palestine.247 The pageant linked the 
Zionist cause to a traditionally Christian and Anglo-American genre of performance, drawing 
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together the language of American liberty, God-given rights, and redemptive promise. 248 This 
was an atypical staging for Piscator precisely because it relied so heavily on a narrative of 
suffering and redemption. 
The Golden Doors was a pivotal moment for Piscator, a moment when he was still trying 
to conceive of and articulate a relationship between theatre and history. Although he fell back on 
a particular Christian teleology in this pageant, this was not how he wanted his theatre to 
continue. Even leaving aside the question of teleology, Piscator was very skeptical of parables. 
He would never be interested in creating theatre modeled on Biblical parables, nor even in the 
secular parables of Brecht’s Herr Keuner Stories or The Yeasayer/The Naysayer. While 
Piscator’s politics had changed, his conviction about the importance of historical specificity had 
not. But on the other hand, Piscator also wanted to move away from his interwar theatre that was 
only about contemporary action.  
 Six years after the “Rally for Hope,” a new sort of play caught Piscator’s attention. This 
play was The Burning Bush, based on the transcripts of a late nineteenth century trial in Hungary. 
Through the form of this play, a documentary trial play, Piscator was able to conceive of a new 
sort of relationship between theatre and history. The documentary trial play allowed him to focus 
on the historical specificity of one particular moment and situation—that of the play—while 
asking that the audience understand the trial as a sort of precedent through which to judge 
contemporary situations. In his stagings of documentary trial plays ranging from The Burning 
Bush to The Crucible to The Investigation, Piscator would present the event on stage as one in a 
long history of similar events, but frame the events within a strong historical narrative. The 
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documentary trial play gave Piscator an opportunity to see the theatre as a site of political action 
once more. This action was no longer revolutionary; on the contrary, it emphasized that justice 
must be enacted through law and legal procedures. Unlike the Brechtian theatre that condemned 
the practice of law within capitalist systems as necessarily corrupt, Piscator’s trial plays 
emphasized the ways that corrupt trials were aberrations from the rule of law. The problem was 
not that the law needed to be overthrown, but that courts needed to abide by the law. Piscator 
believed that the theatre, by restaging historical trials, would be able to provide justice that the 
trials themselves had not. Furthermore, he believed that the audience could learn from its own 
judgment of the trial within the play, and could refer to this judgment as a moral precedent to 
judge other events and situations. Previously, Piscator crossed the boundary between the theatre 
and the meeting hall, now he was crossing the boundary between the theatre and the courtroom.  
 
The Burning Bush in New York 
Ten years before the Dreyfus Affair, a court case in a remote village in Northern Hungary 
drew international attention to anti-Semitism within legal proceedings. A fourteen-year old 
Christian girl disappeared, and many of the Jewish men in the town were charged with murder, 
accused of using the girl’s blood in their preparations for Passover. Before being cleared of the 
charges, the men would spend over a year in prison as the prosecution fabricated evidence and 
coerced witnesses to speak against them. The trial was covered widely in newspapers around 
Europe, and galvanized anti-Semitic agitation both in Hungary and abroad. Within Hungary, this 





In the months after Kristallnacht, Geza Herczeg and Heinz Herald (the first a Hungarian, 
the second a German refugee) began to investigate the Tiszaeszlár Affair of 1882 and eventually 
co-wrote The Burning Bush, based on this trial. In his program notes for The Burning Bush at the 
Dramatic Workshop, Herczeg recounts that after he and Herald collaborated on the screenplay 
for the film The Life of Emile Zola, which focused primarily on the Dreyfus Affair, he began to 
think about the Tiszaeszlár case as a “direct predecessor to the Dreyfus case, to Lueger in Austria, 
to Hitler in Germany.” They wrote the play “based on the actual courtroom records of the trial. 
No pertinent fact is altered, the drama of the situation being so real that no fiction was 
necessary.”249 The entire play takes place within a courtroom, each act showing one day’s 
proceedings. In the trial, we see a political struggle play out between two members of parliament: 
Dr. Eotvoes, the liberal lead defense attorney, and Baron Onady, a right-wing nationalist who has 
orchestrated the trial and who continually interrupts the proceedings from his place in the 
audience. The judge and most of the public represented in the courtroom are strongly biased 
against the defendants. The play combines a portrayal of the historical trial with a family drama 
as the adolescent son of one of the defendants is threatened and cajoled into betraying his 
community and testifying that he witnessed the murder.  
 It was ten years before The Burning Bush received its stage premiere. During the war, 
there were several false starts for productions in New York but “fear of misunderstanding, 
refusal of concessions by the author to water down the material, postponed every planned 
production.”250 Finally, in 1948 the play was produced at the New Lindsay theatre in London and 
in the same year adapted as a Hollywood film. In the following year, Erwin Piscator directed the 
play with the New York Dramatic Workshop; a year after that it received its Los Angeles 
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premiere. The fate of the film version of The Burning Bush gives us a good indication of the 
context in which Piscator produced the play. The director of the film, W. Lee Wilder (a Jewish 
exile from Galicia) collaborated on the film with Paul Dessau (a German composer who also 
wrote the music for The Caucasian Chalk Circle and The Trial of Lucullus). In the film, the issue 
of anti-Semitism is “watered down,” possibly in the same way that the New York theatres 
planned during the war, and certainly along the lines of the Communist Party’s position. In the 
film, a wealthy landowner, Baron Arady frames Jewish farmers in order to buy their land 
cheaply: he is driven primarily by profit, not anti-Semitism, and the villagers he manipulates 
have no anti-Semitic prejudices at the outset of the film. The film received poor reviews and was 
re-cut and re-released in the following year under the name The Woman in Brown. In this new 
version the farmers were no longer identified as Jewish.   
 Piscator took the play in the opposite direction. His production emphasized the role of 
anti-Semitism in the historical trial and was designed to alert audiences to the dangers of 
American prejudice. Using law and a courtroom trial to understand and judge the history of anti-
Semitism in Europe and condemn its current manifestations in the United States was not easy. 
Piscator did not have a model for this in reality. The trial within The Burning Bush is a negative 
example of the dangers of anti-Semitism, not a positive example of how to prosecute or condemn 
it. The Nuremberg Trials had used concentration camp footage to reveal the barbarism of the 
Nazi regime, but did not dwell on anti-Semitism. In a sense, this production on a small studio 
stage on East Houston Street would be the first postwar trial “high-lighting prejudice, which 
played a major role in the fomentation of World War II.”251 In the rest of this chapter, I will 
discuss three changes that Piscator made to the script of The Burning Bush in his production and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





how, through these changes, Piscator demonstrated that documentary trial plays could 
supplement legal trials. 
 
Legends and Law 
According to Piscator’s notes, he believed that the central question of the play was about 
how a “gruesome legend” (“Gräuelmärchen”)—the legend of the blood libel—can be used for a 
political purposes.252 The persecution within the play stems from the rejection of actual historical 
fact and evidence in favor of longstanding prejudices. For Piscator, the use of legends in politics 
was always dangerous, even when used by the left, because it makes people forget their 
particular situations. Piscator wanted to interrogate the way that political legends are deployed, 
and to prevent the play itself from becoming yet another legend about the unending persecution 
of the Jews. The challenge was twofold: first, to show that anti-Semitism was not unchanging 
and unchangeable and second, to appeal to a broad public without rhetorically engaging in 
sweeping historical generalizations. This tension was not unique to Piscator. It is a central one in 
scholarship on the Holocaust specifically and ideas of justice more broadly. It is, of course, this 
very tension animated much of Hannah Arendt’s account of the Eichmann Trial and her 
condemnation of the lead prosecutor Gideon Hausner for painting a general picture about anti-
Semitism throughout history. 
The rhetoric of the main opposing forces of the play—Onady (the anti-Semitic Baron 
orchestrating the trial) and Eotevos (the defense lawyer)—is rather similar. They both speak in 
Biblical terms, of millenia of unending antagonism. And both see the case as being about 
something other than the individual defendants on trial. After all, they are both politicians, and 
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their prime allegiance is to their respective causes. For Onady, as he tells the court, the trial of 
these twelve defendants is an occasion to propose legislation in the parliament that would 
deprive Hungarian Jews of their citizenship and property. Furthermore, he insists that the facts of 
the case are irrelevant, that the Talmud and Torah already prove that Jews commit ritual murder. 
As Onady tells the court, “true, twelve Jews are accused -- but only because no court is big 
enough to hold their thousands of invisible accomplices,”253 and asks, “Who needs proof with 
Jews? That’s [the fact that they’re Jews] proof enough for a good Christian.”254  
While Eotvoes is able to prove that the defendants are innocent based on evidence, he 
still uses the same rhetoric of the “good Christian” that Onady uses. Eotvoes, like the Piscator of 
the “Rally for Hope,” is having a hard time speaking to his audience without recourse to 
religious legends and parables. Like Onady, he speaks of the case as a fundamental and timeless 
clash. After the defendants are found innocent and begin celebrating, Eotvoes tells the judge that 
the defendants are mistaken to think themselves free, “Poor devils. Theirs is a trial that can never 
end in acquittal. A thousand years from now, their case will still be dragging on, without end.”255 
Although Eotvoes rejects the myth of the blood libel, his characterization of the Jews and their 
suffering echoes another medieval myth -- that of the wandering Jew. 
 While the second and third acts of the play bring Eotvoes and Onady head to head, the 
first act offers a glimpse of a form of justice not attached to political legends. The District 
Attorney is skeptical about the case against the defendants. In the published play, he tells the 
court during his opening statement that it is essential to judge the defendants as individuals, who 
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may or may not have committed a particular crime.256 While the defense attorney seeks to 
engage the public through an appeal to Christian values, the Distict Attorney emphasizes the 
obligation of the law to try defendants based on facts. 
 The District Attorney becomes increasingly frustrated with Onady’s outbursts as well as 
with the judge’s obvious bias.  After Onady is permitted to attack the District Attorney with a 
riding crop, the District Attorney formally resigns and leaves the courtroom. He is replaced by an 
assistant District Attorney who is eager to take Onady’s side. Reading the play, this departure 
seems rather abrupt, a simple expedient to open up the drama to greater contention between the 
opposing lawyers. Piscator’s production changed the role of the District Attorney. The Dramatic 
Workshop cut his claim about the importance of judging the defendants as individuals from his 
opening statement and moved it to his resignation: 
I have only this to say to the Court: individuals have committed this crime: individuals 
face us as defendants: until we are in possession of the facts, and all of the facts, with not 
one hidden or held back, we cannot and dare not be influenced by rumors and prejudices 
which involve not the individuals, but the suffering of an entire religion! … the terror and 
the superstitions, the torture and the bigotry of the Dark Ages are abroad again. The 
world is watching. Justice and truth must prevail in this courtroom—or we descend to the 
level of the jungle. (Pause) I take the liberty of tending to the honorable court of justice 
my resignation from the office of Chief Representative for the Prosecution.257  
By expanding this speech and moving it to the dramatic climax of the act, directly before the 
intermission, Piscator put additional emphasis on the plea for law bound up in history and facts. 
Through Piscator’s revision, the law is given a power and charisma that surpasses the rhetoric of 
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Onady and Eotvoes. Piscator does this by making the law more dramatic, by using the 
dramaturgy of the act to turn this defense of the law into a climactic moment. The District 
Attorney tells the court, “the whole world is watching,” suggesting that on the world stage, terror 
and superstition will necessarily be superseded by law. The show character of the trial, the fact 
that others are watching, is what ensures that justice will be done.  
 This scene also emphasizes the importance of evidence, and in particular the importance 
of publically presenting evidence against those charged of crimes. Piscator’s emphasizes the 
importance of evidence in order to criticize both political legends in Germany and the emerging 
anti-communist hysteria in the United States. Piscator linked anti-communism with anti-
Semitism in the United States. In a public lecture that he gave in connection with the West 
German premiere of The Crucible in 1954, Piscator emphasized that McCarthyism targeted not 
just leftists, but “Unamericanism” closely connected to Jewishness. For Piscator “this shift [from 
red baiting to anti-Semitism] can be seen in the ways that people began to refer to Roosevelt as 
‘Rosenfeld’ and New York as ‘Jew York.’”258 Piscator, like Brecht, experienced investigations 
into suspected Communists first hand. Pisctor’s eighty-eight page FBI file details multiple 
investigations into Piscator between 1942 and 1965. In 1943, Piscator signed a voluntary waiver 
to allow the FBI to search his apartment for “contraband or propaganda material” (neither of 
which they found); The year before Piscator staged The Burning Bush, the INS contacted the FBI 
about beginning deportation proceedings against Piscator. It seems that the proceedings were 
abandoned because a number of the informants were unavailable to testify -- the lack of any 
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concrete evidence was apparently not a problem as long as people were willing to testify against 
Piscator. 259 
 
Identity and Diversity 
The second series of changes that Piscator made to the script reveals an American 
influence on Piscator’s work: a conviction in the importance of self-representation and diversity. 
Piscator’s position at the Dramatic Workshop immersed him in New York’s theatre scene and 
brought him into close collaboration with students from a range of backgrounds. His most 
famous students—Harry Belafonte, Tony Curtis, Bea Arthur, Judith Malina, Tennessee Williams, 
and Marlon Brando—testify to the workshop’s diversity. At the Dramatic Workshop, Piscator 
moved from advocating tolerance to a belief in the importance of individual difference. Far from 
his early projects of forging collective consciousness, theatre became a way to both enact and 
secure diversity. 
During the trial’s opening in the original script, Onady interrupts the proceedings in order 
to demonstrate the Jews’ thirst for human sacrifice. He claims to be well-versed in the Torah and, 
conflating the stories of Abraham and Moses, claims that the Jewish God “told Abraham to slit 
the throat of his OWN son—his own, mark you!—and only stopped him in the nick of time, by 
appearing as a burning bush!”260 In the original script, Onady’s mistake is not corrected, and 
only those who knew the correct lines themselves could understand the title’s reference to 
rebellion and liberation. For Piscator, this reference was too subtle and he was concerned that 
because the title of the play was taken from Onady’s speech it seem that the play condoned 
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Onady’s position.261 The Dramatic Workshop’s production included a substantial revision of this 
reference to the burning bush. In the 1949 production it was rewritten as an extended exchange 
between Onady and the Jewish defendants. The defendants countered Onady’s sloppy exegesis, 
interrupting him to give the proper citations and verse numbers. These edits gave the defendants 
a much stronger voice than they are accorded in the original play, showing that even the 
clownish beggar among the defendants knew his scriptures better than Onady.262  In this new 
version, one of the defendants, Rabbi Taub, rose and quoted the story of Abraham and Isaac 
from the scriptures, adding:  
 But the Lord did appear in the Burning Bush! In Exodus 12… and it was not to Abraham 
 but to Moses to whom He said, “I have surely seen the affliction of my people… and 
 have heard their cry…by reason of their taskmasters; for I know their pain and I came 
 down to deliver them out of the hands of the Egyptians, and bring them up out of that 
 land unto a good land and a …”     
Staging notes indicate that the Rabbi spoke the final lines with a rising cadence of optimism, 
only to be interrupted by the judge who demanded that Onady be allowed to continue his 
speech.263 But Rabbi Taub would not be silenced. He told Onady and the court, “This is our 
Burning Bush, Baron. This is our Bible and yours… You commit blasphemy upon your own 
God when you do not tell the truth about our Lord. For there is only one God for all Mankind… 
and only one love.”264  
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In his new monologue about the burning bush, Taub spoke for himself and his 
community. This focus on self-representation and self-determination had strong resonances not 
only in Zionist politics, but in the politics surrounding the actual postwar trials of the subsequent 
decades. The question of whether Jews could sit in judgment over crimes against their own 
people, and whether they were reliable witnesses remained controversies during the Eichmann 
and Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials. Piscator’s production affirmed the right of the Jewish lawyer 
and defendants within the play to speak on their own behalves. Ultimately, it is Rabbi Taub who 
names the play.  
At the same time as this was a moment of self-representation on the part of the Jewish 
defendant, it is also a moment that underscored the fluidity of identity and community. Taub tells 
Onady that, much to the latter’s dismay, they have the same God, and thus to condemn the 
Jewish God is to blasphemy against the Christian one. The difference between the Jews and the 
Christians is not as big as the audience might imagine. Piscator confronted the audience with 
identities that defy the political legends that Onady sought to impose on them. By emphasizing 
that the Jews and Christians have not two separate Gods, but one shared God, one burning bush, 
Taub challenged the boundaries of identity that Onady was so eager to demarcate.  
Through his revisions, Piscator made what might seem to be contradictory claims about 
the importance of self-representation and the fluidity of identity. To testify about crimes 
committed against them, Jews had to be able to speak on their own behalves, to tell their own 
stories. But at the same time, Piscator believed that creating strong boundaries around religious 
or ethnic identities could lead to narratives of eternal antagonism. As in his work in interwar 




in Berlin, though, these actors on stage were not representing the audience. The point of the 
exercise was to develop the ability to identify with someone unlike yourself.  
The acting techniques at the Dramatic Workshop showed the strong influence of Stella 
Adler and Method acting. We can begin to imagine the acting in The Burning Bush through the 
account of Piscator’s assistant director, Rachel Rosenthal, who is now known primarily for her 
work as a feminist performance artist. Rosenthal was born into a Russian Jewish family whose 
parents had fled Paris when she was young, and emigrated to the United States by way of Brazil. 
In the production, she played the role of a fortune-teller who testified against the defendants. 
Rosenthal recounts: 
The play was grim & a downer for the actors, although a great vehicle for overacting! We 
moaned & groaned and writhed! It was swell. I remember doing a character because the 
appointed actor was sick. I don't remember if I kept playing it. It was a tear-jerker & Mr. 
P liked it.  
The trial was staged as a tragedy, demanding that the audience cry even despite the happy ending. 
Piscator liked that it was a tear-jerker, sensing that the identification with the victims on stage 
would deeply affect the audience and perhaps combat prejudice among audience members. This 
overacting also had consequences for the actors. Rosenthal recounts,  
I also remember that, at a matinee, & for no apparent reason, we were all afflicted with an 
attack of "fou-rire" (crazy laughter). and couldn't stop, much as we tried! We howled & 
guffawed. Right at the most pathetic moment! The audience began to boo. It was awful! 
Then one of the main actors (whose name I forget) who played the defense attorney, I 




although we were so shamed by the upper rungs of the pyramid that we never spoke 
about it even between ourselves!     
This sudden shift into compulsive laughter can be read in a number of ways. Brecht would claim 
that this form of overacting robs the actors of any rational capacity to process the material, and 
naturally results in completely irrational reactions to the material. In this sense, it is a scene of 
“hysterical displays” by young people, similar to those Arendt believed the Eichmann Trial 
occasioned. At the same time, this impulse to laugh within a courtroom during testimony about 
suffering, staged so soon after a genocide that many of the actors themselves had only narrowly 
escaped, echoes Arendt’s own laughter when confronted with the testimony of K-Zetnik.  
 Like Arendt’s laughter during the testimony of K-Zetnik, we can understand the laughter 
of the students as a rebellion against the demands of identification and the institutional 
framework of the Dramatic Workshop. Rosenthal describes the Dramatic workshop as, 
a pyramid, with total power on top, run by a single man, with Mrs. Piscator a  close 
“mensch” below!  The atmosphere of the place was utterly neurotic and guilt-ridden, with 
a great deal of pressure on the bottom rung, the students!265    
An issue of the school newspaper, “The Dramatic Workshop Critique,” from two years earlier 
featured a cartoon about the acting teacher Raiken Ben-Ari, who played one of the defendants in 
The Burning Bush, and must have been one of the teachers who shamed the students into never 
speaking of the laughing episode, even about themselves. As we can see in the cartoon below, 
Ben Ari’s demand of identifying with roles is seen as a certain kind of violence. 
To really “live” the part the way that Ben-Ari wants you to, you have to let your head be 
chopped off in rehearsal. Like Brecht’s Berliner Ensemble, it bears emphasis that the structure of 
the school was strongly hierarchical and undemocratic. In Brecht and Piscator’s theatres we may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




see a democratic public realm emerge during the performance, but the relationship between the 
actors and directors during the rehearsal process was a different matter entirely. The students 
who laughed—students like Rosenthal and Malina—would be the ones to develop more 
democratic structures of theatre making in the following decades.  
 
The Trial as a Case 
Piscator wanted his audiences to identify with the Jewish defendants on stage in order to 
teach them about the rise of anti-Semitism across Europe and about the pernicious consequences 
of anti-Semitism in the United States.266 To do this, Piscator first had to contend with skepticism 
from at least some audience members and critics about the dangers and significance of anti-
Semitism. As an anonymous reviewer for Variety wrote that if the New York production were 
not based on historical fact, The Burning Bush, “would seem like a flagrantly contrived work to 
show the plight of the Jew as a minority race.”267 Another review in the New York Telegram 
agreed that historical accuracy and the documentary nature of the play were essential for 
communicating the play’s message: “The play is a frank adaptation of actual records of a 
Hungarian trial of the Eighties. Its blatant injustice is such that but for its authenticity, the 
normally smug brain reels, and rejects it as incredible.” The reviewer suggested, furthermore, 
that the documentary nature of the play was demonstrated precisely by the ways in which the 
proceedings of the trial did not adhere to the rules of dramatic form, for example the presentation 
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of definitive evidence by a character who was barely introduced beforehand such that, “The 
entire production has an unusual quality of seeming revivified history, rather than art.”268 The 
play’s departures from dramatic conventions and generic narratives signaled to audiences the 
veracity of the staged actions. Piscator knew that he could only convince his audience of the 
extent and danger of anti-Semitism by emphasizing the documentary quality of the play. This 
meant attending to the specific details that would signal to the audience that the play was 
following the actual transcripts of the play (for example, having an underdeveloped character 
play a crucial role in the trial). 
After convincing audiences of the truth of events depicted in the play, Piscator had to 
show how this Hungarian court case was relevant to American society. In an essay in the 
program book entitled “It Can’t Happen Here,” Piscator describes the shock of reading Sinclair 
Lewis’s novel and imagining the United States falling under the power of a dictator. He bemoans 
the failure of Eisenhower’s revelations about genocide and the concentration camps to teach the 
world a lesson. He warns that in America, “reaction and intolerance are working hand in hand, 
no matter which minority is selected as its victim,” and went on to tell the story of a young 
Jewish boy, whose father was killed in the Battle of the Bulge. The boy, Piscator says, “was spat 
upon and abused by a gang of children because he was a Jew. The innocent, heart-broken child 
asked his mother ‘Why did my daddy die?” Around the same time he heard this story, Piscator 
was given a copy of The Burning Bush. The play reminded him that, “one of the reasons anti-
Semitism made such headway in Germany was because the majority never realized its danger 
and did not oppose its growth until it was too late.”269 In a separate essay in the program, 
Herzceg also encouraged audiences to keep in mind that, “the lessons learned in The Burning 
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Bush, are not dead, antiquated nor unnecessary. The time of the play is not only Hungary in 1882, 
but the United States, or any other country at any time.”270  
 In the program of The Burning Bush, Theodor Apstein, a faculty member of the Dramatic 
Workshop’s playwriting department, emphasized the unique potential of the cause célèbre to 
bridge the gap between specific individuals and universal issues. He wrote that, “the legal cases 
which come down to us as cause célèbres involve issues more universal than the immediate 
conflict of the individuals concerned. Problems of truth and justice arise and they are 
complicated by the social environment of each specific case.” He argued that this sort of play is 
especially well-suited for epic theatre, in which “the audience is asked to observe rather than to 
become involved since the play will demand decisions instead of feelings from it. That is, the 
audience sits in judgment—it becomes the jury or part of the jury.”271 In The Burning Bush, 
Piscator kept dim lights on among the audience, and would have actors enter through the aisles 
of the theatre, turning the theatre audience into the audience at the trial. According to the 
reviewer for the New York World Telegram, “the theater is turned into a courtroom and the 
audience treated like spectators. The stage terraces down to the auditorium floor, and the aisles 
are part of the acting space. This approach is tremendously effective, once one accepts the fact 
that this is all true, and is being depicted as such.”272 Like the spectators in In Spite of it All, the 
audience members became part of history. 
 Piscator’s historical imagination here is quite different than Brecht’s. Brecht presents 
history at a distance in order to allow the audience space to consider its meaning. Piscator, in 
contrast, seeks to create an immediacy between his audience and the events on stage, to have 
them live through the events just as the characters do. When Brecht conceives of the audience as 
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jurors, he sees them as jurors of the entire production. Participants in Brecht’s performances are 
asked to exercise judgment in all of the senses that Arendt lays out: judgments about how to act 
(how do I play the role I am given? What is my stance vis-à-vis that role?), historical judgments 
(why did the story develop as it did? How could it have been different?) and aesthetic judgments 
(how did that actor perform? How did the staging techniques influence how we understood this 
story?). Piscator’s audience members become jurors in the fictional world of the court. During 
the performance they are not asked to judge the performance from a distance, but rather to think 
about their own legal judgment of the case in front of them.  
Piscator is not, however, returning to nineteenth century modes of historical drama. 
While he wants his audience to live through the performance as though they were jurors at the 
nineteenth century trial, he also wants them to be able to link their experience to contemporary 
events. This is a difficult task because he does not want his audience members to confuse the 
political conditions of nineteenth century Hungary with Nazi Germany or the postwar United 
States. What he needed to do was develop a way to have audiences directly experience an older 
historical moment without relying on any grand historical narratives that would explain the 
relationship between the staged event and the present day. Piscator resolved this difficulty in The 
Burning Bush and subsequent productions by rejecting the notion of history as a story and 
instead presenting history as a set of independent chronological events. That is, Piscator presents 
history not as a story, but as a chronicle.273 To do this with his production of The Burning Bush, 
Piscator relied heavily on different ways of framing the Hungarian trial as one particular case 
within a series of other court cases and persecutions. This framing took place first and foremost 
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through the set design. The set of The Burning Bush was designed by students at the Dramatic 
Workshop under the guidance of Henry A. Condell, the head of the design department. The set 
featured posters in Hungarian, English, French, and other languages about the trial, including 
caricatures of the supposed ritual murder. But it also included murals of famous persecutions 
throughout history including the persecution of Christ, the Sacco and Vanzetti trial, and the 
Haymarket Case.274  
Like Piscator, Condell was interested in using the production both to explore the history 
of anti-Semitism in Europe and to make a contemporary plea against racial prejudice. More so 
than Piscator, Condell was interested in making connections between anti-Semitism, colonialism, 
and racism against African Americans. In the same year as Condell worked on the set for The 
Burning Bush, he designed the set for the premiere performance of Troubled Island, an opera 
composed by William Grant Still with a libretto by Langston Hughes and Verna Arvy. The 
premiere production of Troubled Island, the first opera by an African American composer to be 
produced by a major opera company, was achieved through close collaboration between African 
Americans and Jewish and Eastern European immigrants. The opera tells the story of Jean- 
Jacques Dessalines and the Haitian Revolution. The opera focuses both on slavery and racial 
subjugation and on the problems of post-revolutionary dictatorship and the difficulty of creating 
a new government more just that the old regime. The opera can be seen a reflection on racial 
struggle and liberation in the Americas, as well as on the Bolshevik Revolution. Condell’s work 
on the Troubled Island sought to bring together not only the Bolshevik and Haitian Revolutions, 
but also the anti-Semitic policies of Nazi Germany. In an early stage sketch, Condell proposed to 
project a stylized swastika onto the curtain during the opera’s overture in order to set the stage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




for the slave rebellion of the first act.275 In his designs for Troubled Island we see that Condell, 
like Piscator, is working through different ways to connect stories of racial persecution across 
different historical periods, and—in the case of Condell—across different races.  
The Dramatic Workshop production opened with an empty courtroom and two poster 
boards on stage.  One reproduced the authors’ note printed at the beginning of the script attesting 
to the historical accuracy of the play. The other board presented a list of the “Trials of History”: 
Socrates, Jesus, the Witch Hunts, Danton, Nyíregyháza, Dreyfus, the Haymarket Case Chicago, 
Sacco and Vanzetti, each with their respective dates. A bailiff walked up the middle aisle of the 
theatre, through the audience. He held an old oil lamp that illuminated only a streak of the board 
at a time. He whispered the names, “like crying far away, out of the mist of history.” After each 
case, a chorus of actors among the audience repeated the name of the case, alternately 
whispering and yelling, “like night-mare-dreams of humanity.” When his lamp illuminated 
Nyíregyháza (the city where the trial of The Burning Bush was held), the bailiff rang a bell and 
called out: “Case number 8. Year 1882. The case again Joseph Scharf and his co-defendants.”276 
While the audience was drawn into the action of the trial itself, the addition of this prologue, and 
the explicit connections that the set drew between Nyíregyháza and other trials encouraged the 
audience to think of the trial in relation to other cases. 
 In a number of subsequent stagings, Piscator would present chronicles of historical events 
linked to the story on stage. One of the most striking examples of this is his production of The 
Crucible that premiered in Mannheim in 1954 and in subsequent years was revived in Göteborg, 
Tübingen, Essen, and Marburg. The actors played in historical dress, but the set, designed by 
Paul Walter, was far from a recreation of seventeenth century Salem. It featured a number of 
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metal platforms with grated floors and wooden crates, and a series of murals along the wall. Each 
of the murals depicted a historical event with brief descriptions: “Christ is crucified,” 
“Persecution of the Jews (Judenverfolgung),” “July 20th” (the date of the failed assassination of 
Hitler), “John the Baptist is beheaded,” “Spanish Inquisition,” “Counterrevolutionaries executed 
by the Red Army,” “Mark the Evangelist is martyred.”   
On another part of the wall, a series of signs were projected, each with the name of a 
location above and an event or person below: Athens/Socrates, Palestine/Christ, France/Jeanne 
D’Arc, Germany/July 20, 1944.  The collections of events on the murals and signs are rather 
strange. First, there is the odd inclusion of “July 20th,” which was an assassination attempt on 
Hitler’s life; seeming not an apt parallel for the crucifixion of Jesus or the execution of Socrates. 
Presumably, Piscator was referring to the mass arrests and execution following the attempt rather 
than the attempt itself. But nevertheless, the events also dissimilar in other ways; some are long 
processes (the Spanish Inquisition, Persecution of the Jews), others single events (July 20th, 
Christ is crucified), and of course, some are recent historical events and others Biblical.  
But Piscator wanted to emphasize the lack of redemption and the absence of teleology.  
There is no causal relationship between any of the events listed, and no clear movement 
of history that would make sense of each moment of violence as part of a larger narrative. By 
including Christian martyrs within this series but presenting them as isolated events, Piscator 
emphasizes the lack of a path toward redemption. Piscator presents these Christian martyrs as 
historical individuals, no more or less that the victims of other persecutions. The crucifixion of 
Christ can be understood as one particular historical event among many rather than as subsuming 




Almost twenty years after Piscator’s production of The Crucible, Eric Bentley wrote a 
play about the persecution of Jesus that took precisely this view. In the preface to the printed 
edition of the play, From the Memoires of Pontius Pilate, Bentley suggests that the most radical 
political stance one can take toward the story of Jesus is not to deny his existence, but to 
recognize him as an “ordinary guy.” Bentley states explicitly what is implicit in Piscator’s 
montage of the crucifixion alongside the persecution of the Jews: 
If he [Jesus] was just a Jew, how is he more interesting than six million others who, not 
so long ago, perished in the gas chambers? I think the possibility must be faced that he 
was not more interesting. It is possible that, among six million, there were others who 
would have made a better subject for hero worship, hagiography, even ordinary 
biography.277   
Indeed, after staging Peter Weiss’s play The Investigation about mass extermination at 
Auschwitz, Piscator began to plan a new documentary trial play with Weiss about the 
persecution and death of Jesus. 
 In the program book for the Essen production of The Crucible, Piscator and the theatre’s 
dramaturges included a far longer and more comprehensive chronicle of events. It is possible that 
the political events of the five years between the original Mannheim production and the Essen 
production influenced Piscator’s inclusion of colonial history, slavery, and American racism 
within this later list. The length and breadth of the list is striking: 
399 BC Trial of Socrates 
33 AD  Jesus is crucified 
71 AD  Spartacus, 6000 slaves killed 
1st-3rd c.  prosecution of Christians 
1252 inquisition starts using torture 
1290  start of 100 year persecution and expulsion of Jews in England 
1306  100,000 Jews expelled from France 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




1415 Johannes Hus burned 
1431  Jeanne D’Arc 
1440 imprisonment of Blacks for slave trade 
1481 Spanish Inquisition 
1484 persecution of witches begins  
1492 expulsion of Jews from Spain 
1498 Savonarola burned 
1509 start of Black slave trade in America 
1521 Montezuma and Aztecs annihilated 
1572 Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 2000 Protestants murdered 
1600 Giordano Bruno burned 
1731 26,000 Protestants expelled from Salzburg 
1793-4 Jacobin terror 
1881 Jewish pogroms in Russia 
1933 the first concentration camp for political opponents of National Socialism. By  
1944, 10 million people will perish here. 
1934 terror law (Terrorgesetz) issued for the protection of the National Socialist  
dictatorship, People’s Court (Volksgerichthof) founded to execute it. 
1935 political show trials in USSR 
1938 Kristallnacht. By 1944, 5.7 million Jews will be exterminated.  
1943 sentencing of Scholl siblings 
1944 July 20, over 700 German officers are executed  
1950 in the GDR a law is passed for the “protection of peace” that punishes dissenting 
political opinions, including through the death penalty  
1952 massacres and terror between Blacks and Whites [this is most likely referring to  
the anti-colonial Mau Mau Uprising against the British in Kenya]  
1953 Uprising in Berlin 
1956 Uprising in Posen 
1956 Uprising in Hungary   
1957 Little Rock lynchings [the last known lynching in Little Rock was actually in 
1927, but 1957 was the year of the desegregation crisis] 
1958  race riots in London278 
 
This listing of events may seem simplistic. Of course, Piscator’s focus is certainly on Western 
Europe. But that the same time, this chronicle form opens a way for thinking about the 
relationships between political persecutions, the Holocaust, and colonialism that does not seek to 
quantify the atrocities in respect to each other or emphasize the uniqueness of any single one 
over the others: to Piscator each historical event is completely unique, and each one has 
something to teach. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 In his excellent book, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age 
of Decolonization, Michael Rothberg discusses and rejects the common assumption that “the 
public sphere in which collective memories are articulated is a scare resource and that the 
interaction of different collective memories within that sphere takes the form of a zero-sum 
struggle for preeminence.” He suggests instead that “we consider memory as multidirectional: as 
subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not 
privative.”279 In the beginning of The Burning Bush, when the Baliff illuminates the names of 
each of the trials in turn (Socrates, Jesus, the Witch Hunts, Danton, Nyíregyháza, Dreyfus, the 
Haymarket Case Chicago, Sacco and Vanzetti), he suggests that each one of them are the subject 
of their own play. Each of them is worthy of restaging and remembrance, and each one can be 
remembered in some connection to others.  Indeed the memory of other events helps us to situate 
the event we see on stage. Piscator does not stop at suggesting that each of these episodes 
deserves its own production, he actually gives many of them a production in the years that follow. 
The historical events of the list and the murals from The Crucible almost reads like a repertoire 
of Piscator’s wartime and postwar productions: Jesus (unfinished project with Peter Weiss); 
beheading of John the Baptist (Wilde, Salome, Florence, 1964); persecution of Christians (Shaw, 
Androcles and the Lion, West Berlin, 1964); Joan of Arc (Shaw, Saint Joan, Washington D.C. 
1940); Giordano Bruno (unfinished project with Guntram Prüfer to be titled The Temptation of 
Giordano Bruno and premiered in Kessel, c. 1959)280; Jacobin terror (Büchner’s Danton’s Death, 
West Berlin, 1956; Rolland, Robespierre, West Berlin, 1963); witch hunts (The Crucible); 
Spanish inquisition (Schiller, Don Carlos, Munich, 1959), concentration camps (Hochhuth, The 
Deputy, West Berlin, 1963; Weiss, The Investigation, West Berlin, 1965); July 20th (Kirst and 
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Piscator, Uprising of the Officers, West Berlin, 1966). Piscator, in assembling his list, believed 
that each of these trials and persecutions deserved their day on stage. One by one, he tried to 






Peter Weiss: Investigations, East and West 
 
Between 1963 and 1965, approximately twenty thousand spectators traveled to a 
Frankfurt courthouse to watch proceedings against a group of mid and low level guards, doctors, 
and functionaries from Auschwitz.281 The year that the trial concluded, thousands more in both  
East and West Germany attended performances of Peter Weiss’s documentary play The 
Investigation, based on testimony from the trial.282 The play premiered simultaneously at fifteen 
different theatres throughout East and West Germany. Each of these fifteen premiere productions 
staged the play in a different way, telling a range of different stories about the trial, the 
Holocaust, and Cold War politics.  
The play has been the subject of particularly vitriolic criticism and condemnations, both 
at the time and in subsequent scholarship. In the weeks preceding the premiere of The 
Investigation alone, over 1,000 articles about Weiss appeared in East and West Germany.283 
These debates focused on the limits of representation in the theatre; Weiss’s critics claimed that 
the play “raped” the stage and violated audience members by exposing them to the testimony of 
Holocaust survivors.284 While these West German critics saw violence in what Weiss brought to 
the stage, later scholarship has condemned him for what he left off the stage. This later 
scholarship has claimed that Weiss’s play effaces the specificity of Jewish suffering in 
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Auschwitz in order to present Nazism as simply capitalism’s most extreme form.285 This 
criticism raises crucial questions about the limits of representation. How can theatre represent 
atrocity and what does it mean to bring Auschwitz to trial in a theatre? The play and its 
productions also open a second, related, set of questions about the demands of specificity and 
how we use representation. Must a play based on the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial be about Jewish 
suffering? Must it be only about Jewish suffering? Does any adaptation of the play that links the 
play to other contemporary events instrumentalize the victims of the camps? The first sections of 
this chapter begin to answer these questions through the text of Weiss’s play, while the later 
sections turn to the 1965 productions. 
To fully understand what is at stake in The Investigation, it is essential to also see how 
the play emerged in contemporary and subsequent productions. In 1965, The Investigation was a 
different play in each production. And it became a different play yet again in 2005 when staged 
by Rwandan director Dorcy Rugamba, whose entire family had perished in the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. This production, featuring all Rwandan and Congolese actors, had an extensive 
international tour.286 Understanding The Investigation, therefore, is not just a matter of analyzing 
the text of the play, or one of its stagings which we might be inclined to name as the correct or 
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emblematic one, but taking account of the play’s production history. This history opens up new 
elements in the original set of questions about theatre and atrocity, adaptation and 
instrumentalization, challenging us to consider whether, in this case, remembering Rwanda 
means forgetting the Holocaust?  
 
Setting the Stage 
Beginning two years after Eichmann’s trial, the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial was the largest 
and most publicized West German trial to charge individuals—in this case guards and officers at 
Auschwitz—for their roles in genocide. Most of the accused had spent the past two decades 
living prosperously in West Germany, in some cases building up successful businesses with 
start-up capital carried out of Auschwitz.287 The trial came at a crucial moment in West German 
debates about how the country could best achieve a “coming to terms with the past” 
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung). It was a moment of widespread public debate and controversy. 
The Auschwitz Trial occurred at the same time as debates about whether to extend the statute of 
limitations for murder.288 Unless the parliament passed legislation that lifted the statute of 
limitations, those who committed crimes during the Third Reich would be immune from 
prosecution after 1965.289 The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial also began the same year as the 
premiere of Rolf Hochhuth’s play The Deputy, which includes an Act set in Auschwitz, and 
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which led to public controversy over the role of the Catholic Church in the Holocaust. In the 
same year as the trial’s conclusion, the Second Vatican Council’s Nostra Aetate declaration and 
other statements issued by the Catholic and Protestant clergy garnered anger from the radical 
right by decrying anti-Semitism. 
Debates about the trial were interwoven with political debates connected not only to 
Germany’s past, but also to the contemporary context of the Cold War. Those on the right 
rejected the trial, arguing that it was time to move forward, and that the trials were a distraction 
from the crimes of the Soviet regime. From across the border, East Germany condemned the 
lenient sentencing of German “de-Nazification” trials, arguing that this leniency showed the 
direct ideological consistency between fascism and West Germany’s capitalist expansion. During 
the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, the defense attorneys led a campaign to dismiss the testimony of 
the witnesses (most of whom traveled from Eastern bloc countries), by arguing that the 
accusations betrayed foreign influence—explicitly charging that the testimony was coaxed by 
communist regimes, and implicitly hinting at an international Jewish conspiracy. The defense 
team also argued that because many of the witnesses were foreign (most of the victims of 
Auschwitz were from Eastern Europe), their testimony could not be trusted at the same level as 
that of the German witnesses (i.e. witnesses for the defense), because foreign witnesses were not 
accountable to perjury charges. After the trial, one witness reflected: “If I had guessed…that I 
would be interrogated by the attorney of my tormentor as though I myself were the defendant, I 
would not have come.”290 Of the twenty-two defendants, five were released, ten received 
sentences of under ten years, one received a fourteen year sentence, and only six were given life 
sentences. The trial was condemned from the right and the left. Those on the right found it 
monstrous to charge guards and soldiers who had only been following orders, especially after so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




many years. Those of the left found the light sentences and the treatment of survivors during the 
proceedings a travesty. 
Weiss attended the Frankfurt trial, and even traveled with the court to visit Auschwitz. 
The Investigation is based entirely on dialogue recorded in his own notes and in other 
contemporary reports, in particular Bernd Naumann’s series of articles from the Frankfurt 
Allgemeine Zeitung.291 Weiss adapted the dialogue into an oratorio following the form of Dante’s 
Divine Comedy.292 In this Divine Comedy trilogy, The Investigation was to be a bitterly ironic 
Paradiso; the destination of the innocent. The play was conceived of as a sharp critique of the 
trial, demonstrating how the survivors of Auschwitz are not only denied justice, but during the 
day of judgment relive the distain and disrespect visited upon them in the camp. 
The oratorio is constructed to show what life was like in Auschwitz as well as to 
demonstrate the ways that the courtroom mistreated the witnesses. It is divided into eleven 
cantos (Gesänge), each of which is further divided into three parts.293 Each canto features 
testimony concerning one aspect of Auschwitz.  Some of these are cantos are about places: the 
oratorio begins with the Canto of the [train] Platform and ends with the Canto of the Ovens. 
Other Cantos are about methods of killing, and include the Cantos of Phenol (the chemical 
injected into the hearts of inmates), the Canto of Zyklon B (the chemical used in the gas 
chambers), and the Canto of the Swing (a torture device). Other Cantos have broader themes: the 
Canto of the Possibility of Survival and the Canto of the Camp. At the center of The 
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Investigation is the Canto of Lili Toffler, Weiss’s Beatrice, which recounts the story of a woman 
who was discovered smuggling a letter to another inmate in the camp and executed.294 
Just over a month before the scheduled premieres of The Investigation, Peter Weiss 
published an op-ed in the East German paper Neues Deutschland called “Ten Working Points for 
an Author in the Divided World.” In the column, Weiss argues that the world is divided into two 
sides: on one, the socialist countries and nations engaged in liberation struggles, on the other, 
capitalist colonial powers. While qualifying his support with criticism of “the errors that have 
been and still are committed in the name of socialism” and urging freedom of expression in the 
East, Weiss commits to what he saw as the ideals of socialism.295 The publication of this op-ed 
shocked many West German critics who, despite the obvious political interventions of 
Marat/Sade, did not see Weiss as a political playwright.296 The response in West Germany, 
especially in the newspapers of the right-wing Springer press, was immediate and vitriolic. The 
theatre scholar Ludwig Marcuse, wrote of the first sentence of Weiss’s “10 Working Points” 
(“Every word that I write down and publish is political, that means it aims for contact with large 
segments of the population, in order to achieve a specific impact”), that “Hitler could have said 
the same thing!”297  
Attacks on Weiss from the far right emphasized the connection with Weiss’s politics to 
his Jewishness. In a three part exposé in the Deutsche Wochenzeitung and Deutsche Nachrichten 
called “Communist Auschwitz-theatre: Show Trial or Trial Show?,” Heinrich Härtle sought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 In his notebooks, Weiss connects Toffler to several women from his own life, most notably Lucie Weisenberger, 
who he tried to marry in order to help her leave Theresienstadt, and who eventually perished in the camp. Jens-Fietje 
Dwars, Und dennoch Hoffnung: Peter Weiss, Eine Biographie (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2007).	  
295 Peter Weiss, “10 Arbeitspunkte eines Autors in der geteilten Welt” Neues Deutschland September 17, 1965.	  
296 Jürgen Habermas sharply criticized reviewers of Marat/Sade for focusing exclusively on its formal innovations 
and neglecting to discuss its contemporary political relevance. Jürgen Habermas, “Ein Verdrängungsprozeß wird 
enthüllt”, Die Zeit June 12, 1964, accessed April 5, 2012, http://www.zeit.de/1964/24/ein-verdraengungsprozess-
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reveal The Investigation as part of a broader scheme that used the “demonization of German anti-
Semitism” to “distract from the terrors and crimes of the communist world revolution.”298 Härtle 
writes that “no one can blame this Jewish emigrant for wanting to bring the suffering of the 
Jewish people to the stage… perhaps as a Jew he has a strong emotional impulsion for this 
‘drama.’”299 In a circuitous argument, Härtle connects Weiss as well as the “philo-semetic” and 
“anti-German” playwright Rolf Hochhuth to the disproportionately large number of Jews in the 
East Germany government, who propagate “Anti-anti-Semitism.”300 Both Weiss and Piscator 
received extensive anti-Semitic hate mail and threats around the time of the premiere.301  
Although the radical right was quick to link Jews and communists, neither the SED nor 
the far left in the West were actually invested in countering anti-Semitism. The Communist 
party’s platform had always been that Nazism was no more that the most extreme expression of 
capitalism. To make this claim meant to discount the role of racial ideology and Jewish 
persecution under Hitler.302 As Andreas Huyssen has pointed out, “remembering the Third Reich 
was not identical to remembering the Holocaust.”303  
Holocaust studies scholarship in the 1980s and 90s accused Weiss of ignoring the Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust in order to advance his anti-capitalism, pointing in particular to the fact 
that Weiss never uses the word “Jew” in the play. Characteristic of the heavy rhetoric of many of 
these condemnations is James E. Young’s accusation that the play is “as Judenrein as most of 
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301 In a notebook from 1965-1966, Weiss recorded several hate letters sent to himself and Erwin Piscator 
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post-Holocaust Europe,” equating Weiss’s play with literary genocide.304 For Young, Weiss’s 
omission of the word “Jew” is a direct result of Weiss’s ideological preoccupations, in which his 
Marxism led him to portray the persecuted as “victims not of anti-Semitic terror but of monopoly 
capitalism gone mad.”305 These critiques touch on fundamental questions about how to portray, 
remember, and legally represent the victims of the Third Reich. Recast in Arendt’s terms, the 
question is about whether the theatre is a place to remember the victims for what they were (their 
religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, nationality, political affiliation) or for who they were (as 
unique individuals). Not attending to what the victims were, of course, is bad history; but not 
attending to who they were is bad remembrance.  
Part of the reason that it was possible for Weiss to both be accused of both effacing the 
memory of Jewish suffering in his play, and at the same time of participating in a Jewish 
conspiracy was his own reticence to adopt a strong national or ethnic identity.  Weiss was the son 
of a protestant German woman and a Jewish man. He came of age in Prague, Sweden, and 
London, was a Czech and later Swedish (never German) citizen, but he wrote primarily in 
German. In “I come out of my hiding place,” a lecture delivered at Princeton in 1966, Weiss 
traced his sense of Jewish identity to German anti-Semitism:  
I was thrown out of this society, because they had made up their mind that there should 
be another race which had to be extinguished… I hadn’t even known that I fitted into this 
other race and I didn’t know what to do with this new difference.306  
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In an interview for the New York Times Magazine from the same year, Weiss claimed: “I do not 
identify myself any more with the Jews than I do with the people of Vietnam or the blacks in 
South Africa. I simply identify myself with the oppressed of the world.”307 Weiss also saw 
identity and power structures as dynamic constellations: the victim one day could become an 
oppressor the next. Though an early supporter of Israel, Weiss grew increasingly disillusioned 
with Israeli politics after the Six Day War. In 1967, while stating that he was among those “who 
have followed the development of Israel with great sympathy, and who stand in solidarity with 
the state of Israel’s absolute right to existence,” he raised concern about Israeli policies: “It is 
becoming more and more clear that Israel is not simply fighting for its life, but that its 
government and its military have adopted the mentality of a master race (Herrenvolk) in relation 
to the Arab people… The Israeli population has fallen into aggressive, military politics.”308  
In Weiss’s notebooks from the beginning of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, Weiss 
repeatedly connects anti-Semitism to other forms of racism and prejudice. He notes that anti-
Semitism “always runs parallel to hatred of Negros, hatred of yellow-skinned people, and other 
racial hatred.”309 Not only does he believe that anti-Semitism can help him understand other 
forms of racism, he believes other forms of racism can help him understand anti-Semitism and 
his own personal history. He notes that in Purgatorio he will explore his father’s assimilation and 
anti-Semitism; he does this in The Lusitanean Boogey through the character of a black African. 
He is also concerned with national, intra-ethnic rivalries, noting in that in the camps the Western 
Jews looked down on the Eastern Jews. It is not until his later notebooks during the trial that 
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Weiss first explicitly connects the concentration camps to capitalism: “Capitalist society, pushed 
to the outer limits of perversion—exploitation to the blood, the bones, the ashes.” 310 But he also 
suggests that the camps are not specific to capitalism, but to totalitarianism, writing, “the 
totalitarian order also led socialism to the construction of camps, place for mass executions.”311 It 
is only in the notebooks of mid-1965, at the end of the trial and after Weiss had almost 
completed The Investigation that he begins to condemn capitalism in Marxist terms. It was not 
until after the completion of The Investigation that Weiss publicly declared his tentative support 
for socialism. As Robert Cohen has argued, “It was not Weiss’s Marxism that produced The 
Investigation, but rather Weiss’s work on the Auschwitz material that intensified his interest in 
Marxism.”312 Chrisoph Weiβ additionally suggests that it was not only Weiss’ own research, but 
the attacks on him from Western critics for his participation in a GDR writers’ conference that 
prompted his politicization.313 
When Weiss does turn to socialism it is less in the service of Marxist dogma (he was 
never actually able to get through Capital), than as a pragmatic measure for contemporary 
critique.  Marxism was, for Weiss, always a means rather than an end. Weiss’s anti-capitalism in 
the play is manifested primarily through naming the specific corporations that benefited from 
slave labor and from manufacturing poisonous gas and human-shaped ovens, many of which 
were now reporting record-breaking profits in the postwar boom. In other words, Weiss was not 
trying to offer a Marxist history of the events, but to engage directly in current debates. The 
contemporary relevance to the Verjährungsdebatte in particular, was central to the decision of 
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theatre companies to participate in the simultaneous premiere of The Investigation.314 The 
contemporary relevance was also apparent to critics far in advance of the production, evident 
both in the heated condemnations, and among defenders of Weiss. In the Frankfurter Rundschau, 
Hermann Naber argued that the oratorio applied not to “the past… but to the present.”315 
The Investigation moves frequently between the past and the present. The camp is never 
actually presented on stage, it is only described through the testimony of the witnesses. 
Throughout the play, Auschwitz is referred to only as “the camp” and no specific ethnic group is 
mentioned by name. At the same time, though, the play is full of specific historical markers 
(including the names of each of the defendants). Robert Cohen points out that critics who 
emphasize the absence of the word “Jew” neglect a crucial scene in which one of the inmates is 
referred to as Sarah, the generic name given to all Jewish women by the Third Reich.316 In 
another canto, one of the defendants tries to argue that he had no personal animosity against the 
inmates, and states: “Before they were taken/I always told my family/go ahead and shop from the 
Krämers/they are people too.”317 There are also multiple references to an inmate named Bunker 
Jakob, an actual historical figure. Critics have read The Investigation as a subordination of 
Jewish identity to a universalizing Marxist narrative, but one might also see in The Investigation 
a sort of particularization from the category of Jew to the level of individuals like the Krämers 
and Bunker Jakob. 
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Robert Cohen and Andreas Huyssen both read Weiss’s lack of ethnic markers as a means 
to create a parable that would have contemporary applicability.318 Certainly, Weiss intended to 
encourage audience reflection about contemporary wars and massacres. But it does not follow 
that Weiss would dissociate the play from historical markers in order to effect this political 
reflection. On the contrary, Weiss is similar to Brecht and Piscator in his convictions about the 
necessity for historical specificity in political theatre. In Marat/Sade, Hölderlin, and Trotsky in 
Exile, it is precisely through extreme historical specificity that Weiss critiques contemporary 
politics. Furthermore, ethnic and racial identity does have a role within the other plays of 
Weiss’s Divine Comedy trilogy: The Inferno includes a scene of violence against Jews, The Song 
of the Lusitanian Boogey takes place in colonial Angola and is filled with references to race and 
the problems of assimilation. 
A different explanation for the absence of the word “Jew” can be found in the framing of 
the play. After all, this was not justice as it should be, it was a portrayal of justice designed to 
show the way that the court perpetrated violence against the survivors.319 Thus the use of the 
generic and imposed name Sarah signals the effacement of the individual within the camps, a 
deprivation that Weiss wants to show continues to the present. According to Weiss, he does not 
give the witnesses names in the play because “they had none in the camp, they were only 
numbers.”320 Witness 5 expresses this loss in the second canto (“The Camp”): “Family home 
occupation and property/those were concepts/ that were extinguished/ as the number was cut 
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in.”321 Weiss left out the proper names of witnesses because he wanted to demonstrate continuity 
between the treatment of witnesses in the camps and their treatment during the trial. As the 
attacks on Weiss from the far right demonstrate, Weiss would have assumed that spectators 
would understand the survivors as Jewish. After the West Berlin premiere, a reviewer for the 
German-Jewish exile newspaper Aufbau wrote, “The word ‘Jew’ is not spoken a single time… it 
is conspicuous, when six million killed are spoken of and everyone knows that it could only be 
referring to the murdered Jews.”322 Weiss wanted his audience to feel this absence, that the 
witnesses were deprived of their identity in the trial as they were in the camps. 
It is important to remember, as well, that The Investigation is a play. Weiss not only 
omits mention of Auschwitz, Jews, and Germans by name, he also omits all punctuation and all 
stage directions except for noting when the defendants laugh and clap together. Weiss left the 
completion of the play up to the process of staging. That is, he left it to the judgment of directors 
to move from the script to the particular ways that the survivors were presented on stage.323 
There were, indeed, productions that portrayed Auschwitz simply as a prison for German anti-
fascists. Some of the productions cut large sections of Weiss’s text and some purposely staged it 
badly to undermine its political significance.324 But there were also productions that showed the 
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Jewish victims at the center of the story. It is only possible to understand The Investigation and 
how it portrayed the survivors of Auschwitz by studying how it was actually produced and 
staged. 
 
East Berlin: We were all Antifascists 
The East Berlin production was not held in a theatre, but in a plenary room of the 
Volkskammer (the unicameral legislature of the GDR). This staged reading was directed by Karl 
von Appen, Lothar Bellag, Erich Engel, Manfred Wekwerth, and Konrad Wolf. Coming only a 
few weeks after Weiss’ public declaration of solidarity with socialism, the East Berlin reading 
was a self-congratulatory state event.325 The Volkskammer production used casting to identify 
the victims of the Third Reich. All of the roles were played by the political and artistic elite of 
East Berlin, many of whom had been political exiles or concentration camp inmates during the 
Third Reich. Among the performers were Helene Weigel and Ernst Busch (both in exile during 
World War II), the journalist Peter Edel (an Auschwitz survivor), writer Bruno Apitz (a 
Buchenwald survivor), and Alexander Abusch (a resistance fighter, journalist, and Deputy 
Chairman of the GDR Ministry of Culture), along with other painters, sculptors, writers, and 
actors.326 The casting of the East Berlin production invited the television audience to identify not 
with the defendants or the witnesses, but with a nation. It did not particularly matter who played 
the victims and accused because the emphasis of the evening was not on the testimony or the 
figures within the play, but on the political and cultural elite themselves and their Western 
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enemies. Abusch told GDR’s Bild Zeitung am Abend: “Here we are proceeding against men, who 
today are again in high positions, and who are planning new harm against our nation. Our 
participation in the reading proves that in the GDR there are no difficulties in spreading the 
truth.”327  
Of course, the “truth” required significant cuts in Weiss’s play. In the final canto, after 
being accused by the defense attorney of testifying out of personal hatred toward the defendants, 
Witness 3 replies: “I speak free of hate/ I don’t have the wish to revenge myself on anyone/ I 
stand calmly before the individual defendants/ I’d just like to offer the thought/ that they could 
not have achieved what they did/ without the support of millions of others… I only ask/ to be 
allowed to point out/ how crowded the sidewalks were with audiences/ as they drove us from our 
apartments/ and loaded us into cattle wagons.”328 This reference to collective German guilt was 
particularly troubling for the GDR regime. Manfred Haiduk’s 1977 monograph on Peter Weiss 
published in the GDR hints at why it was so important for the East Berlin production to cast its 
reading with individuals who had been opposed to the Nazi regime. Referring to this speech, 
Haiduk writes, “On the one hand, this refers to the guilt of the great majority of 
Germans…including those who live in the territory of the GDR. At the same time, though, it is 
stated that some of the actually guilty, the main guilty ones, continue in positions of authority. 
And so it really thematizes the question of the unresolved past (unbewältigten Vergangenheit) in 
West Germany.”329 Haiduk’s awkward displacement of the guilt of everyone to the “actually 
guily” to “the main guilty ones” in West Germany was also enacted in the East Berlin 
performance, which cut the very lines that Haiduk references here. Both the extensive cuts and 
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the anti-fascist credentials of everyone in the cast (those playing the accused as well as the 
witnesses) effaced the shared guilt of all Germans who stood by and watched—including those 
in the GDR—implicit in the script.  
The GDR productions needed to make significant cuts throughout the play in order to 
bring it into line with official policy. While Piscator’s production was about three hours, the 
televised version of the Volkskammer production was only one and a half hours. Lothar 
Orzechowski, a West German journalist who attended several East German productions, 
indicates that while parts of the play (the naming of West German corporations) cohered well 
with official GDR ideology, other parts did not. Orzechowski cites in particular a passage about 
the bonus given to guards who shot prisoners attempting to escape, asking, “Does the audience 
associate such sections with their own situation?”330 (i.e., the Schießbefehl whereby East German 
guards were required to shoot East Germans attempting to cross to West Germany). This passage 
was cut from the East Berlin production. Indeed, all descriptions of barbed wire fences and walls 
surrounding Auschwitz (a familiar sight to the East Berlin audiences) and references to escape 
attempts that were cut from the production. 
Although the casting of the East Berlin performance emphasized the antifascist resistance 
of GDR politicians and artists, some of the most significant cuts within the play were of the 
sections that explicitly discuss the treatment of political prisoners. The cantos that deal 
specifically with the political department at Auschwitz—Canto of the Swing and Canto of the 
Black Wall—are almost entirely cut and with them the references to denunciation, false charges 
of sabotage, torture, and forced confessions. Cut too from the East Berlin telecast were the two 
references to show trials held at the camps (in Canto of Junior Squad Leader Stark and Canto of 
the Ovens).  Presumably, the discussion of political repression would hit too close to home. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




While the GDR wanted to remember the war as a fight between the Nazis and the antifascists, 
any specific discussion of political prosecution ran the risk of becoming fodder to critique the 
GDR itself. While the East Berlin production used casting to suggest that the victims of the 
camps were first and foremost antifascist, the stories that the witnesses told were not about the 
experience of political repression, but of ethnic genocide.  
 
Rostock: Auschwitz and the Wall 
 Outside of the GDR’s capital city (and off national television), theatres had far more 
freedom to diverge from the party line. According to Orzechowski’s account, the Dresden 
production included reference to the rewards for shooting escapees.  In Rostock, director Hans 
Anselm Perten used a stage design that strongly invoked both the camp and the fortified borders 
of the GDR. Designed by Falk von Wangelins, the Rostock set diverged radically from the other 
productions. Far from effacing the references to Auschwitz’s fences, the Rostock production 
made them the set. While the East Berlin production strove to emphasize parallels between the 
Third Reich and the contemporary FRG, the production at the Rostock Volkstheater was the only 
theater in either East or West Germany to draw visual parallels between National Socialism and 
the repressions of the GDR. 
Wangelin’s set was composed of scaffolding about twenty feet high, and divided into 
three levels. Defendants sat on each level, each of them dressed in black suits and with a 
machine gun and iron helmet close at hand. At the top of the scaffolding sat two policemen, each 
controlling two spotlights. The entire scaffolding was backlit, de-emphasizing the defendants as 
individuals and turning them into part of the architectural edifice. Witnesses for the prosecution 




the audience to present their testimony. Of course, officially, the set was supposed to invoke 
Auschwitz for the audience, and show the continuities between the Third Reich and FRG, but in 
reality it undermined the distance that the GDR sought to create between itself and the National 
Socialists. 
Perten worked with Weiss to add a passage about the resistance of Soviet prisoners of 
war in the camp.331 While the East Berlin production had taken the paradoxical position of trying 
to tell a story about antifascists without any reference to resistance, the Rostock production 
added an extra scene of sabotage as a heroic act against authoritarian power. Perten also added a 
short epilogue. After the final speech, a chorus of witnesses stands up and gives account of those 
who did not survive: “Over six million dead Jews and Roma, of those, three million in 
Auschwitz alone. Over three million Soviet prisoners of war and over ten million civilians 
senselessly and brutally murdered in the occupied territories.” The epilogue listed Jews and 
Roma first, and while mentioning Soviet prisoners of war made no mention of German 
antifascists.332  
 
Stuttgart: Everyone a Victim, Everyone a Perpetrator 
The Stuttgart production, directed by Peter Palitzsch, had a very different take on identity 
and casting than any of the other productions. Far from attempting to reveal the political or 
ethnic identity of the survivors and the defendants, Palitzsch’s production erased the differences 
between them. He radically changed the play such that the accused and the witnesses were all 
played by the same people, who would alternate roles between each canto. Palitzsch justified this 
decision on the basis of Witness 3’s testimony about Auschwitz as a system in which the guards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 Manfred Nössig, “Ermittlung zur ‘Ermittlung’: Über einen Pressetod” Theater der Zeit 23, 1965.	  




and inmates were joined by witnessing what to others would always remain unfathomable, and 
that, furthermore, if the inmates “were not designated as inmates/they could also have been 
turned into guards.” 333 
The decision to collapse the witnesses and defendants into one group certainly went 
against Weiss’s specifications about casting in the script. Even among the witnesses, Weiss is 
been careful to distinguish between the figures playing the witnesses for the defense and 
prosecution: he specifies in his notes that Witness 1 and 2 were “on the side of the camp 
administration,” whereas witnesses 3-9 are survivors of the camp.334 Tellingly, the same article 
from Christ und Welt that criticized Berliner’s “invested” performance at the Freie Volksbühne 
praised the Stuttgart production, arguing that the decision to mix the perpetrators and the victims 
was a good one, and that Weiss’s decision to give each of the accused his real name was 
misguided.335 Other reviewers, though, mistrusted the politics of the Stuttgart production. In the 
Schwäbisches Tagesblatt, Andre Müller criticized the production’s apparent moral, that “it was 
merely fate that dictated whether one came to Auschwitz as an inmate or a guard.”336   
Although the set gave a nod to the specifics of the case (it featured a map of Auschwitz, 
along with photographs of some of the actual defendants), it stopped short of compelling 
audiences to adopt a critical stance toward either the trial or the defendants. Because of this, the 
moments of political critique that did occur were misunderstood by the audience. One indicative 
example of this was in the audience’s reaction to the music. In between the scenes, Palitzsch 
played sentimental Nazi songs like “Lili Marleen” and “Es geht alles vorüber” that sought to 
bridge the experience of the camps with the war-time experience of the audience members: “the 
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unknown, or at least repressed, reality of the time was mixed with kitsch and officially known 
into an indivisible unity.”337 While the Nazi songs were included to emphasize the connection of 
popular culture with fascist expansionism, one critic noted that far from unsettling the audience, 
these melodies were taken as an invitation to relax between the scenes.338 Although it is 
impossible to trace what effect this staging had on all of its spectators, we can say with certainty 
that at least one audience member was unmoved -- Erwald Bucher (the Federal Minister of 
Justice at the time as well as a former Nazi party and SA member) maintained his support for 
preserving the statute of limitations after the performance.339  
 
Gemeinschaftsarbeit in Essen 
The Artistic Director of the Essen theatre, Erich Schumacher, decided to distance the play 
from the normal production process. The Essen staging was a “communal production” 
(Gemeinschaftsarbeit). The program did not name individual roles in the production. Composed 
and staged by the company as a whole through a process of discussion about the material, this 
production itself enacted a democratic process of deliberation and “coming to terms with the 
past.” Perhaps for this reason, this production most strongly implicated the audience in the 
staging and emphasized the audience’s shared culpability for the crimes of the Third Reich. In 
Essen, it was the witnesses who were onstage, and the accused in the pit.  The witnesses sat at a 
low table that took up almost the whole stage, and when they presented their testimony, they 
would stand on top of the table and speak to the judge and prosecutor, who sat at the same level 
on the right.  The accused sat on benches upholstered with red velvet in the pit with their backs 
to the audience. As the witnesses gave their testimony, they would gesture simultaneously to the 
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accused in the front of the auditorium, and to the audience itself.340 The Essen production earned 
some of the best reviews, and critics argued that this production was particularly effective in 
transferring a sense of accountability to the audience. 
In the Essen production, the accused wore black suits and presumably appeared like a 
first row of audience members for as long as they were seated. Yet as soon as one was called 
forward, he turned and faced the audience. While the witnesses were made up to appear pale, the 
accused wore glass half-masks. These masks gave their faces an unnatural shimmer and brought 
out the stylization of the witnesses and accused as chorus and anti-chorus. The masks introduced 
a tension between distance and identification: while the masks distanced the actors from the 
audience and emphasized the theatricality of the performance, the masks also anonymized the 
figures and thus made their actions generalizable. Rather than performing The Investigation as 
one of their repertoire pieces, the Essen theatre decided to perform it on specific dates associated 
with the Third Reich and the German state.341  
 
Piscator’s Investigation 
As audience members arrived at Berlin’s Freie Volksbühne for performances of The 
Investigation, they received a slip of paper: 
Please do not leave the performance; try to push through—like the actors have through a 
long rehearsal process, like they do every night.  What’s the length of one such evening 
compared to the unending depth of suffering that came to the victims of Hitler’s regime? 
If you do want to leave, however, we ask you to please give us the reason or reasons. 
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You are leaving,  
Because you are opposed to dealing with Jewish problems on the stage?  Yes - No 
Because you are opposed to presenting the Auschwitz trial on the stage?  Yes - No 
Because you already know the things you are told in The Investigation? Yes - No 
Because you could no longer bear the testimony? Yes - No 
Because you are bored? Yes - No 
Or are there other reasons? If so, what?342 
The Volksbühne’s survey touches on the most pressing questions of Germany’s 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Piscator asked audiences whether they found the production painful, 
redundant, boring, or whether they opposed presenting “Jewish problems” or the trial on stage. 
In the broader debates about the Auschwitz trial, West German conservatives argued that it was 
senseless (perhaps boring) to repeatedly castigate individuals for crimes committed long ago, and 
damaging to the robust new nation of the FRG. For them, testimony at the Frankfurt Auschwitz 
trial was at once unbearable in its graphic sensationalism, and boring in its repetition of well-
known facts.  
As the previous chapter would suggest, Piscator was very concerned that his production 
show not only the genocidal policies of the Nazis, but also the persistence of anti-Semitism in 
postwar West Germany. Piscator’s survey suggests that he conceived of the play first and 
foremost as a play about “Jewish problems.” Early in the rehearsal process, Piscator planned to 
costume each of the survivors in a generic corduroy pants or skirt suit, with yellow star on the 
left hand side of his or her jacket.343 Such costumes would serve both to make the Jewish identity 
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of the survivors unambiguous, and also to visually signal that though the war was over, the court 
treated the survivors as legally inferior to German defense witnesses. While Weiss left the term 
“Jew” out of the play, in Piscator’s directing scripts for the first scene, he noted which witnesses 
were Jewish.  In the first scene, these were Witness 3 and 8, the two witnesses who have the 
largest and most compelling roles throughout the play. 344 As Witness 8, Piscator cast Martin 
Berliner, a Jewish Austrian actor who had escaped to the United States during the war. Another 
key witness, Witness 4, was played by Angelika Hurwicz, whose father was Jewish. Hurwicz 
had also premiered the role of Gruscha in Brecht’s Caucasian Chalk Circle in 1954 before 
emigrating to West Germany. Piscator had hoped to cast more Jewish actors in his production, 
but many who he approached did not think they could bear the physical strain of performing the 
piece.345  
According to a profile on the rehearsals at the Freie Volksbühne for Christ und Welt (a 
conservative Protestant weekly), not everyone at the theatre agreed with Piscator’s casting 
choices. Wolfgang Ingée quoted Berliner as telling him that, “No one knows if it’s a good thing 
that I am taking part.” 346 One of the tactics of the defense attorneys during the trial was to 
discount witness testimony by claiming the Jewish witnesses were unreliable because they were 
too personally invested to testify objectively.347 Arendt discusses, and dismisses, this very 
objection to the Eichmann Trial in Eichmann in Jerusalem. Peter Weiss, too, was accused of 
betraying “Jewish ressentiment” in his play.348 It seems that Berliner’s fellow cast members had 
related misgivings about his role in the play. Perhaps if a Jewish actor were taking part in the 
production it would undermine the veracity of its political message. Piscator’s casting decisions, 
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then, can be seen as an act of defiance, challenging the common rejection of a role for Jews in 
bringing Nazi criminals to justice.  
A number of reviewers explicitly mentioned that Berliner was Jewish, and made 
reference to the fact in their evaluations of his performance. Christ und Welt discounted 
Berliner’s performance, claiming that “Martin Berliner, and who would hold it against him, 
showed too strong an investment (war zu stark beteiligt) as a witness.”349 Christ und Welt echoed 
in its evaluation of Berliner’s performance the very criticism that was leveled against Jewish 
survivors at the trial, that the performance was not objective enough. Other reviewers were far 
more appreciative. Among them was Heinz Elsberg, who wrote in Aufbau that, “doubtless the 
most striking performance of the evening was given by Martin Berliner, himself belonging to 
those persecuted by the Nazis. He came alive in the text.”350 
Although Piscator emphasized Jewish identity in his production, he did not want to mark 
the witnesses in a way that would marginalize their testimony. Just like in his production of The 
Burning Bush, Piscator wanted the audience to identify with the Jewish characters in the play. In 
Piscator’s staging, designed by Hans-Ulrich Schmückle, the defendants sat in a shallow orchestra 
pit facing the stage, while the accused sat on bleachers on the stage looking out into the 
audience.351 
Whereas the set design of The Burning Bush cast the audience as jurors, the set design of 
The Investigation positioned them as witnesses. The judge and attorneys sat stage left; when 
witnesses testified they would walk up a short flight of stairs to a triangular playing area. In this 
way, the witnesses in Piscator’s production seemed to be rising from the first row of the audience. 
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One reviewer wrote of this set design, “the witnesses… are perched in front of the auditorium, in 
the first row, as though they were people (Menschen) like you and I.”352 This is quite a striking 
phrase, certainly the author means to say “as though they were spectators like you and I,” but 
instead writes “as though they were people like you and I.” This mistake gets to the heart of 
Piscator’s convictions about identification—identifying with a character on stage is also a way of 
recognizing the people being portrayed as people. In an essay in the program of the Freie 
Volksbühne production, Angelika Hurwicz emphasizes that it is this quality of theatre that makes 
it a crucial place to reflect on the Holocaust, “On the stage, a person (der Mensch) steps 
immediately (unmittelbar) before people. For no topic is this [dynamic] more necessary than the 
topic of the debasement of the person by the people.”353 Of course, the tension in this review is 
telling—as though they were people—and may leave us unsure about how Piscator’s staging was 
in guiding the recognition of the witnesses as “people like you and me.”  
Luigi Nono’s music was designed to further the audience’s identification with the 
witnesses. Although The Investigation is an oratorio, written to be performed with Nono’s music, 
his music is rarely analyzed in conjunction with the play and was only used in the productions in 
West Berlin, Essen, and Rostock. Nono worked with Weiss to develop the music for The 
Investigation during Weiss’ summer vacation in Venice in 1965. Nono created his recording at 
the Studio di Fonologia RAI in Milan using adult and child choruses, acoustic instruments, and 
electronics. While Weiss’s text mediates descriptions of Auschwitz through the testimony of 
witnesses, the recording seeks to offer the audience a representation of the camp itself. In the 
recording one hears gunshots and shrill whirring and whistling that sound like gas. Distorted 
human voices sound alternatively like gasps, sobs, coughs, moans, and the gurgles of infants. 
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Weiss writes that Luigi Nono’s music added “the level of the unspeakable” to Piscator’s 
production.354 
Piscator surrounded the audience with speakers, and the music was played very loudly.355 
Critics, whether they praised or rejected the play and its music, all seemed to agree that the 
music was perhaps the most penetrating element of the staging. Many of those who left 
Piscator’s production and filled out the survey said that it was because of Nono’s music.356 A 
reviewer for the Rheinische Post described the central importance of Nono’s music to the 
production in the following way, 
The strongest emotional effect came from the composer Luigi Nono… [The music] 
portrayed the atmosphere of the camp with unrelenting severity. That which the 
predominantly objective and sometimes also ideologically digressing tenor of the 
testimony perhaps did not allow for, was expanded through this electronic sound-image 
(Geräuschbild). . . it bears witness to the dread of humans before other humans, and 
attained for the play an effectiveness on stage that would certainly not have been reached 
by the documentary report alone.357 
The review in Christ und Welt commented that the Freie Volksbühne audience seemed reflective 
but did not seem ill at ease or emotionally stirred by the text, “only under Nono’s shrill 
flagellations did they now and then cringe, or hold their ears.”358 For some audience members, 
the music may have conjured not just a sense of the camps, but personal memories of aerial 
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bombardment. It was Nono’s music with “its bloodcurdling chords” that “intensified the 
atmosphere to rupture.”359  
 When studied in comparison with the other premiere productions of The Investigation, 
the Freie Volksbühne production shows something surprising: this production was both the 
production most concerned with anti-Semitism and the production that most explicitly engaged 
with contemporary international concerns and conflicts. Piscator’s remarkable ambition, and I 
believe, achievement, was to use Germany’s history to urge his audiences to condemn and take 
action against contemporary wars (in particular America’s involvement in Vietnam) by 
emphasizing the specificity of the Holocaust rather than ignoring it. Paging through the program 
of The Investigation at the Freie Volksbühne, the audience members not only acquired context 
specific to the Auschwitz trial—for example, the biographies and photographs of the 
defendants—but also read a number of articles that connected the trial and the crimes of the 
Third Reich to current international politics. In his essay for the program, Piscator writes that 
“only regret prompts transformation, changes; regret turns bad into good deeds, forestalls 
repetitions—becomes the measurement of future actions—whether they now happen in Vietnam, 
in the Congo, or in India.”360  
In his text for the program, Nono begins by asking why it is important to remember 
Auschwitz in 1965, two decades later.  He points out that it has taken two decades for the crimes 
at Auschwitz to be recognized and formally charged. But he also argues that remembering 
Auschwitz is part of being able to consider contemporary political events: 
of course, today there are human, social, ideological, economic, in short | political 
problems (or questions), that seem more pertinent. [than Asuchwitz]… but how is it 
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possible not to recognize contemporary relationships in Auschwitz… what is happening 
today? destruction of villages and people who are fighting for their freedom through 
napalm and other means.361 
Through the production history of The Investigation we can see that it is when documentary 
theatre is most grounded in the specifics of the case it presents that it is also most able to travel. 
To put this in the terms with which I began the dissertation: the strong archival component of 
documentary theatre is what allows it to enter the repertoire, to be adapted and to speak to other 
situations and historical moments.  
 
Auschwitz on the Stage 
The 1965 productions of The Investigation also show something surprising about 
theatricality: the productions that were the most ostensibly theatrical, were also the ones that 
most deeply engaged with the question of German culpability. In other words, the productions 
that were the most theatrical were not the ones that, as Arendt would put it, replaced genuine 
reflection with “cheap sentimentality”. The Rostock, Essen, and West Berlin productions all 
distanced the performance from the actual courtroom by using Nono’s music. The set at Rostock 
and the glass masks in Essen both heightened the theatrical effect of the productions. In each 
case, theatricality was used to encourage the audience to judge for themselves. In Rostock, the 
set encouraged audiences to consider the repressions of the GDR. The East Berlin production,  in 
contrast, disavowed the theatricality of the event—by holding it in a government building rather 
than a theatre and casting recognizable antifascists—in order to turn the play into a story about 
East German anti-fascism.   





In the weeks leading up to the premiere of The Investigation, many of the articles 
condemning Weiss and calling for a cancellation of the premiere performances rejected the 
representation of Auschwitz on stage.  One of the most important mainstream attacks on The 
Investigation in the debate preceding its premiere was Joachim Kaiser’s “Plea against the 
Theater-Auschwitz” in the centrist Süddeutsche Zeitung.362 Kaiser’s central argument against 
The Investigation is that its subject matter does not allow for aesthetic critique on the part of the 
audiences. Auschwitz, he writes, “explodes the boundaries of theatre, is plainly not consumable 
under the aesthetic conditions of the stage.”363 Kaiser argues that art must allow its audiences the 
freedom to judge the performance. Presenting Auschwitz on stage was an act of violence both 
against the theatre and the audience members who “have to cower under the violence of the 
facts.” Kaiser’s article betrays intense anxiety about the premiere through extended metaphors of 
impotence and sexual violence: the stage will be “raped” by the play, attending the performance 
will be like watching “a difficult abdominal operation,” the opening night will be a “premiere-
orgy.” 
Kaiser does not dispute the “facts” here, nor does he condemn the Frankfurt Auschwitz 
Trial. But he argues that the facts of the case get in the way of aesthetic judgment. It would be 
impossible, by his account, for a theatre critic to criticize a production of The Investigation in 
aesthetic terms because of the subject matter. His concern is that the audience will not be 
allowed to say “I don’t like that,” to leave at intermission, or to say “they should have cut that 
part about the bunker” because “such criticism would be pure shamelessness.” The thematic 
material deprives the audience of its capacity for judgment.  
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In some ways, Kaiser’s description of the impossibility of critiquing the performance 
echoes Arendt’s discussion of testimony during the Eichmann Trial. Arendt describes how the 
judges could not bring themselves to challenge the testimony of survivors, for, 
Who were they, humanly speaking, to deny any of these people their day in court? And 
who would have dared, humanly speaking, to question their veracity as to detail when 
then they “poured out their hearts as they stood in the witness box,” when though what 
they had to tell could only “be regarded as by-products of the trial.”?364  
But Arendt suggests that it is precisely through theatre and in the “transforming realm of poetry” 
that we gain the freedom to discuss and judge suffering. Kaiser also refers to the impossibility of 
fully narrating and judging the Holocaust in courtroom, implying that the Holocaust simply 
cannot be spoken of or judged. To charge the theatre with the task is unfair—how, he asks, “can 
the theatre be expected to achieve what the trials and reports could not.” Bringing Auschwitz to 
the stage does not help to come to terms with the past, it simply makes more innocent people 
suffer. Kaiser offers a hypothetical story about an innocent young couple who walk into The 
Investigation thinking that it will be a detective play: 
These young people, all dressed up, have plans to meet friends after the show for a beer. 
They then watch an actor tell a true story about starving people who, in the grey eternity 
of the bunker, swallow their own fingers. Is that somehow coming to terms with the past? 
The Bild Zeitung was one of many publications that took up Kaiser’s argument and  condemned 
Weiss for writing about a theme that allegedly prohibited criticism, and therefore robbed 
audience members of their freedom, calling  this “terrorism of opinion” (“Meinungterror”).365 
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 The effect that The Investigation would have on audience members was a central 
concern to every theatre. Many directors and journalists also sought to emphasize that this play 
could not be “consumed,” as Kaiser put it, like usual play. One of the earliest critics to discuss 
The Investigation was Siegfried Melchinger in his radio commentary on August 13, 1965. He 
pleads that Auschwitz not be integrated into usual theatrical production (and consumption): “To 
me, it seems unbearable that The Investigation should appear next to A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream in season schedules.”366 From the beginning of the production process, The Investigation 
was distanced from usual theatre transactions in the open call for theatres to join in the premiere, 
and in Weiss and his publisher’s decision to donate all royalties directly to a foundation for 
survivors of the camps. In debates about The Investigation before its premiere, Auschwitz was 
spoken of as something sacrosanct, whose memory would be irreparable damaged through 
theatrical representation. At the same time, though, there was little concern or regard paid to how 
survivors might receive the play; critics were concerned with what the play would do to German 
audiences who confronted Auschwitz for the first time in the theatre. 
In their attempt to distance The Investigation from theatre as usual, theatre houses used a 
variety of tactics. Each theatre first, had to decide how to present The Investigation in the context 
of a usual theatre season and how to prevent (or ensure) that people unprepared for the play’s 
substance would find themselves in the audience. Many of the theatres that participated in the 
premiere had ticketing policies that included subscriptions. In West Germany, as in Germany 
today, the audience members who purchase subscriptions are usually more conservative than 
those who buy tickets for individual performances, but also more reliable as an audience base.  
The decisions of the theatres in Cologne, Stuttgart, and Essen not to include The Investigation in 
their subscriptions can be read as a calculation to avoid angering theater-goers unprepared to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




engage with the material.367 In some of these cases, the idea that Auschwitz needed to remain 
above the normal machinery of the theatre actually weakened the force of the play. By 
segregating The Investigation from the rest of the season, producers were able to avoid precisely 
the situation that Kaiser foresaw: a young couple out for a good time, confronted by their 
nation’s past. As numerous commentators suggested after the premiere, none of the people who 
really needed to see The Investigation went to see it.368   
There were few dissenters from the idea that theatrical presentation would profane 
Auschwitz. Most of The Investigation’s directors disavowed the theatricality of the event. During 
a podium discussion after a performance at the Munich Kammerspiel, only one discussant 
questioned this opinion. Reinhard Baumgart argued: 
It has been said that one should not have an intermission during this play because it 
would be awkward if people drank beer during it.  I find that received wisdom to be 
completely unproductive and perhaps even somewhat hypocritical. We all encountered 
Auschwitz before Peter Weiss, we have read books by Hannah Arendt, or Reitlinger, or, 
twenty years ago, Kogon’s SS-State—and we drink beer after that as well.369 
Baumgart suggests that the insistence that one cannot drink beer during The Investigation misses 
the point of the play. The play is not supposed to be a punishment of the audience, it is supposed 
to urge them to think and judge. Brecht might add that is it the relaxed, beer drinking audience 
who is best able to judge the actions taking place on stage.  
Of the directors, Piscator was the only one actively to promote the idea that The 
Investigation should be presented as theater. In his Christ und Welt article, Ingée recounts one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 “Drei Fragen an Funf Intendanten,” Die Zeit,  October 29, 1965.	  
368 George Salmony “Auschwitz-Drama uraufgefüht: Für wen ermittelte Peter Weiss?” Abendzeitung, October 21, 
1965.	  




episode during the rehearsals when Piscator demanded of his actors: “We have to create theatre 
here” (“Es muß hier Theater gepielt werden”). One of the actors playing a defendant 
contradicted him: “But it’s not theatre!” A debate ensued in which Piscator was able to convince 
the cast that The Investigation was indeed theatre. 370   Not only did Piscator stage The 
Investigation as theatre, but he used the premiere of The Investigation as a celebration of 
theatre’s political potential. In other words, it was important to him that everyone, actors, 
audience, reporters, recognize what was happening before their eyes as theatre. As the program 
book emphasizes, the premiere of the The Investigation marked the 75-year anniversary of the 
Freie Volksbühne. During the speeches before the performance, the Chairman of the Freie 
Volksbühne, SPD politician Günther Abendroth spoke about the disjuncture between the 
celebration and the theme of the play: “genocide in Auschwitz was something incomparable, 
something that cannot be understood with received concepts. And now we are simultaneously 
commemorating the founding of our organization and some may ask, is it still possible, after 
Auschwitz, to have celebrations in Germany.” Adendroth suggests that job of contemporary 
critical (zeitkritisch) theatre is essential now more than ever. This theatre is a service to humanity, 
“a humanity that had become so rare in our people (Volk) and that we need to find once more for 
a peaceful future.” 371  
For Piscator, it was not theatre in general, but the specific theatre of the Freie Volksbühne 
that could help Germany find this humanity. Like Arendt in her condemnation of outpourings of 
cheap sentimentality, Piscator did not want his production to allow audiences to simply purge 
themselves of guilt through a moment of catharsis. In his program notes, Piscator writes,  
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Why is the conclusion of the Frankfurt Trial and of the play The Investigation 
unsatisfying? 
Because the catharsis is missing: the sublimation, cleansing, and lifting of the soul 
through regret and sympathy. 
It is missing, because the regret of the perpetrators is missing. 372 
One reviewer noted that Piscator had hung signs asking the audience not to applaud.373 By 
forestalling applause, Piscator did not allow the audience to distance themselves from the 
oratorio, they were themselves implicated in the trial and were meant to distinctly feel a lack of 
catharsis or resolution that would allow them to leave the theatre and put the past behind them.  
While Piscator’s production of The Investigation was in line with Brecht’s anti-cathartic 
conception of Epic Theatre, it also responded to a very different German theatrical tradition. In 
the program of The Investigation, Piscator used the imagery of the Passion to describe the 
relationship between theatre and the Holocaust: “Here, theatre truly re-enters the cultic realm 
from which it sprung. It returns from the realm of the purely aesthetic” to become a “ritual of 
unfathomable fate, the most harrowing, meaningless Passion in world history.”374 Later in the 
same essay, Piscator explicitly names the victims of this Passion, arguing that through the play 
we understand that despite the excuses about chain of command there was never actually deadly 
pressure to murder Jews. By connecting his production of The Investigation to the ritual of the 
passion play, Piscator not only emphasizes the centrality of Jews in the production, but also 
proposes to reverse the terms of one of Germany’s most notoriously anti-Semitic folk genres. For 
Piscator, creating theatre about Auschwitz was a way to question and shift modes of cultural 
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production. It was not just I.G. Farben, but also the Oberammergau Passion plays that bore 
responsibility for the Holocaust.  
Piscator contrasts the tradition passion play to his own theatre, which seek to be a “moral 
institution in Schiller’s sense.” He writes that,  
As long as we have not completely accounted for our past, as long as we try to bracket 
our past from our present and future… the task of political theatre will be to recapitulate 
the unresolved…theatre cannot remain neutral and distanced, even when it runs the risk 
of certain artistic inadequacies. 375 
Piscator, believes that his theatre can teach audiences how to judge. In his essay in the program, 
Piscator discusses and rejects Kaiser’s argument that The Investigation would rob spectators of 
their freedom of opinion. Instead, Piscator insists that the play itself is about freedom of opinion 
and action, demonstrating that “in spite of all of the talk about ‘superior orders’ [the defendants] 
had the freedom to made moral decisions.” By showing that the defendants had a responsibility 
to morally judge and reject their genocidal orders, the projection encourages the audience to 
judge, 
The freedom of the spectator in respect to the facts is not restricted: he can define his own 
moral responsibility unhindered; he can make himself a witness or a defendant; he can 
become a juror, who wants to come to his judgment.376 
Piscator argues that modern drama has become increasingly successful and political by 
emphasizing individual responsibility. Documentary plays by Hochhuth, Kipphardt and Weiss all 
challenge the “prevailing myth that people are just anonymous members of a uniform mass, and 
have no choice but to swim along with the crowd.” (mitschwimmen) The interest in for the 
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possibility of individual judgment “led Hochhuth to find new heros, Kipphardt in his 
Oppenheimer to make visible the conflict between different ‘loyalties’ (to the state… as opposed 
to humanity).” Weiss in turn, shows that “the comforting and fatal excuse of ‘superior orders’ is 
flawed, that there wasn’t actually deadly pressure to murder Jews.” Documentary theatre teaches 
best when it teaches about specifics because it teaches the facts of one particular case, but it also 






Show Trials and the War on Terror 
 
The plays and productions that I discussed in the preceding pages were written in a 
different era than ours. The major political trials that occurred during Arendt, Brecht, Piscator, 
and Weiss’s lifetimes can all be categorized as show trials. By this I mean that they were trials 
that used the courtroom as a stage to present evidence to a broad public. In the Nuremberg Trials 
this evidence took the form of thousands of pages of documents, in the Eichmann Trial it was 
personal testimony, and in the Stalinist Trials in Moscow and the House Un-American Activities 
Committee it was public confession. All of these trials were recorded and broadcast as widely as 
contemporary technology would allow. The governments that prosecuted these cases touted their 
evidence, even when the evidence was extremely suspect. This has changed. In its War on Terror, 
the United States has shown little inclination to prosecute detainees and with the policy of 
infinite detention, evidence is no longer at a premium. When detainees are prosecuted, the 
United States does not widely publicize its evidence against them; in the current Guantanamo 
Hearings, presenting evidence against the detainees has also meant presenting evidence of the 
torture through which it was gathered. 
Accompanying this fear of evidence, we have seen an increase in secrecy and in 
retribution for leaked government documents. Bloomberg News reported that under Obama 
administration, more government officials had been prosecuted using the Espionage Act of 1917 
than during the administrations of all of his predecessors combined.377 Part of the fear, no doubt, 
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is connected to the Internet. The problem is not that there are more spies secreting away 
documents for foreign powers, but that documents today can instantly become public and widely 
accessible. There is a new stage for presenting evidence, and it is one that states cannot easily 
control. 
It is no surprise that the United States should try to conceal evidence of the crimes of its 
own soldiers. The Abu Ghraib photos, the video of American soldiers urinating on the bodies of 
dead Afghans, the WikiLeaks video of a helicopter strike on civilians, and many other photos 
and videos taken by soldiers have presented serious challenges to the United States’ credibility 
and justifications for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is surprising, though, is the extent 
to which secrecy is becoming a goal in and of itself. Whereas in the golden age of Cold War 
espionage, trials went out of their way to showcase evidence, it seems today that any publicity is 
bad publicity. A recent op-ed by David Carr published in the New York Times describes the 
strange ways that the United States is prosecuting its case against Bradley Manning, the soldier 
who published a number of “classified” documents highlighting illegal acts by American soldiers 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the trial, the government has sought to reveal as little 
evidence as possible as a course of policy, even when it is evidence which they have little to gain 
from suppressing. The trial is, in fact, open and reporters can watch the proceedings. Although 
the proceedings are not secret, transcripts are not released—it is an open trial, but not a public 
one. Documents that have been released are heavily redacted in ways that, according to Carr are 
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“mystifying at best and at times almost comic.” Of the redacted details, one was the name of the 
judge who had been presiding over the case for months.378 
Brecht, Piscator, and Weiss conceived of their trial plays in relation to public trials aimed 
to show and expose. Their theatre was linked to the theatricality of the trials themselves.  What 
sort of trial theatre might we see when trials cease to be shows? “Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal pp. 002954-003064: A Public Reading” gives one answer.  This performance, created 
by Andrea Geyer, Sharon Hayes, Ashley Hunt, Katya Sander, and David Thorne, involves a 
four-hour reading of unedited transcripts from eighteen tribunals held at Guantanamo. Premiered 
at Documenta 12 in 2007, and performed at venues including the Museum of Modern Art in New 
York, the piece emphasizes that it is a reading rather than theatre. The transcripts are unedited, 
and the readers in each performance are primarily academics rather than artists or actors. In the 
performance that I attended, very few of those reading attempted to read in character, and the 
readers would switch their respective roles as prosecutors, defendants, translators, etc. between 
each hearing. Few audience members, if any, stay for the entire four-hour performance. The 
emphasis of the piece is on presenting the transcript itself. According to the press release, the 
artist group,  
understands the performance as a simple yet urgent gesture towards making these 
tribunals public by presenting the transcripts word for word. The readings offer insight 
into the complicated geopolitical landscape in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2001 
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and 2005, and aim to expose the contradictory and problematic processes the U.S. 
military has used in capturing, detaining, and classifying so-called “enemy combatants.379  
The performance “presents,” “offers insight,” and “exposes.” At a time when trials themselves 
fail to present, offer insight, or expose the complexities of war this is certainly a welcome 
intervention. But in showing and demonstrating, there are other things that the performance does 
not do. It is not coincidental that the performance has taken place primary in museums and art 
fairs: the performance is about the transcript as object, not about staging.  
 The reading makes the transcript public, but it does not quite create a public, which is the 
possibility that Arendt saw in theatre. Arendt teaches us that we lose something when we lose 
theatre. We hear speech, but no voice comes through. We lose the voice of the storyteller and the 
voice of the actor, and we also lose each other when we do not live through a full story together. 
Archives and documents never speak for themselves; looking back to Brecht, Piscator, and 
Weiss can help us consider how we might begin to stage them today. 
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